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Introduction
This Article represents my commitment to the lifting of veils. It
examines the veils created by the form of racism typical in college
athletics-a persistent, unconscious racism nourished by fraudu-
lent stereotypes and myths. As discussed below, the dearth of
scholarship concerning the adverse implications of racism for Afri-
can-Americans' involved in college sport underscores the impor-
tance of beginning a candid dialogue on racism in sport.
I also posit, however, that the significance of this Article tran-
scends the bounds of sport. An examination of racism in college
sport provides an opportunity for a discussion in a discrete context
of the larger social significance of unconscious racism. Indeed this
Article suggests that such a discourse reveals that racial justice for
African-Americans in college athletics, as in society, remains illu-
1. My focus on African-Americans is not intended to suggest that racism in sport
does not adversely impact other racial groups. Indeed it does in ways ranging from
the stereotyping of Native Americans as mascots and team names to exclusionary
practices exercised against Hispanics. See JAY J. COAKLEY, THE SocILowY OF
SPORT 256-62 (1994) (discussing the impact of racism in sport on racial minorities
other than African-Americans and noting the need for more detailed study).
My focus on African-Americans derives from recognition of the substantial impor-
tance attached to sport in the African-American community. As discussed below,
sport has helped significantly in framing the career aspirations of many African-
Americans, particularly males, many of whom perceive it as a vehicle for financial
success. Such beliefs have broad implications for the African-American community.
These ascribed beliefs also provide evidence of the continued presence of racism in
sport. See infra part II.B.
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sive, absent recognition of the impact of racism.2 Racism in sport
thus represents a reflection of the pathology that pervades our so-
ciety in general.
Since it represents a microcosm of American society 3 sport pro-
vides a useful paradigm for examining certain themes appearing in
critical race literature.4 One such theme is challenging stereotypes
employed by dominant groups to justify racial subordination.5
With respect to college sport, this theme also requires exploration
of the pernicious nature of stereotypes. Particular attention will be
devoted to the stereotypes that nourish the dominant mindset that
perpetuates racism in college sport.
The second theme that emerges in critical race literature which
will be examined in this Article is the notion of colorblindness.
College sport also provides an appropriate vehicle for examining
this theme6 and assessing the propriety of race-based remedial al-
2. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blin4 But Now I See," White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 953, 956 (1993) (not-
ing the argument of Alexander Aleinikoff that racial justice cannot be attained unless
we recognize the impact of race); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Con-
sciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1113-25 (1991).
3. See, e.g., D. STALEY ErrzEN & GEORGE H. SAGE, SOCIOLoGY OF NORTH
AmERiCAN SPORT 17 (5th ed. 1993) (Sport provides a useful institution for examining
the complexities of the larger society since it represents a microcosm of the society in
which it is embedded); Ben Lombardo, The Harlem Globetrotters and the Perpetua-
tion of the Black Stereotype, 35 PHYSICAL EDUCATOR 60 (1978) (Inasmuch as sport
represents a microcosm of society, racism is a problem in athletics just as in the rest of
American society).
4. Critical race scholarship has been defined as challenging the universality of
white experience/judgment as the authoritative standard that binds people of color
and normatively measures, directs, controls and regulates the terms of proper
thought, expression, presentment, and behavior. As represented by legal scholars,
critical race theory challenges the dominant discourse on race and racism as they re-
late to law. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. Rnv.
2129, 2160-61 (1992).
A comprehensive bibliography of critical race literature appears in Richard Del-
gado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L.
REv. 461 (1993). See also Flagg, supra note 2, at 955 n.15 (listing recent critical race
scholarship).
5. Challenging myths and stereotypes is one of the several themes which Profes-
sor Delgado has identified as appearing in the writings of critical race scholars. Rich-
ard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv.
95, 96 n.4 (1990). See Calmore, supra note 4, at 2160-68 (summarizing the central
themes of critical race scholarship).
6. Calmore, supra note 4, at 2161 n.107 (noting how critical race theory unmasks
themes in mainstream legal discourse, including the notion of colorblindness); see
Delgado, supra note 5, at 95-96 n.4.
In the context of constitutional doctrine, the colorblindness principle disapproves of
the use of race-specific criterion of decisionmaking regardless of the "race of the deci-
1995]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ternatives. Both of the identified issues-stereotypes and color-
blindness-are prevalent in critical race scholarship.7 In this
regard, the Article briefly addresses colorblindness as it relates to
the impact of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 8
rules and regulations on African-Americans. 9 Moreover, color-
blindness becomes relevant to remedial alternatives aimed at ame-
liorating the adverse consequences of racism in college sport.10
Rather than merely focusing on the foregoing themes, this Arti-
cle more broadly examines the role of race in denying equality of
opportunity to black participants involved in college sport. In so
doing, I propose that college sport serves as a metaphor for the
racism encountered by African-Americans in our society.1
sion-maker or of the persons respectively advantaged or burdened by that criterion."
Flagg, supra note 2, at 1005. Professor Flagg adds that the principle of colorblindness
can often be viewed as representing an expression of the liberal notion of personal
autonomy. As such, it disapproves of holding persons responsible for personal char-
acteristics such as race or gender over which they have no control. Id. at 1011.
Professor Bryan Fair argues that the most critical problem in the twenty-first cen-
tury will be the issue of colorblindness. Bryan K. Fair, Forward: Rethinking the Color-
blindness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1993). Critically, he adds that
colorblindness models ignore the racial subordination which we encounter daily and
permit us to ignore the racism which infects us all. Id. at 9-11. Moreover, he con-
cludes that as currently used, colorblindness is "confusing and counterintuitive." Id.
at 64-68. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in
Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1152 (1993) (discussing the illusions
of fairness as well as the harm to minorities ensuing from a race neutral model. Pro-
fessor Delgado concludes that "facially neutral laws would still fail to redress most
racism because of the cultural background against which such laws operate.").
A delineation of other literature concerning race consciousness is found in Fair,
supra at note 3, n.17.
7. The notion of colorblindness is another of the topics examined in critical race
literature. Delgado, supra note 5, at 96, n.4.
8. The National Collegiate Athletic Association consists of approximately 950
four-year colleges and universities. Thomas R. Ostdiek, Comment, LB 69: Need
Based Financial Aid for College Athletes, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 729, 738 (1992). As
articulated in its constitution, the primary purpose of the NCAA "is to maintain inter-
collegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as
an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarca-
tion between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." 1994-95 NCAA
CONST. art. 1, § 1.3.1, at 1, in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssoCIATION
NCAA MANUAL [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
9. Detailed examination of the issue of colorblindness in the context of college
sport is reserved for a planned sequel to this Article. Nevertheless the skeleton out-
line of the analysis which I plan to undertake is set forth infra Part IMl.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity:
A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 356 (1988) (commenting
that although baseball numerically provides a small example, it serves as both meta-
phor and example).
[Vol. XXII
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Much of the backdrop against which this metaphor is explored is
provided by the recent initiatives of the Black Coaches Association
(BCA).'2 Underlying the BCA's concerns are questions relating to
the extent to which alleged inequities are the end product of the
continued presence.of racism in collegiate athletics.13 I conclude
that the BCA's actions are derived in large part from tensions sur-
rounding the enigmatic role of African-Americans in college sport
and the crucial supporting role played by unconscious racism.
The notion that racism plays a central role in college sport is not
novel. For example, when examining the components of organized
American sport, sociologists typically speak of the long-standing
and pervasive presence of racism in college athletics. 14 Notwith-
standing what appears to be a presumption, legal scholars have de-
voted scant discourse to the legal ramifications of such racism.
Particularly in this context, given accusations of discrimination
against African-American participants, the failure of legal scholars
to address the myriad issues related to racism in college athletics is
as surprising as it is neglectful.' 5
12. The Black Coaches Association is comprised of approximately 3,000 African-
American high school and college athletic coaches. Debra E. Blum, Eyes on the
Prize, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 13, 1994, at A33, A34. Spawned by frustration
emanating from being relegated to outsider status, the BCA was initially created to
address hiring practices at NCAA institutions. Id. at 34; Dana Brooks and Ronald
Althouse, Racial Imbalance in Coaching and Managerial Positions, in RACISM IN COL-
LEGE A-m.nncs: mT AmicAN-AMEmcAN AmHLm's ExPERIENCE 101, 128 (Dana
Brooks & Ronald Althouse eds., 1993)[hereinafter RACIsM IN COLLEGE ATHLEmCS].
The organization's expanded agenda encompasses a myriad of issues which affect
people of color in intercollegiate athletics. IaS; Blum, supra at A34.
13. See Blum, supra note 12, at A33 (noting that some members of the BCA view
their efforts as directed toward eliminating racism in college sport).
14. George H. Sage, Introduction, in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS, supra note
12, at 1, 3. See Alison Dewar, Intergroup Race Relations: Success or Failure?, in RA-
CISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETIcs, supra note 12, at 225, 230 (emphasizing a historical
pattern of exclusion and oppression in sports); Lombardo, supra note 3, at 60 (ac-
knowledging racism is a problem in athletics just as in the rest of American society);
Lodis Rhodes & Johnny S. Butler, Sport and Racism.. A Contribution to Theory
Building in Race Relations, 55 Soc. Sci. Q. 919, 922 (1975) (noting the significant
extent to which racism has impacted the participation of black athletes throughout the
history of organized American sport activity); D. Stanley Eitzen & David C. Sanford,
The Segregation of Blacks by Playing Position in Footbal" Accident or Design?, 55
Soc. Sci. Q. 948 (1975) (agreeing with those who conclude that racial discrimination
in organized sport, including college sport, limits opportunities for blacks in playing,
officiating, coaching and administering).
15. A few legal scholars have indirectly raised the question of race in the context
of the impact of NCAA initial eligibility rules on African-American student-athletes.
No one appears, however, to have directly addressed the broader dimensions of the
issue of racism in college sport. See, e.g., Chad Baruch & Edward 0. Cassidy, Jr.,
Technical Foul" The Legality and Wisdom of NCAA Academic Requirements, 20 LIN-
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Upon reflection, however, commentators' reluctance to engage
in dialogue which directly addresses the consequences of racism
and the harm it inflicts upon African-Americans involved in organ-
ized sport is unremarkable. It is an illustration of America's aver-
sion to confronting directly the question of race in the context of
sport.16 A noteworthy example of this reticence occurred in 1991.
After examining what it purported to be the critical issues con-
fronting intercollegiate athletics, the Knight Foundation's Commis-
sion on Intercollegiate Athletics17 released a report that concluded
that abuses such as the compromise of academic integrity war-
ranted major reforms and structural changes in college sport. 8
Not only was the impact of racism on black student-athletes not
cor. L. REV. 71 (1991); Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Aca-
demic Integrity or Racism, 28 ST. Louis U. LJ. 101 (1984); Deborah E. Klein &
William B. Briggs, Proposition 48 and the Business of Intercollegiate Athletics: Poten-
tialAntitrust Ramifications Under the Sherman Act, 67 DENv. U. L. REv. 301, 306 n.29
(1990); Michael R. Lufrano, The NCAA's Involvement in Setting Academic Standards:
Legality and Desirability, 4 SETON HALL. J. SPORT L. 97 (1994); Ray Yasser, The
Black Athletes' Equal Protection Case Against the NCAA 's New Academic Standards,
19 GONZ. L. REv. 83 (1983/84); See also Timothy Davis, Ross v. Creighton University:
Seventh Circuit Recognition of Limited Judicial Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics,
17 S. ILL. U. L. 85, 101-102 (1992); Rodney K. Smith, An Academic Game Plan for
Reforming Big-Tume Intercollegiate Athletics, 67 DENv. U. L. Rv. 213, 226 (1990)
(noting the unintended racism and classism in the funding of nonrevenue sports by
funds generated to a large extent by minority athletes in revenue-producing sports).
While enlightening, these discussions fail to comprehensively examine the signifi-
cance of race in college sport and its relationship to racial issues which arise in general
in American society. It is also conceivable, however, that the dearth of legal scholar-
ship reflects the disincentive traditionally associated with directly dealing with race.
See generally Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. Rnv. 561 (1984).
Recognizing a similar failure in social science literature, historian Donald Spivey
views the failure of scholars to seriously study the history of blacks in intercollegiate
athletics as a lost opportunity to "understand an important dimension of African-
American intellectual history, the nature and development of the modem civil rights
struggle, and the black protest movement." Donald Spivey, The Black Athlete in Big-
Time Intercollegiate Sports, 1941-1968, 44 PHY..ON 116 (1983).
16. One commentator sadly acknowledges that the issue of racism in college sport
has only recently been discussed. "We seemed to think we could ignore or get away
from one of the most tumultuous issues of our time." Richard Lapchick, Finally a
Small Step in the Right Direction, SPoRTmo NEWS, Jan. 31, 1994, at 8. The recent
surge of interest is attributed in significant part to the actions of the BCA which has
focused attention on racism. Id.
17. In 1989, the Knight Foundation (a philanthropic foundation) created a com-
mission to propose a reform agenda for intercollegiate athletics. See Krinrrr FOUN-
DATION, COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIcS, REPORT. KEEPING FAITH
WITH THE STUDENT-ATHLETE-A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, V
(1991) [hereinafter KNoIHr COMMSSION REPORT].
18. See generally KNiOTrr CONMISSION REPORT, supra note 17.
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identified as a major issue, the Commission referred only indirectly
to racism's influence in college sport.19
The reluctance of the Knight Commission and others to discuss
racism in sport is consistent with a general predilection not to ex-
plore the social conditions that influence sport in American soci-
ety. Indeed, American society seems content to remain in blissful
ignorance of the numerous factors, such as social class, race and
gender, that influence college athletics.2° In a recent article, I con-
cluded that our tendency to romanticize college athletics by relying
on myths, such as the principle of amateurism, perpetuates a false
model which fails to comport with the present day social, economic
and legal realities of intercollegiate athletics.21 The comfort appar-
ently arising from ignoring such issues does not, however, negate
the reality of sport as a cultural practice that is not separate from
the "social, economic, political, and cultural context in which it is
situated.''22
Reluctance to address directly the role of racism in college ath-
letics also reflects differing perceptions. Unlike blacks, many white
Americans refuse to acknowledge race as a factor that influences
sport . 3 The popular belief of athletics as a venue that provides a
19. Only four indirect references to the issue of racism in college sport are con-
tained in the KNIGirr COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17. The Report notes: Sports
have aided in breaking down bigotry and prejudice in American life; the need to
expand grants-in-aid to student-athletes from low-income groups; and on two occa-
sions reaffirms the general principle that student-athletes should be treated fairly
whether male or female, majority or minority. KmNGHT CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra
note 17, at x-19. See Audwin Anderson & Donald South, Racial Differences in Col-
legiate Recruiting, Retention, and Graduation Rates, in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLm'-
ics, supra note 12, at 79, 82-83 (identifying critically the Knight Commission's indirect
references to racism in college sport).
20. Sage, supra note 14, at 2.
21. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting
Realities, 25 RuTG. LJ. 269 (1994).
22. Sage, supra note 14, at 2. Thus a true understanding of college sport is a result
of understanding the societal forces of which it is a part. Id. at 2-3.
Anderson & South, supra note 19, at 82-83 (arguing that "if big-time college athlet-
ics is going to solve its much publicized problems and dilemmas, it also must face
honestly the issues and implications of race relations.").
23. A series of surveys conducted in 1991 by USA Today confirmed this conclu-
sion. The survey noted the gap between the beliefs of whites and blacks as to the
impact of racism in sport. A majority of the African-Americans surveyed believe that
prejudice remains a component of sport. Most whites, on the other hand, concluded it
is no longer a factor. Jim Myers, Race Still a Player: Stereotypes Pit Ability vs. Intel-
lect, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 1991, at 1A. For example, 73 percent of blacks believe
that racism limits coaching opportunities for African-Americans, while only 31 per-
cent of whites shared in this view. Race in Sports: A Black-and-White Issue, USA
TODAY, Dec. 18, 1992, at 3C.
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level playing field where athletic attainment prevails over bigoted,
discriminatory attitudes and conduct contributes to this notion.
Given this background, a central purpose of this Article is to ini-
tiate and to lay the foundation for what I hope will be a continuing
dialogue concerning the innumerable legal issues invoked by the
continuing presence of racism in college sport.24 I begin by exam-
ining the historical25 and present-day manifestations of racism in
college athletics. Part I of this Article gives a detailed examination
of the formal and informal rules that excluded and otherwise lim-
ited opportunities for blacks in organized college sport. Building
upon the notion of interest convergence,26 this Article posits that
economic considerations were one of the significant influences
leading to the eventual end of segregation in college sport.
Drawing from the work of critical race scholars, I argue that in
contrast to the Jim Crow era, the racism currently residing within
college sport is subtle. Therefore, it is more difficult to identify.
Nevertheless, Part II of this Article demonstrates that today's un-
conscious racism is premised largely on the same stereotypes and
assumptions that effectively excluded African-Americans from
sport participation during most of the history of organized college
athletics. 27 Moreover, the racism persisting in the modern inter-
collegiate athletic enterprise, though more illusive, continues to in-
See Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L.
REv. 295, 304 (1990) (noting the disparity in perceptions between blacks and whites
on issues of race). See also infra text accompanying notes 103-23.
24. As noted above, these issues include the impact of racism on other ethnic
minorities.
25. A historical perspective is important inasmuch as racism as it currently exists
can only be interpreted in light of the historical experience of the oppressed. Del-
gado, supra note 6, at 1153-54 (criticizing race neutral rules as deficient in that they
ignore the past and focus on the present so as to employ a "freeze frame" sort of
approach). See also Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Recon-
structive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. Rv. 985 (1990);
Wendy R. Brown, The Convergence of Neutrality and Choice: The Limits of the State's
Affirmative Duty to Provide Equal Educational Opportunity, 60 TlNN. L. Rav. 63(1992) [hereinafter Neutrality and Choice].
26. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
27. See discussion infra especially text accompanying notes 149-61.
28. The persistence of racism in college sport mirrors its continued presence in our
society. Indeed, Professor Derrick Bell concludes that racism in America is not a
temporary phenomenon that the nation desires to cure. He contends that racism is
permanent. Professor Bell further states, "racism is an integral, permanent, and inde-
structible component of this society." Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis:
Courageous Revelation or Unconscious Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. Rev.
571, 573 (1993).
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flict educational, social, economic and psychological damage on
African-American participants. 9
Part III identifies the injuries unconscious racism causes to Afri-
can-American coaches, administrators and student-athletes. In this
regard, the concerns voiced by the BCA provide a framework for
analyzing the extent to which racism results in injury to African-
American participants at the various levels of intercollegiate ath-
letics. This Article also examines, in detail, the adverse impact of
unconscious racism to the academic interests of African-American
student-athletes. Contending that this impact is significant, Part IV
of this Article explores alternatives that may aid in remediating
this harm. In particular, it discusses the utility of contract as an
antidiscrimination norm to combat unconscious racism.
L Historical Background
A. Early Years: Exclusion and Overt Discrimination
Critical race theorists recognize the importance of the reinter-
pretation of history by legal scholars of color.30 The impediments
to full participation in intercollegiate sport currently encountered
by African-Americans cannot be appreciated apart from the histor-
ical and social context from which those impediments spring.31 In-
deed, the discrimination encountered by African-Americans in
college sport has never been independent of the discrimination en-
countered by blacks in society in general.32 Accordingly, an histor-
ical account of the influence of racism in college sport is an
appropriate point of departure.
Since the first intercollegiate competition in 1852,33 black ath-
letes' involvement in college sport has been marked by racial dis-
crimination and prejudice. 34 The attitudes and assumptions that
29. See infra part 1I.
30. See, e.g., George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the
Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 555
(1994) (reinterpreting the Mexican-American litigation experience).
31. See Neutrality and Choice, supra note 25, at 124. Professor Brown and other
race scholars argue that a decontextualized approach to civil rights litigation ignores
historical and social influences. Moreover, by focusing on process-oriented reasoning,
a decontextualized approach tends, inter alia, to delimit the impact of structural ra-
cism in American society. Il at 69, 124.
32. Neutrality and Choice, supra note 25, at 69.
33. HOWARD J. SAVAGE, AmERICAN COLLEGE AmT.mics 17 (1929) (identifying
an 1852 crew match between Harvard and Yale as the first intercollegiate com-
petition).
34. Sage, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that racism has been a salient feature from
the very beginnings of organized college athletics).
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subordinated blacks in society in general fostered exclusionary
conduct and blatant discrimination against black athletes during
most of the history of college athletics.35
1. Formal Rules of Exclusion
During the late Nineteenth and early TWentieth Centuries, le-
gally countenanced segregation impacted virtually every aspect of
social behavior and interaction, including sport.36 In college sport,
a series of rules and customs limited black participation to histori-
cally black colleges and a few predominantly white colleges located
in the northern United States.3 7
In the South, prohibitions against blacks attending white colleges
and universities effectively excluded the black athlete from playing
for predominantly white southern institutions.38 Moreover, Jim
Crow laws enacted to prohibit whites and blacks from social inter-
action extended to bar direct sporting competition between them.
For example, a Texas Penal Code provision, enacted in 1933, pro-
hibited "boxing, sparring or wrestling contest or exhibition be-
tween any person of the Caucasian or 'White' race and one of the
35. The unfair and discriminatory treatment afforded black athletes in both col-
legiate and professional sport during the latter years of the nineteenth century were
the result of "the dominant culture's belief in black inferiority, general deterioration
of black rights, and eventual separation of the races in late-nineteenth-century
America." David K. Wiggins, Critical Events Affecting Racism in Athletics, in RACISM
IN COLLEGE ATHLETCS, supra note 12, at 23, 25.
36. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whis4 Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why
Integration Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CA. L. REv. 1401, 1409 (1993). One
writer aptly described the pervasive reach of segregationist laws:
The most conspicuous forms of racial segregation ... are in residential areas;
in educational, recreational, and other public institutions; in quasi-public or
privately operated institutions under public control, such as railroads, steam-
ship lines, streetcar and bus systems, and hospitals; in private business estab-
lishments, such as hotels and restaurants; and in other private commercial
and professional services, such as department stores, mortuary establish-
ments, and doctors' offices. These are the more common visible forms of
separation; actually it pervades, in some degree or other, practically the
whole range of social behavior.
1d. at 1409 n.25 (quoting MAURIcE R. DAVIE, NEGROES IN AMERICAN SocIErY 287
(1949)).
37. Sage, supra note 14, at 8; David K. Wiggins, Prized Performers, but Frequently
Overlooked Students: The Involvement of Black Athletes in Intercollegiate Sports on
Predominantly White University Campuses, 1890-1972, 62 REs. Q. FOR EXERCISE &
SPORT 164, 165 (1991).
38. See AnTm R. AsHE, JR., A HARD ROAD TO GLORY: A HISTORY OF THE
ARICAN-AMBRICAN ATmLET 1919-1945 56 (1988) (noting that the enactment of Jim
Crow laws along with racist customs eliminated any possibility for blacks to compete
for white colleges located in the South).
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African or 'Negro' race .... ,,39 Likewise, a 1932 Atlanta city ordi-
nance prohibited amateur baseball clubs of different races from
playing within two blocks of each other. °
More broadly written statutes prohibited any form of athletic
competition between whites and African-Americans. Legislative
Act 579 is illustrative. Enacted by the Louisiana legislature in
1956, the statute prohibited interracial sports participation.41
Although similar legislation was defeated in Mississippi,42 Missis-
sippi state institutions adopted an "unwritten but ironclad segrega-
tion policy. '43 That such a policy was adopted with respect to sport
may be explained by the fact that Mississippi led former states of
the Confederacy in enacting laws and policies to "ensure effective
apartheid.""
39. TEax. ART. 614-11(), Texas Penal Code (1933). This act was invalidated on
grounds that it'violated the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the U.S. Con-
stitution. I.H. 'Sporty' Harvey v. M.B. Morgan, 272 S.W.2d 621, 627-28 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. C. VAN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 117 (3d ed. 1974).
A Birmingham, Alabama ordinance similarly provided: "It shall be unlawful for a
Negro and a white person to play together, or in company with each other, in any
games of cards, dice, dominoes, checkers, baseball, softball, football, basketball, or
similar games." THoMAs E. FOREMAN, DISCRMINATION AGAINST THE NEoRO IN
AmERICAN AmTEncs 39 (1957). This ordinance was amended in 1954 to permit
professional football and baseball exhibitions with mixed teams. Id.
In Boyer v. Garrett, 88 F. Supp. 353 (D. Md. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 912 (1951), Baltimore's informal policies which main-
tained the racial segregation of athletic competitors was upheld pursuant to the estab-
lished practice of segregation and the precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. Joan Paul, et al., The Arrival and Ascendence of Black Athletes in the South-
eastern Conference, 1966-1980, 45 PHYLO 284 (1984). The stimulus for the enact-
ment of the statute was a controversy involving the 1955 Sugar Bowl which was
played in New Orleans. Efforts to prevent the University of Pittsburgh from playing
its sole black player in the contest against Georgia Tech set into motion events which
led to enactment of the legislation. FOREMAN, supra note 40, at 33-34.
Relying on the precedent established by Brown v. Board of Education, a federal
court invalidated this law in Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission, 168 F. Supp. 149
(E.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
42. Paul, et al, supra note 42, at 284. This action was taken following a game in
which Jones Junior College of Mississippi accepted an invitation to compete in the
Junior Rose Bowl Game in Pasadena, California against a Compton College team
which had several blacks in its lineup. FOREmAN, supra note 41, at 34 (also noting the
introduction into the Mississippi legislature of an act which barred college teams
within the state from competing against teams with black players).
43. Id. at 37. Mississippi legislators indicated they would withdraw funds if the
unwritten law was violated. Paul, et al., supra note 41, at 284. This threat was with-
drawn when 13 junior colleges in the state agreed informally not to engage in inte-
grated sports competition. FoREMAN, supra note 40, at 37.
44. Neutrality and Choice, supra note 25, at 74.
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One commentator observed, "What was left for blacks generally
was participation of black against black and the formation of Ne-
gro leagues. At a less organized level, it meant acceptance of the
Jim Crow laws which called for separate (but almost never equal)
playgrounds, public parks, swimming pools, and other recreational
facilities." 45 Under such a regime, the idea of competition in the
South between white and black collegians was out of the question.
2. Informal Rules of Discrimination
During the late Nineteenth and early TWentieth Centuries,
blacks played sports for a limited number of northern colleges such
as Harvard, Amherst and Oberlin." Informal rules reinforced by
social strictures, however, were as effective as legislation in limiting
the opportunities available to black athletes to compete at
predominantly white institutions outside of the South.
These informal limitations appeared in various guises. In some
instances, they were manifested as a virtual prohibition of African-
Americans from becoming student-athletes. For instance, few
black students competed in sports for Catholic universities, be-
cause most such institutions excluded African-Americans students
during this period.47 Often informal Jim Crow laws prohibited
blacks from playing sports for the schools that did admit black
students.
African-American students' experience at the University of Kan-
sas is illustrative. No formal Jim Crow laws were passed in the
state of Kansas.48 Nevertheless, the official policy of the University
attempted to minimize the presence of black students in order to
remove them from the mainstream of the school's social and extra-
45. JOHN A. LucAs & RONALD A. SMITH, SAGA OF AMERICAN SPORT 275 (1978).
46. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 166.
47. Id. at 166. Similarly, prestigious academic institutions and sports powerhouses
throughout the first half of the twentieth century such as Princeton, Yale and Notre
Dame did not allow blacks to compete on their sports teams. Notre Dame refused to
recruit black athletes until the early 1950's. Even though Yale admitted exceptional
black students, it resisted admitting black athletes. Princeton, due to historical ties to
southern society, did not admit black students. Consequently, it had no black athletes
competing on its athletic teams until 1944. Id.; AsHm, supra note 38, at 56. In 1941,
the U.S. Naval Academy, which had no blacks on its sports teams, banned a black
player on Harvard's lacrosse team from a game between the schools in Annapolis.
William A. Brower, Prejudice in Sports, 19 OPPORTUrNTY 260-261 (1941) (providing a
detailed account of the incident and its ramifications which included student protests
at Harvard).
48. Loren Miller, The Unrest Among College Students, 34 CaisiS 187 (1927).
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curricular activities.49 One historian notes, "Blacks were denied
practically every right except that of attending classes. ' 15 0 The Uni-
versity's denial of African-American students' rights to participate
in most extracurricular activities included the right to participate
on the University's athletic teams. The head of athletics at Kansas
in the 1930s insisted, "[N]o colored man will ever have a chance as
long as [he is there]."51 The situation at University of Kansas illus-
trates the lack of opportunity for black students to compete for
northern universities, which often paralleled those institutions' atti-
tudes and policies towards black students in general.52
The environment encountered by black students and student-
athletes at the University of Kansas was not unique. Certain ath-
letic conferences, such as the Missouri Athletic Conference (with
the exception of Nebraska)53 systematically excluded black athletes
pursuant to so-called "gentlemen's agreements" that prohibited
blacks from participating in league contests.5 4 These "gentlemen's
agreements" constituted a series of written rules or tacit under-
standings precluding black participation in organized sport.55
The reach and impact of "gentlemen's agreements" extended be-
yond the walls of the institutions that relied on them to exclude
black athletes. These agreements severely impacted the few black
athletes who were participating for northern universities.5 6 Prior to
49. Numerous prohibitions excluded African-American students from the social
life of the university. Black students could not attend university parties, proms and
dances; they were barred from using the school's swimming pools even when it was a
part of their physical education curriculum; they were not permitted to live in univer-
sity housing and they were excluded from literary, drama and glee societies and clubs.
Id.
50. RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE NEw NEGRO ON CAMPus: BLACK COLLEGE RE-
BE.LLoNs OF THE 1920s 316 (1975).
51. Miller, supra note 48, at 187.
52. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 166.
53. In 1914, the University of Nebraska withdrew from the conference after the
school refused to capitulate with demands not to allow a black athlete to play in a
game against Kansas. I. at 168. Such progressive attitudes were slower in the mak-
ing at other institutions. Student protest led to the desegregation of the Big Six Con-
ference (now known as the Big Eight) in the 1940's. Similarly, following a student
resolution protesting discriminatory practices, members of the Missouri Valley Con-
ference (Colorado, Iowa State, Kansas, Kansas State and Nebraska) voted in 1947 to
end racial discrimination at their institutions by 1950. The three year delay in imple-
mentation was deemed a necessary period of adjustment. Id. at 172.
54. I at 168; WOLT Rs, supra note 50, at 316 (noting that these schools also
"barred Negroes from their campuses" during the 1920's).
55. FOREMAN, supra note 40, at 1.
56. WOLTERs, supra note 50, at 316. Although gentlemen's agreements were
strictly enforced when southern teams played in the South, occasionally southern
teams would suspend the agreements when competing in the North against a school
1995]
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World War II, most northern teams with blacks on their rosters
either did not schedule games against southern teams or would
leave their African-American players at home when the team trav-
eled south.57 It has also been suggested that a promise to with-
draw voluntarily from games against southern schools was an
element of the consideration that some northern institutions ex-
tracted from their black athletes.58
Illustrations abound of northern schools forcing black players to
sit out games against southern teams. For instance, in 1916, Paul
Robeson, a member of Rutgers University's football team, was
barred from the field of play when Washington and Lee College
threatened not to play if he was allowed to participate.59 Such ra-
which had black players. Donald Spivey, "End Jim Crow in Sports". The Protest at
New York University, 1940-41, 15 J. SPORT Hisr. 282, 296 (1988).
57. FOREmAN, supra note 40, at 31.
58. Brower, supra note 47, at 263. Such promises amounted to precautionary
measures intended to obviate the embarrassment northern schools would encounter if
their black players protested their exclusion. Id
59. George Fislunan, Paul Robeson's Student Days and the Fight Against Racism at
Rutgers, 1969 FREEDOMWAYS 221 (providing a detailed account of this incident);
Rutgers did redeem itself a few years later when it stood by Robeson in the face of
threats by the University of West Virginia that its players would not take the field if
Robeson was permitted to compete. WOLTERS, supra note 50, at 316.
Similarly, in 1929, a star black halfback for New York University was withheld from
participating in a football game because of the University of Georgia's protest. Wig-
gins, supra note 37, at 169. The glee with which segregationists applauded this form of
racial discrimination is captured in the following remarks: "The Georgians exulted,
'even the most powerful binoculars could not discern the nigger in the grid pile' and
congratulated [NYU's] coach Mechan for inventing 'such a terrible injury-a dam-
aged acromioclavicular ligament-to meet such a delicate emergency."' WOLTERS,
supra note 50, at 317. Such incidents of racism provide illustrations of numerous in-
stances during the pre-World War II era during which northern universities would
restrict their black players to the sidelines in contests against southern colleges and
universities. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 169.
Although this practice was less prevalent during the 1930's and 1940's, even then
northern institutions often benched their black players during games against white
southern colleges. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 169. In 1934, the University of Michigan
kept a black football star, Willis Ward, from competing in a game against Georgia
Tech. Likewise in 1941, Harvard succumbed to a request by Navy not to permit a
black lacrosse player from competing-a decision which resulted in such an outcry
that Harvard thereafter announced a policy "telling all future athletic opponents it
would no longer 'countenance racial discrimination' ". Wiggins, supra at 169. See
Brower, supra note 48, at 260 (providing additional illustrations).
After World War H in particular, some non-southern universities resisted the segre-
gationists' pressure and permitted their black student-athletes to play. For instance,
the University of Southern California permitted two black athletes to compete in the
1924 Rose Bowl despite objections by the University of Missouri. WOLTERS, supra
note 50, at 316. Other notable illustrations of the refusal of northern teams to suc-
cumb to the segregationist pressures of southern schools are described in FOREmAN,
supra note 40, at 31-34.
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cially exclusionary practices resulted in black colleges providing
the only significant opportunities for the black athlete to compete
in college athletics prior to the 1930s.0
Northern institutions adopted other informal rules. These rules
carried the weight of law and, thus, restricted the ability of black
athletes to compete for white colleges and universities. Informal
quotas typically restricted the slots open to black athletes to no
more than one or two players on a team.61 In addition to numeri-
cal quotas, northern colleges imposed another requirement that
limited the number of black student-athletes allowed to compete
on their teams. Many of these institutions imposed a "superspade"
requirement. 62 In other words, the typical African-American stu-
The early years following the war also saw a few instances in which the color bar-
rier, perpetuated by gentlemen's agreements, was crossed. In 1947, two black football
players for Penn State played against Southern Methodist University in Dallas. In the
same year, a black student-athlete for Harvard was permitted to play in its game
against the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. Id. at 32. These illustrations
were, however, the exception to the rule.
60. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 29. As an alternative to their lack of access to play
sports at white colleges and universities, black colleges and players created all black
leagues. Segregation in athletic competition also resulted in the development of all
black teams and leagues at the professional level. The black baseball leagues are well
known illustrations. ErrzEN & SAGE, supra note 3, at 324.
61. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 172 (acknowledging the existence of quotas limiting
the numbers of African-American student-athletes allowed to compete for a school at
one time); ASHE, supra note 38, at 93 (also noting that most white colleges had no
black student-athletes on their teams during the early 1900's and the few that did had
no more than one or two).
62. Therefore, black student-athletes assumed only token status at the predomi-
nantly white institutions willing to admit them. The burdens imposed on "super-
spades" have been depicted as follows:
That is, they were expected to do more than simply participate in the team's
success, they were expected to carry the team to victory. Willis Ward is a
shining example of a "superspade;" he scored 13 of the University of Michi-
gan's 18 3/4 points to lead them to victory over Illinois in the 1932 Butler
Relays. Three years later Jesse Owens scored 40 of Ohio State's 40 1/5
points in a win over UC, Berkeley. Paul Robeson, the lone African-Ameri-
can on campus at Rutgers, was an All-American in 1917 and 1918. They and
other African-Americans were expected to provide super performances to
justify their presence on athletic teams at predominantly white colleges and
universities.
Othello Harris, African-American Predominance in Collegiate Sport, in RAcIsM iN
COLLEGE ATHLEmCS, supra note 12, at 51, 53.
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dent-athlete 63 playing for a predominantly white college prior to
the 1930s tended to be an exceptionally talented starter.64
3. The Black Athlete as an Outsider
University policies also contributed to the plight of the black stu-
dent-athlete. These policies operated to ensure that black student-
athletes, competing for the few predominantly white colleges will-
ing to admit them, were not spared the indignities of racism at their
home institutions. A lack of institutional sensitivity and overt ra-
cism relegated the African-American student-athlete to outsider
status. Those problems also reflected the schizophrenic attitude of
the American public toward the black athlete. As expressed by
one commentator,
Black athletes at predominantly white universities [have] been
both segregated and despised, yet cheered at game time since
William H. Lewis and W.T.S. Jackson played football for Am-
herst in 1890-1891. This dual existence for black athletes in col-
legiate sports-simultaneously scorned and loved-was a
microcosm of the contradictions of a segregated society. Martin
Luther King, Jr. would later speak of the dual nature of an
American society "that both loves the Negro but is repelled by
hill.''65
63. The profile of the small contingent of African-American student-athletes who
played for these schools displays a marked contrast to the African-American student-
athlete who would populate college teams once desegregation led to significantly
greater access beginning in the 1930's. Black student-athletes who competed during
the early years of organized college sport came primarily from middle class families
that placed a premium on education and culture. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 165.
These values were transferred to the black student-athlete. Although black athletes
approached sport seriously, they attached far greater significance to academic
achievement. Id.
William Henry Lewis, who was an academic and athletic star at Amherst College, is
paradigmatic of the early black college athletes. Following graduation from Amherst
and Harvard Law School (he played football at both schools), Lewis became a highly
successful lawyer and was appointed as assistant attorney general of the United States
in 1911. Id
See discussion infra text accompanying note 81 (providing profile of the modem
African-American student-athlete).
64. Asim, supra note 38, at 93.
65. Donald Spivey, The Black Athlete in Big-Time Intercollegiate Sports, 1941-
1968, 44 PHYLON 116, 116-17 (1983).
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Such attitudes66 resulted in the exclusion of the black athlete from
the mainstream of campus social, academic and athletic life.67
Black student-athletes typically were not permitted to reside in
campus housing or otherwise engage in campus social life. 68 They
encountered demeaning comments from coaches, teammates and
other members of the university community, as well as the popu-
lace of the local communities in which those colleges were lo-
cated.69 This sense of isolation was heightened by an absence of
other black students, as well as black faculty, coaches or
administrators .70
These attitudes also contributed to the academic neglect increas-
ingly suffered by the African-American athlete during the 1920s
and 1930s. Black athletes were counseled to take courses that of-
fered little in the way of intellectual value, but which would keep
them eligible to play sports.7'
Black student-athletes faced various forms of discrimination in
both locker rooms and on the playing field. During the early
1900s, black athletes who played for white institutions were chan-
neled into sports such as track and field, and to a much lesser ex-
66. Commenting on the discriminating way in which modem racism manifests it-
self, Professor Bell concludes it results in racial schizophrenia. He provides the fol-
lowing illustrations:
... whites, ready and willing to applaud, even idolize black athletes and
entertainers, refuse to hire or balk at working with blacks. Whites who
number individual blacks among their closet friends approve, or do not op-
pose, practices that bar selling or renting homes or apartments in their
neighborhoods to blacks they don't know. Employers, not wanting 'too
many of them,' are willing to hire one or two black people, but will reject
those who apply later. Most hotels and restaurants who offer black patrons
courteous-even deferential-treatment, uniformly reject black job appli-
cants, except perhaps for the most menial jobs.
Bell, supra note 28 at 574-75.
67. Harris, supra note 62, at 53-54. See WOLmRS, supra note 50, at 317 (noting
the housing discrimination black athletes at the University of Kansas encountered).
68. See Donald Spivey & Thomas A. Jones, Intercollegiate Athletic Servitude: A
Case Study of the Black ilini Student-Athletes, 1931-1967, 55 Soc. Sc. Q. 939, 944
(1975) (noting as an example of discrimination, the frustration ensuing from housing
discrimination which black athletes at the University of Illinois endured).
69. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 171.
70. l&
71. IL at 170. A newspaper commentator in 1951 described the academic neglect
and exploitation of the black student-athlete as follows: the large majority of black
athletes have "been little more than professional performers who were virtually
duped into neglecting their academics for a few moments of athletic glory." Id. (quot-
ing Al Dunmore, Pittsburgh Courier-Journal, September 1, 1951). Between 1931 and
1967, black athletes had a significantly higher rate of attrition than the general student
body at college campuses. IaL
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tent, football.72 These sports were viewed as not involving the type
of intimate physical contact required by basketball and swim-
ming.73 For instance, although the Big Ten Conference permitted
blacks to play on its members' football teams, they were prohibited
from playing basketball until after World War II.7 Moreover, the
African-American athlete alone bore the burden of being the
"superspade." They were often blamed when misfortune befell
their teams.75 The use of blacks as scapegoats in college athletics
parallels behavior that has occurred in other contexts. Historically,
blacks have been deemed responsible for any number of economic
or political failures.76
In short, black student-athletes were subjected to an atmosphere
that isolated them from their university communities and forced
them to look outward for nurturing and support.77 The ramifica-
tions of this isolation extended beyond the emotional pain caused
by discrimination. It also adversely affected their college careers.7
Frustrated by patterns of discrimination, some black student-ath-
72. Id at 166; Harris, supra note 62, at 54 (noting that it was not until after the
1930's that blacks began to compete in appreciable numbers in sport, including foot-
ball, other than track and field).
73. Id at 54. See also WOLTERS, supra note 50, at 316. Such conduct was consis-
tent with the treatment afforded the non-athlete black student at these institutions.
During the 1920s, the University of Kansas prohibited black students from all forms
of extracurricular activity including glee clubs, literary societies, dramatic associations
and dances. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 168. "It also insisted black students live off
campus rather than in school dormitories and promoted other segregated practices
ranging from seating assignments in the cafeteria to exclusion from local theatres."
Id.
74. ASHE, supra note 38, at 56. Black athletes at northern institutions were sub-
jected to other forms of conduct aimed at separating them from white players. For
instance, white teammates of Fritz Pollard, who along with Paul Robeson were per-
haps the two most prominent black athletes during this period, refused to share the
locker room with him. Pollard was also refused permission to ride on the trolley
which carried the rest of his teammates from the campus to the playing field. Wiggins,
supra note 37, at 167.
The African-American student-athlete was often slighted in the awarding of ath-
letic honors such as All-American status. AsHE, supra note 38, at 93-94 (providing
illustrations of the slights black athletes encountered with respect to awards for ath-
letic achievement).
75. See Wiggins, supra note 37, at 171.
76. See Bell, supra note 28, at 576 (providing examples of the many instances in
which American society has used African-Americans as scapegoats).
77. Black college athletes often found nurturing within the local black community.
Wiggins, supra note 37, at 166.
78. Spivey & Jones, supra note 68, at 944.
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letes ultimately stopped competing.79 Many of those who contin-
ued to compete performed poorly academically.80
B. The Post World War H Era: From Overt to Covert Racism
During the post-World War II era,81 the African-American stu-
dent-athlete emerged as a force to be reckoned with at predomi-
nately white colleges and universities. 2 America's engagement in
79. See Spivey & Jones, supra note 68, at 944 (many black athletes who encoun-
tered a pattern of discrimination at the University of Illinois as at other predomi-
nantly white northern colleges gave up on competing).
Professor Harris describes the shabby treatment afforded black student-athletes by
their schools as follows: "Campus housing was off-limits to most of them; they were
refused service in restaurants and not allowed to stay at hotels with their white team-
mates (even in northern cities like Chicago and Buffalo, New York); and probably
most humiliating, they were kept out of home and away games against southern
teams." Harris, supra note 62, at 53-54.
80. Spivey & Jones, supra note 68, at 944 (commenting on how the absence of
social outlets for black athletes impeded their academic success).
81. Although the post World War II years are widely recognized as the period
during which access opened up for blacks to participate in organized sport, during the
1930's the numbers of highly gifted black athletes competing for predominantly white
institutions rose substantially. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 169. This increase occurred
simultaneously with the increase in the numbers of black students attending predomi-
nantly white northern schools as a result of the African-American migration from the
South to the North which began in the 1920's and continued at a reduced rate in the
1930s. kd Increased access of the African-American student-athletes to white col-
leges was also attributable to the changing focus of college sport. The increased com-
petitiveness of intercollegiate athletics during the 1930's influenced some
predominantly white institutions in the North to disregard skin color in order to ac-
quire the services of the best athletes so as to field successful teams. Id
The 1930's also marked the beginning of a disturbing trend-a change in the type
of black athlete being recruited to attend colleges. As noted above, prior to the
1930's black athletes at white institutions came primarily from middle class families
which stressed educational attainment. However, in the 1930's an increasing number
of white colleges began to recruit greater numbers of black student-athletes who were
"either inadequately prepared or unwilling to do what was necessary to be successful
academically." 1d at 170. The focus of the university was to attract the outstanding
black athlete who would increase the school's winning percentage regardless of the
athlete's ability to survive in the classroom. Id.
82. The segregation of college sport prior to World War H was not quietly con-
doned. African-American sportswriters for black weekly newspapers campaigned to
increase collegiate sport opportunities for black athletes beyond those which existed
at traditionally black colleges and universities. Wiggins, supra note 35, at 32. African-
American student-athletes and their supporters also protested the discrimination
which the former encountered at northern, predominantly white university campuses
prior to World War II. Spivey, supra note 65, at 117. In 1940, New York University's
decision to bench Leonard Bates, a black football star, in a game against the Univer-
sity of Missouri which maintained a staunch line against interracial sporting competi-
tion, erupted into mass protest by NYU students against the university administration
and its athletic program. Id at 119. Prior to the 1960s, this form of protest as well as
individual acts of defiance were ineffective in changing the discrimination in college
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World War II forced many colleges to seek talent from sources that
previously had been ignored. One such source of available talent
was the African-American. student-athletes 3 As summed up by
one author, "the chaotic athletic situation of World War II was a
vital factor in the assault on the color-line in sports." 4
Factors both external and intrinsic to intercollegiate athletics
contributed to the increased integration that began in the years fol-
lowing the war."5 Increased commercialization of college sport was
one of the most significant intrinsic factors.86 It resulted in Afri-
can-American student-athletes gaining greater access to opportuni-
ties to compete.87 Commercialization enhanced the pressure on
colleges to field winning teams. This, in turn, propelled colleges to
athletics. Id. Nevertheless, the protests at NYU, Harvard and other institutions pro-
vided notice that the discrimination in college athletics was intolerable to some. Id. at
120.
83. Id. at 121.
84. Id.
85. Available statistical data reveals the dramatic increase in access to African-
American student-athletes in the post World War 1I era. In 1948, approximately 1%
of all players at white universities were black. The percentage increased in 1962 to a
figure which was roughly comparable to the distribution of blacks in society at large.
In 1975, 34 % of all players were black, and by 1985, the percentage of black players
competing at predominantly white institutions had increased to 49%. Forest J.
Berghorn & Norman R. Yetman, Racial Participation and Integration in Men's and
Women's Intercollegiate BasketbalLk Continuity and Change, 1958-1985, 5 SOCIOLOGY
SPORT J. 107, 107-24 (1988).
The predominance of the African-American student-athlete is more clearly seen
when placed in the context of the overall enrollment of African-Americans at
predominantly white institutions. "[B]iacks comprised only 8.0% of the total under-
graduate population in 4-year colleges and universities in 1982, and more than one-
quarter of these black students were enrolled at historically black colleges.... ." Id. at
110.
By the end of World War U, virtually every major collegiate team outside the South
had opened its doors to permit at least one black player to compete for it. Spivey,
supra note 65, at 121. Southern colleges and universities resisted this fundamental
change in college sport and continued after World War U to exclude black student-
athletes. The integration of college sport at predominantly white colleges in the
South did not occur until the latter part of the 1960's during which time the numbers
of black players competing for these institutions mushroomed. Wiggins, supra note
35, at 35.
Thus, although the proportion of blacks living in the South remained con-
stant at 53% throughout the 1970s, the percentage of college basketball
players in that region rose nearly 40% between 1970 and 1985. While black
players represented 22% of all players in the South in 1970, by 1985 this
figure had increased to 61%.
Berghom & Yetman, supra at 111.
86. Spivey, supra note 65, at 122.
87. Id.
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recruit and obtain the services of the most talented student-athletes
regardless of their color.s8
While a moral desire to end segregation may have prompted
many to seek the integration of organized collegiate sport, the eco-
nomic interests of others may have been of primary importance.
Despite the increased integration of college athletics, the emer-
gence of the black athlete has been restricted primarily to the "rev-
enue producing sports. '8 9 This phenomenon was adroitly captured
by one commentator who stated:
In those team sports in which "revenue producing" has come to
dominate, the contribution of outstanding African-American
athletes to winning championships and holding public interest
has opened opportunities to African-Americans in college
sports. Sports more closely linked to upper-class patronage and
with less spectator interest have been slow to attract and inte-
grate blacks.90
Notwithstanding this "revenue-producing" role, black student-ath-
letes could potentially benefit because their interests often con-
verged with the commercial interests of predominantly white
colleges and universities.91
Although this view may seem unduly harsh, it gains support
when one examines the "revenue-producing sports"-sports in
which there have been substantial increases in the number of Afri-
can-American participants. It appears that, in part, colleges set
aside discriminatory practices in order to reap benefits. Such bene-
fits came in the form of championship titles and recognition ac-
88. Id ("Intercollegiate sports was cashing in on black athletes. The post-war era
was the coming of age of big time intercollegiate sports and the final victory in col-
legiate athletics of the win-at-any-cost mentality.").
I do not intend to suggest that intercollegiate sport was not a commercialized enter-
prise prior to World War H. Indeed it was. However, the years following the war
witnessed the maturation of the commercialization which had begun in the early
1900's. HARRY EDWARDS, SocioLooy OF SPORT 41 (1973).
89. Davis, supra note 21, at 276 n.33. The primary revenue-producing sports are
Division I-A football and Division I men's basketball. Id
90. Sage, supra note 14, at 10.
91. The notion of interest convergence was introduced in large part by Professor
Derrick Bell in addressing the motivations which underlie the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. Professor Bell's thesis is that whites in policy making capacities
recognize that civil rights laws accrue to their political and economic interests at least
as much as they benefit blacks. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 518 (1980). Thus the principle
of interest convergence provides that the "interest of blacks in achieving racial equal-
ity will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites." Id at
523.
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crued from the contributions of African-American student-
athletes.92 As noted by historian Adolph Grundman, 93 the profes-
sionalization of college sport following World War II enticed col-
leges to recruit African-American student-athletes. He posits that
their recruitment served a dual purpose: it helped these schools
strengthen their athletic programs, while at the same time it pro-
moted the advancement of race relations.94
Changes occurring in society at large also contributed to the de-
segregation of college athletics.95 During the period prior to
Brown v. Board of Education,96 the laws of the nation were em-
ployed to perpetuate the segregation of college sport. Conversely,
Supreme Court desegregation decisions,97 political decisions, 98 and
events occurring in professional sport99 helped to break down bar-
92. Sage, supra note 14, at 10.
93. Adolph H. Grundman, The Image of Intercollegiate Sports and the Civil Rights
Movement: A Historian's View, SPORT AND HIGHER EDUC. 339, 341 (Donald Chu et
al. eds., 1985).
94. Id
95. For instance, growing federal concern for nondiscrimination in higher educa-
tion also favorably impacted the integration of college athletic teams. See K. C.
GREEN, GovERNMENT SUPPORT FOR MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 9-10 (1982). This is illustrated by President Truman's appointment in 1946 of a
commission created to examine the goals, objectives and the social role of America's
system of higher education. Id at 9. The six volume report of the President's Com-
mission on Higher Education espoused egalitarian goals including a call for the end of
racial and religious discrimination in higher education. Id.
In addition, Congressional passage of the G.I. Bill which funded post-secondary
education for many who otherwise could not afford to attend college resulted in an
increased presence of African-Americans, some of whom were athletes interested in
competing in sports, on predominantly white campuses. Harris, supra note 62, at 54.
Consequently, as summed up by Professor Harris, "at a time when Americans were
more receptive to African-Americans at least at the level of secondary structural as-
similation, there was also a larger pool of potential black athletes available to col-
legiate athletic teams." Id at 55.
96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
97. The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education has been de-
scribed as igniting "an educational reform movement for African-Americans." Kevin
Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by
Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IowA L. Rav. 813, 837
(1993) [hereinafter Do African Americans Need Immersion Schools?.
98. See id. at 816-17 (commenting on the role that legal and political considera-
tions have played in the aspirations to integrate public schools in America over the
past 40 years).
99. A significant external factor was the Brooklyn Dodgers' signing in 1945 of
Jackie Robinson. Although signed by the Dodgers in 1945, Robinson spent 1946 in
the minor leagues and emerged in 1947 to break the color barrier in major league
baseball. ErrzEN & SAGE, supra note 3, at 324; JULES TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT
EXPERIMENT. JACKIE ROBINSON AND HIs LEGACY 343 (1983) (noting the expansion
of previously closed opportunities for African-American athletes following the
Dodger's signing of Robinson).
RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
riers for the African-American student-athlete. 1°° As described by
Professor Alex Johnson, in the period following Brown, "[a] com-
bination of desegregation and other economic and legal events
gave African-Americans opportunities which could be, and often
were, used to improve their economic and social status."101 He
adds, however, "[t]he promise of Brown and the opportunities for
African-Americans that followed it were... short-lived."102
Nevertheless, sport, including college sport, is perceived by many
as the segment of society where the promise of Brown has been
truly fulfilled. In that sense, sport would depart from the post-
Brown paradigm presented by Professor Johnson. Yet, as the fol-
lowing discussion reveals, college sport does not depart from the
post-Brown paradigm, but represents a microcosm of American so-
ciety. Thus, it too provides an illustration of the failed promises of
Brown.
I. Stereotypes And Covert Racism in College Sports
A. Permanence of Racism in Intercollegiate Athletics
1. Differing Perceptions
The end of exclusionary practices and most other overt forms of
discrimination in collegiate sport 03 has increased the opportunities
for African-American student-athletes to compete for predomi-
nantly white institutions. Increased access °4 stemming from self-
Integration of the Brooklyn Dodgers was followed over the next twenty years by
the integration of other professional sports organizations. Wiggins, supra note 35, at
34; Wiggins, supra note 37, at 171. Predominantly white sports teams in the north
duplicated the increased integration of professional sports. Harris, supra note 62, at
55.
100. The lowering of the color barrier for African-American student-athletes at
previously off limits, predominantly white colleges resulted in an immediately felt
consequence for historically black colleges. Desegregation of college sports placed
black colleges at a disadvantage since the black athlete turned to the white institutions
to take advantage of the enhanced opportunities provided by increased public expo-
sure. Many black colleges were forced to substantially modify their programs. Sage,
supra note 14, at 9; see Harris, supra note 62, at 54-55.
101. Johnson, supra note 36, at 1410.
102. Id
103. Although blatant forms of discrimination have subsided considerably in inter-
collegiate athletics, particularly with respect to access to opportunities to compete, the
post-1970 years have not witnessed the complete eradication of overtly discriminatory
conduct. The forms of overt discrimination which continue to harm black athletes are
described in RICHARD LAPCHICK, FivE MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT RACE AND SPORT IN
TH 1990s 226-28 (1991).
104. Ample evidence exists to demonstrate that those who control some sports
have created barriers to black participation in a number of sports, thus reproducing
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interest 05 has not, however, resulted in a transformation of the un-
derlying cultural attitudes and values that helped to produce overt
discrimination against the African-American college athlete. As
noted by one commentator, the cynical self-interest that contrib-
uted to opening doors for black athletes did not result in an over-
night transformation of attitudes.106 In short, racism persists in
college sport.
In fact, distributive equality'0 7 has been accompanied by new,
more subtle manifestations of racism. Nevertheless, these manifes-
tations derive from the racial stereotyping and insensitivity which
has perpetually plagued American collegiate sport 308 The overall
impact of these new forms of discriminatory conduct is a failure to
integrate, in a meaningful way, African-American student-athletes
into their university communities.1 9 As described below, these
some of the more odious features of racism. Sage, supra note 14, at 9. Professor Sage
argues that increased access to opportunities for the African-American student-ath-
lete is not yet universal in college sport. He concludes:
Many college sports teams still have very few black participants. These
sports tend to be linked to upper-class patronage, but class linkage is not the
entire explanation for black underrepresentation in these sports. Dominant
classes have the wherewithal to insulate themselves against those with whom
they do not wish to associate. Laws that prevent African-Americans from
being kept out do not assure that they will get in.
It
105. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
106. LAPCHiC, supra note 103, at 226. "As the mood of the country shifted
slightly toward giving blacks more educational opportunities, coaches with an eye to-
ward the scoreboard took advantage of 'open admissions' policies. White coaches,
administrators, boosters, and players had to adjust. If they had been racist before,
they would have to tone it down." Id.
107. As used here, distributive equality refers to the process of measuring equality
based upon opportunity and access. See generally Dewar, supra note 14, at 227-29.
Under this approach, equality is achieved when the distribution and allocation of op-
portunities and rewards within a particular sport match the racial distributions in soci-
ety. Id. at 228. Such an approach is short-sighted inasmuch as desegregation is not
the sole factor which prevents equality in college sport. As such it ignores the com-
plexities which continue to relegate the African-American in college sport to outsider
status. See id.
In discussing the rationales often used to justify increased minority representation
in education, Professor Delgado defines the distributive justice rationale as saying
"there is a certain amount of wealth available and argues that everyone is entitled to a
minimum share of it." Delgado, supra note 15, at 569. ike Dewar, Delgado per-
ceives shortcomings in a distributive approach to racial justice. I& at 569-71.
108. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 172. "As historian Adolph Grundman accurately
points out, intercollegiate sport during the decade of the 1950s did not, as some peo-
ple have been led to believe, 'mark the triumphs of egalitarian ideals in American
society.'" IdM
109. Berghorn & Yetman, supra note 85, at 107-24. Increased access alone will not
necessarily result in full integration and participation.
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new forms of discrimination result in injury that is real and harm-
ful"10 not only to African-American student-athletes but to other
African-Americans not involved in intercollegiate athletics.
(a) The Egalitarian Ideal
Despite its pervasiveness, many would still deny the continued
presence of racism in college sport. This denial may be attributed,
in large part, to the perception that sport itself transcends race.
Sport in America is idealized as an endeavor in which one can be
judged solely on the basis of ability and merit.' One scholar ex-
pressed this desired, yet elusive, concept as follows:
[I]n our culture sport is often presented as one area that is free
from racism. It is presented as an activity in which hard work
and talent are the primary contributors for success because the
bottom line in the sporting world is winning and putting the best
team or individuals into any competitive situation.11 2
The African-American is presumed to have an equal opportunity
to share in the rewards that can arise from sports participation." 3
For example, the dominant creed of sport is thought to be "indi-
vidual achievement through competition."1 4 As noted by histo-
rian Donald Spivey, the sanctum of sport is premised on doctrines
Interracial participation refers to a numerical measure of representation by
race (i.e., the percentage of each race found in an organization). Racial inte-
gration, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which racial interaction is
marked by relative equality and by the absence of ascription in institutional
roles. Interracial participation "is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
integration, for integration involves, in addition to racial mix, a climate for
interracial acceptance."
I& at 108.
110. Brown, supra note 23, at 296 (noting that despite its increasingly subtle and
elusive nature, racism nevertheless inflicts real injuries in need of relief).
111. Most white Americans believe that the egalitarian values which supposedly
predominate in sport apply equally to the African-American athlete. See Anderson &
South, supra note 19, at 85; Spivey, supra note 56, at 283-84 (arguing that sport in
American society is premised on unofficial doctrines including equality of
opportunity).
112. Dewar, supra note 14, at 230. Such romanticized notions, however, fail to
comport with the reality of college athletics. This results in large part from a failure to
examine the linkage between power and the persistence of oppression in sport. I&
113. See generally Grundman, supra note 93, at 341; Harry Edwards, The Black
Athletes: 20th Century Gladiators for White America, 7 PsYcZsoLOoY TODAY 43(1973).
"Sports have been held up in our society as an.activity in which African-Americans,
particularly males, could compete and achieve without the bane of discrimination, an
activity where merit was rewarded and achievement was unambiguous and evident to
all." Anderson & South, supra note 19, at 85.
114. EDWADS, supra note 88, at 334.
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of "equality of opportunity, sportsmanship, and fair play."115 This
premise is consistent with a liberal jurisprudential approach that
"conceives meritocracy as a system in which benefits and burdens
are distributed in accord with one's deeds-presumably the prod-
ucts of rational choice-rather than characteristics over which one
has no apparent control."" 6 The notion of race neutrality then be-
comes an inherent attribute of athletic competition in general, and
of organized sport in particular.117 Yet, as will be discussed shortly,
the experiences of black participants in college sport fall short of
true egalitarianism.
(b) Illusion of Equality
Differences in the ways in which whites and blacks perceive the
same events also influence the former's tendency to discount the
impact of race in college sport.118 Many white Americans assume
that the removal of barriers to access has eradicated all racial im-
pediments in college sport; African-Americans by and large refuse
to adopt this view. 19 The perceptions of white Americans are
formed against a backdrop of the high visibility of African-Ameri-
can athletes who compete in the three major sports, basketball,
football and baseball.1 20 Such substantial visibility creates an illu-
sion of integration and conveniently obscures the pervasiveness of
racism in sport.12 ' The fallacy of this illusion is demonstrated in
non-revenue producing sports (e.g., gymnastics, golf, swimming,
tennis, soccer and volleyball), which provide few opportunities for
African-Americans to compete.?2 Such views also illustrate the
115. Spivey, supra note 65, at 120.
116. Flagg, supra note 2, at 954 n.3.
117. Robert Sellers, Black Student-Athletes: Reaping the Benefits or Recoveringfrom the Exploitation, in RAciSM IN COLLEGE ArHLmcs, supra note 12, at 143, 144.
118. Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the
Fundamental Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 407
(1988).
One structural feature of human experience separates people of color from
our white friends, accounting in large part for our differing perceptions in
matters of race. This structural feature, which dwarfs almost everything else,
is simply stated. white people rarely see acts of blatant or subtle racism,
while minority people experience them all the time.
Id
119. LAPcHicK, supra note 103, at 224.
120. ErrZEN & SAGE, supra note 3, at 332.
121. IM
122. COAKLEY, supra note 1, at 264. It is also ironic that revenues generated from
revenue-producing sports often help to fund those sports with few African-American
student-athletes. Id. The absence of African-Americans in the non-revenue-produc-
ing sports may be linked to more than economics. It may also reflect the desires and
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superficiality of defining racism in terms of access and opportuni-
ties to participate in sport.123
2. The Influence of Race
Considerations more fundamental than the skewed vision result-
ing from the illusion of black dominance in sport account for these
differing perceptions.l24 The endemic nature of racism masks its
reality as well as its harmful consequences. 125
The explicit ideology of white superiority that prevailed during
the Jim Crow era has been "submerged in popular conscious-
ness.' 126 In fact, overt forms of racism are no longer considered
acceptable. 27 It is not so clear, however, whether or not the same
moral culpability attaches to unconscious racism.12 Professor Bell
the abilities of those of the upper classes to insulate themselves from those with whom
they prefer not to associate. Sage, supra note 14, at 9.
123. Dewar, supra note 14, at 228-30.
124. The disparity in perceptions of white and black Americans on the presence of
racism results in differing interpretations of the same events and conditions. See
Brown, supra note 23, at 304.
125. Brown, supra note 23, at 82-83. "Institutionalized racism pervades all facets of
American life, both public and private. Because of its pervasive nature, it is often
difficult to identify or place neatly in either the public, or private sphere." Id. See
Brown, supra note 97, at 825; Charles R. Lawrence Mil, The Id, the Ego and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,322-23 (1987);
Brown, supra note 23, at 304.
126. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment- Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1379
(1988).
127. Commenting on the social science data which supports this conclusion, Profes-
sor Kevin Brown concludes that "[ajlthough individuals (of all races and ethnicities)
act upon the negative connotations attached to blacks, open expression of such
prejudices by individuals is improper." Do African Americans Need Immersion
Schools?, supra note 97, at 825. Professor Brown goes on to add, however, that this
behavioral change has not resulted in more positive attitudes toward African-
Americans.
[Social science data], for example, indicates a shift in the expressed norm for
racial attitudes of whites-from a sanctioned negative attitude to an obliga-
tory neutral or positive attitude towards blacks. While surveys show that
whites overwhelmingly reject blatant forms of discrimination, they fail to
show an association with more positive behavior toward African Americans.
Id. at 825-26.
Lawrence, supra note 125, at 323 (noting that our society has recently adopted a
view that racism is immoral); Brown, supra note 23, at 307 ("Our society has estab-
lished a national consensus against blatant, intentional racism ... ."). See Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can
Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1282
(1992) (asserting that, since overt racism is rare, many whites under appreciate its
extent).
128. Whites seem not to have reached consensus on the immorality of unconscious
racism. Flagg, supra note 2, at 987.
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states: "the very absence of visible signs of discrimination creates
an atmosphere of racial neutrality and encourages whites to believe
that racism is a thing of the past. ' 129 Moreover, it is in the self-
interest of whites to believe that racism can be placed on the shelf
as an object of archival history.130
What emerges then is an unconscious norm of white dominance
that provides the basis for assessing individual and group con-
duct.131 The manifestations of this norm, however, are difficult to
define. Indeed, "[1]aw and much of our social discourse recognize
racism only in the form of an overt expression of white racial supe-
riority and deliberate efforts to denigrate, segregate, or deny op-
portunity on the basis of skin color."132
Despite the muted and elusive nature of its current manifesta-
tions, the prevailing ideology of white superiority remains a prod-
uct of negative stereotypes 133 and cultural beliefs adverse to people
of color. Therefore, it continues to exert a substantial influence on
the interests of people of color,134 causing them real injury.13S
Commenting on the harmful consequences of the new ideology of
white superiority, Professor Crenshaw concludes that it "legiti-
mates prevailing injustices and constrains the development of new
solutions that benefit Black Americans.1 36 This institutionalized,
albeit difficult to define, racism pervades college sport just as it
does other facets of American society. In summary, just as racism
has played a central role in America's "socio-historical experience"
and continues to influence our attitudes, perceptions and inter-re-
lationships, it also continues to influence college sport despite dis-
parate perceptions. 37 The persistence of racism in intercollegiate
athletics is assured when there is incorporation (by the dominant
129. Bell, supra note 28, at 574. See Brown, supra note 23, at 310 ("White race
consciousness informs and helps constitute the existing social conditions that whites
are able to reconcile with processes of formal equality and the belief that racism is no
longer a significant problem in the United States.")
130. See Delgado, supra note 15, at 571; Flagg, supra note 2, at 987.
131. Do African Americans Need Immersion Schools?, supra note 97, at 824.
132. Brown, supra note 23, at 307-08.
133. Crenshaw, supra note 126, at 1369.
134. Id ("The rationalizations once used to legitimate Black subordination based
on a belief in racial inferiority have now been reemployed to legitimate the domina-
tion of Blacks through reference to an assumed cultural inferiority.")
135. Brown, supra note 23, at 310.
136. Crenshaw, supra note 126, at 1369.
137. Racism has "the power to constrict thought, to channel broad human experi-
ence into narrowly referenced and reified stereotypes." Brown, supra note 25, at 81
n.74 (quoting Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructng Ideals From
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. 401, 414 (1987)).
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culture) of stereotypes and notions concerning African-American
athletes that undergirded the segregation of college sports prior to
World War ]1.138
B. The Influence of Racial Stereotypes
Racism-and the political, economic and social disparities that it
spawns-ensue from culturally ascribed beliefs and roles of superi-
ority of whites and inferiority of people of color.139 Indeed, the
very history of racism "helps to develop, and in turn is perpetuated
by, a shared psychology and culture of which racially affected ide-
ology is a constituent part. 1 40 This collective consciousness is
based, in significant part, on fraudulent stereotypes.1 41 In turn,
these stereotypes aid in the formulation of racial identities that are
relied on to define the character and abilities of African-Ameri-
cans. Thus, untrue images and myths, which are unknowingly
transmitted, constitute a crucial ingredient in the process by which
unconscious racism is produced. 42Stereotypes1 43 regarding the African-American athlete are
rooted in the same irrationality that impairs one's ability to per-
ceive the actual qualities and capabilities of any individual or group
that is stereotyped.144 Today, fraudulent stereotypes and cultural
138. Wiggins, supra note 35, at 42.
139. Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound
Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?,
43 EMoRY L. 1, 4 (1994).
140. Brown, supra note 23, at 304-05.
141. Crenshaw, supra note 126, at 1370. Indeed in the past, the blatant oppression
of African-Americans was legitimized in part by stereotypes. Professor Crenshaw
states that the series of stereotypes and myths used to rationalize the subordination of
blacks "made their conditions appear logical and natural." Id.
142. Lawrence, supra note 125, at 332, 343, 372 (discussing the importance of ste-
reotypes, particularly in relation to the creation of unconscious racism).
143. "Stereotype" has been defined as "an incorrect or unthinking generalization
applied indiscriminately to individuals simply on the basis of group membership."
Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1067. Professor Aleinikoff adds that this definition is too
limited inasmuch as it suggests that stereotypes can be overcome merely by the supply
of additional information concerning a group. Moreover, the definition fails to ac-
knowledge the entrenched structure of race consciousness. Id. See Lawrence, supra
note 125, at 372 ("Stereotypes are cultural symbols. They constitute our contempo-
rary interpretation of past and present meaningful behavior.").
144. Do African Americans Need Immersion Schools?, supra note 97, at 828 (dis-
cussing numerous societal stereotypes that foster "rationalized racism"). Professor
Brown offers that the undue reliance on stereotypes impairs reason, distorts the cog-
nitive process and ultimately ignores individuality. I.
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myths help to perpetuate the unconscious racism that too often
subordinates people of color in college athletics. 145
1. The Mythical African-American Athlete
The athletic successes of African-American athletes often has
been attributed to physical characteristics of mythical proportions.
For instance, one prominent sports commentator advanced the
physical superiority myth by erroneously attributing such successes
to eighteenth century genetic gerrymandering:
The black is a better athlete to begin with, because he's been
bred to be that way. Because of his high thighs and big thighs
that go up into his back. And they can jump faster because of
their bigger thighs, you see. I'm telling you that the black is the
better athlete and he practices to be the better athlete and he's
bred to be the better athlete because this goes all the way to the
* Civil War when, during the slave trading, the owner, the slave
owner, would breed this big woman so that he would have a big
black kid, see. That's where it all started."
The unconscious racism that occurs in college sport is, in large
part, a result of the internalization of stereotypes concerning black
athletes' physical superiority as depicted above.147 In the same way
that stereotypes are employed to legitimize the subordination of
blacks in society in general, specific stereotypes of African-Ameri-
can athletes devalue their accomplishments. They also represent
barriers to complete integration of African-Americans into inter-
collegiate athletics. 148
145. Crenshaw, supra note 126, at 1371.
146. Leonard Shapiro, Jimmy the Greek Says Blacks are Bred for Sports, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 1988, at Al, A10.
Similar controversial statements were made by Al Campanis, former vice-president
for player personnel for the Los Angeles Dodgers, when he attempted to explain the
absence of black managers:
They're outstanding athletes .... very God-gifted, and they're wonderful
people.... They are gifted with great musculature and various other things.
They're fleet of foot. And this is why there are a lot of black major league
ballplayers. Now as far as having the background to become club presidents
or presidents of a banks [sic]... I don't know.
PmLLP M. HoosE, NECaSITrS: RACIAL BARRIERS IN AxvmniCA SPORTS xvii(1989).
147. Lawrence, supra note 125, at 343.
148. As the following discussion illustrates, stereotypical notions concerning Afri-
can-American athletes parallel those attached to African-Americans in general. The
negative stereotypes historically attached to African-Americans include: "lazy, unin-
teUigent, immoral, ignorant, disabling culture, criminal, shiftless, lascivious." Cren-
shaw, supra note 126, at 1373. In contrast, the cultural myths and stereotypes
assigned to whites include: "industrious, intelligent, moral, knowledgeable, enabling
644
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(a) Historical Images
The virtual exclusion of African-Americans from organized col-
legiate sport during the Jim Crow era was rationalized by beliefs of
inferiority and inhumanity.149 The ideology of race cast black
males as possessing unique physical stamina and skills, yet lacking
intellectual awareness and feelings.'50 For instance, African-Amer-
ican athletes were "simply too spontaneous and impulsive in nature
to participate within the structure of sports rules with the same de-
gree of sophistication as whites."15'
The image portrayed by the Harlem Globetrotters embodied the
stereotypes crucial to the prevailing ideology. A former team
member described their typical game behavior, which operated to
blind society of the true identity of black athletes:
No pride or self respect ... gallops about with high stepping
strides, loosing shrill jungle sounds, clapping his hands, waving
his long arms, grinning to show his teeth, pull sneaky tricks on
the white referee, calls his friends by foolish names (i.e., Goose,
Meadowlark, etc.) acts devilishly adolescent, shows physical
prowess but in need of mature (white) handling.... [T]he
Globetrotters warm-up to the sounds of "Sweet Georgia
Brown," to exhibit their natural rhythm.15 2
The behavior exhibited by the Harlem Globetrotters fed the stere-
otype of blacks not being serious, but rather "docile, subservient,
good-natured, childlike and slightly exotic. ' 15 3 These images are
remarkably similar to the late eighteenth century theater and liter-
ary portrayals where blacks were presented as docile and con-
tented slaves. 154 Such depictions helped to justify the exclusion of
blacks from organized collegiate and professional sport.
culture, law-abiding, responsible, and virtuous/pious." Id. See Do African Americans
Need Immersion Schools?, supra note 97, at 831 ("African-Americans constantly con-
front a set of socially constructed meanings regarding their suitability for a particularjob, motivation level, intellectual and physical abilities, morality, sexuality, bargaining
skills, desirability as neighbors, and financial status.") (citations omitted).
149. See Wiggins, supra note 35, at 25.
150. JEAN A. COAKLEY, SPORT IN SocIETY: IssuEs AN CoNTRovERsIEs 243 (5th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter SPORT TN SocIETy].
151. EDWARDS, supra note 88, at 38.
152. Lombardo, supra note 3, at 61.
153. I. See Hoosa, supra note 146, at 6-8.
154. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 127, at 1262. These authors conclude that the
potential of black men as social and economic competitors was diminished by depict-
ing them as objects of laughter. Id. These authors also explain that society's depic-
tions of African-Americans and other minorities over time have been consistent in
two ways: their negativity and their evolution so as to serve specific needs.
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Just as stereotypes and myths incorporated into the ideology of
race were relied on to exclude black athletes, they have also pro-
vided a convenient means of explaining the successes and failures
of African-American athletes.155 Even though athletic success is
dependent on multiple psychological, experiential and physical fac-
tors,156 black athletic accomplishments were defined in terms of
"natural" ability and other stereotypes that belittled individual
achievement. 7
As a consequence, the few blacks afforded the opportunity to
compete during the Jim Crow era were characterized according to
fraudulent stereotypes. For instance, the athletic feats of the
"superspade" were attributed to characteristics supposedly indige-
nous only to African-Americans. 58 These innate physiological and
psychological skills,159 which predisposed black athletes to engage
in certain types of physical activities, were used to explain their
In some periods, society needed to suppress a group, as with blacks during
Reconstruction. Society coined an image to suit that purpose-that of prim-
itive, powerful larger than life blacks, terrifying and barely under control.
At other times, for example during slavery, society needed reassurance that
blacks were docile, cheerful, and content with their lot. Images of sullen,
rebellious blacks dissatisfied with their condition would have made white
society uneasy. Accordingly, images of simple, happy blacks, content to do
the master's work, were disseminated. (citations omitted)
Id at 1276 (citations omitted).
155. The stereotypes used to explain the success of African-American athletes dur-
ing this period represents a specific application of the ideology of white racial superi-
ority which predominated and justified the oppression of African-Americans. As
pointed out by Coakley, the ideology of white superiority and black inferiority "has
been revised over the years to fit new circumstances and to continually justify new
forms of racial discrimination." CoAKLnY, supra note 1, at 243; Hooss, supra note
146, at 4-9 (noting and also describing the various genetic explanations which have
been offered with regard to black athletic superiority).
Allowing for journalistic hyperbole, an excerpt from a 1935 newspaper article pur-
porting to describe the reasons for boxer Joe Louis's success demonstrates the dehu-
manization of the personhood and devaluation of the achievements of African-
American athletes. Joe Louis was described as:
the magnificent animal.... He eats, He sleeps. He fights.... Is he all
instinct, all animal? Or have a hundred million years left a fold upon his
brain? I see in the colored man something so cold, so hard, so cruel that I
wonder as to his bravery. Courage in the animal is desperation. Courage in
the human is something incalculable and divine.
COAKLEY, supra note 1, at 244.
156. See Wiggins, supra note 35, at 38-39.
157. See COAKLEY, supra note 1, at 246.
158. See Wiggins, supra note 35, at 38.
159. Spivey & Jones, supra note 68, at 945 n.22. The stereotypes used to justify the
devaluation of achievement included. "Blacks are superior sprinters because of ana-
tomical peculiarities, excellent football players as a result of natural ability, great bas-
ketball players due to the fact they're born with rhythm. 'Sure he is a superb high-
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outstanding performances.' ° As suggested above, the ultimate im-
pact of perceptions based on stereotypes is to deprive individuals
of their autonomy inasmuch as they are reduced to predictable
objects.1 61
(b) Modem Images
Today's African-American student-athlete has witnessed an end
to most overt exclusionary practices and has gained access to cer-
tain opportunities. However, derogatory images and the "super-
spade" myth persist. As is generally true, today's expressions of
race ideology in the sport context are more subtle because they
often remain repressed within the white consciousness.1 62 Never-
theless, these expressions ultimately rest on beliefs that the success
of black athletes results not from intellect, hard work and determi-
nation, but from innate physical skills.163 These stereotypes are
crucial to the development of a consciousness of white superiority
that reverberates within college sport today.
The essence of the modern day image of the African-American
athlete was adroitly captured by one commentator:
African-Americans are thought to possess natural athletic abil-
ity in speed, quickness, and jumping ability.... Whites, on the
other hand, are believed to excel at sport because they possess
traits that are valued both in and (especially) out of sports: intel-
ligence, industriousness, and other unspecified intangibles .... 164
jumper and broad-jumper, he's part ape."' Id. at 945 (quoting EDWARDS, supra note
88, at 190-97).
160. Wiggins, supra note 35, at 38 (describing the nature and the proponents of
such arguments and the debate which ensued). A brief summarization of theories
relying on racial characteristics to explain the dominance of African-Americans in
certain sports can be found in LApCmCK, supra note 103, at 233-38.
Contrary to the myths, most student-athletes of this era emphasized academics over
athletic participation. See discussion supra note 63.
161. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racism, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781, 795 (1994).
162. See COAKLEY, supra note 1, at 248.
163. Professor Wiggins argues that these notions persist in conjunction with stereo-
types that black athletes like other African-Americans are "docile, savage, deceptive,
childlike, oversexed.... ." Wiggins, supra note 35, at 42.
Unfortunately, the dominant racial ideology has also shaped the beliefs of many
African-Americans concerning the source of their athletic successes and abilities. See
COAKLEY, supra note 1, at 247; David K. Wiggins, "Great Speed But Little Stamina:"
The Historical Debate Over Black Athletic Superiority, 16 J. SPORT Hisr. 158, 181-82(1989).
164. Harris, supra note 62, at 61-62.
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The perceived natural athletic ability of the black athlete detracts
from the discipline and work ethic required to excel in competitive
sport. Moreover, the attribution of success to innate traits rein-
forces the false belief that black athletes are slothful and obtuse.
Conversely, the characterization of the representative white ath-
lete, which is equally false, perpetuates the myth that whites excel
in competitive sport in spite of their physical inferiority. Such suc-
cess is attributed to the intellectual resourcefulness of the white
athlete who, according to this view, is forced to compensate for a
lack of innate physical ability.
(c) Media Reinforcement of Stereotypes
The image described above finds frequent reinforcement in the
popular media, which describes white and black athletes differ-
ently.165 References to white athletes will most often refer to their
intellectual capabilities while references to blacks most often refer
165. See Adeno Addis, "Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:" The Mass Media, Law,
and African Americans, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 523, 558-59 (1993) (noting that the perpetu-
ation of these stereotypes is routinely reflected in the media.). See also Armour,
supra note 161, at 812-13; Lawrence, supra note 125, at 343.
Professor Othello Harris provides the following illustration of the different charac-
teristics employed in a magazine article to describe four premier point guards in col-
lege basketball:
1. Kenny Anderson (Georgia Tech)-'Kenny has superb instincts, unbeliev-
able quickness, and he's also amazingly mature for his age.... But ... he
often shoots when he should pass, a serious indictment for a point guard.'
2. Bobby Hurley (Duke)-'So what's the deal here? Hurley's a team ge-
nius, the type of kid coaches love to love.... From a team point of
view-and what other point of view is there for a point guard?-This
perceptive penetrator does every bit as much for the Blue Devils as An-
derson does for Tech.'
3. Chris Corchiani (North Carolina State)-'If he gets the ball on the move,
he's almost impossible to stabilize. Still, many experts question CC
Rider's quickness and outside shot. Legitimate queries. But with a guy
like Chris, his intangibles will always outweigh his ability.'
4. Lee Mayberry (Arkansas)-'Mayberry's a brilliant athlete and a great
passer, but not a true point guard. He just doesn't think like one, says
Hamilton. 'More often than not, I disagree with his decision making.' (ci-
tations omitted).
Anderson and Mayberry are (of course) African-Americans. The writer gives them
credit for their physical ability but has reservations about their mental abilities. The
white players-Hurley and Corchiani-lack the physical skill of Anderson and May-
berry, but they make up for it with cognitive abilities and intangibles. Thus, while it
appears the writer is honoring Anderson and Mayberry by their inclusion in this ex-
clusive group, he is, in fact, reproducing one of the most pervasive stereotypes of
African-Americans: They have the tools, but their intellect is questionable....
Harris, supra note 62, at 62 (citations omitted).
Similar illustrations of the transmission of stereotypes by the media are contained
in HoosE, supra note 146, at 9-20.
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to their physical abilities. 166 Given the limited contact between
whites and blacks, it is the media, rather than individual contact,
that serves as the primary source of information shaping the identi-
ties of each group.167 Unfortunately, the media's depiction is too
infused with stereotypes to bridge the gap in understanding the
true identities of whites and blacks.'6 To the contrary, as Profes-
sor Adeno notes, the media assists in institutionalizing the social
and information gap between whites and blacks.169
Professor David Wiggins posits that, although the specific expla-
nations for the superior performance of African-Americans has
changed over time, a consistent trend emerges: the emphasis on
physiological attributes. 70 This is not surprising given that the
dominant culture is both fascinated and troubled by the dominance
of blacks in certain sports.' 71 Race neutrality in the constitutional
setting serves the interests of the dominant culture by, among other
things, creating the illusion of neutrality. 72 Similarly, the unwar-
ranted focus on physiological attributes ameliorates for white
Americans the troubling aspects of African-American sports
dominance.
Professor Wiggins further offers a cogent explanation for the
emphasis on physiological attributes:
By acknowledging a physiological basis for black athletic superi-
ority, whites... could more easily maintain the broad range of
black character they found acceptable.... Acknowledgement of
physical superiority did nothing to disrupt the feeling among a
large segment of the white population that blacks were either
docile or savage, faithful or tricky, pathetic or comical, childish
166. See LAPcIcK, supra note 103, at 249 (providing illustrations of media perpet-
uation of racist stereotypes of African-American athletes).
167. Addis, supra note 165, at 542.
Given the highly segregated nature of social life and the workplace, the me-
dia is often the only means through which blacks and whites have sustained
contact with each other. The media, however, often fails to bridge the social
space between the two groups, and in many ways it has continued to institu-
tionalize that gap.Id
168. Id. For an articulation of the reasons behind the media's stereotypical por-
trayal of African-American athletes see id, at 558-59.
169. d at 542.
170. See generally Wiggins, supra note 163. Insightful commentary of the various
racial explanations relied on to account for the success of African-American athletes
is articulated in SPORT IN SociLry, supra note 150, at 243-56 and Edwards, supra note
113, at 44.
171. Wiggins, supra note 163, at 182.
172. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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or oversexed .... The notions of hard work, dedication, and
sacrifice [known as the Protestant work ethic] were rarely used
by white commentators to describe the efforts of [notable black
athletes] .... 173
2. Recasting the Image-Mylan's Story
The experience of Mylan, a fictional black student-athlete repre-
senting a composite of several student and professional athletes,174
provides a counterstory to the stereotypes that devalue the intellec-
tual capabilities of black athletes. It demonstrates that the athletic
achievements of black student-athletes are attributable to factors
that extend beyond innate physical abilities.
Mylan grew up in an East Texas town. His father died when he
was young. He and his brother were raised by his mother who
worked two jobs to support them. Thus, like many black student-
athletes, Mylan comes from very modest economic
circumstances. 75
Also like many other African-American student-athletes, Mylan,
as well as his family, perceives sports as one of the few vehicles of
economic and social mobility available to him.176 In the words of
Mylan, "[I]t's a way to obtain an education, make money and help
173. Wiggins, supra note 163, at 182.
174. In creating Mylan's story, I draw from secondary materials as well as inter-
views and conversations with student-athletes.
175. In contrast to their white counterparts, black student-athletes come from fami-
lies with lower incomes and less educated parents. Robert M. Sellers et al., Life Ex-
periences of Black Student-Athletes in Revenue-Producing Sports: A Descriptive
Empirical Analysis, ACA. ATHrimc J. 20, 32-33 (1991); AM. INSTS. FOR RES., RPT.
No. 3: EXPERIENCES OF BLAcK INTERCOLLErATE ATHLETES AT NCAA DIVISION I
INsTrrrTONS 13, 32-33 (1989) [hereinafter A.I.R. REPORT].
176. See Edwards, supra note 113, at 44. See also SPORT IN SOcIErv, supra note
150, at 247.
The truth however is that although sport has provided a means of upward mobility
for a few black athletes, the perpetuation of this myth has unwelcome consequences
for the African-American community. Quite simply, sport is not a viable avenue for
escaping the ghetto for the vast majority of black youngsters. As Harry Edwards
cogently wrote, "To tie the aspirations of 30 million people to fewer than 2,000 jobs in
three professional sports is an inhuman mockery." STEPHEN K. FiGLER & GAIL
WHITAKER, SPORT AND PLAY IN AMERICAN LIrw 301 (2d ed. 1991) (quoting Harry
Edwards). The injury resulting from the perpetuation of this myth is that it misdirects
the time and energy of black youths from endeavors which provide more realistic
avenues of development. Id. Professor Edwards explains,
Athletics, then, stifles the pursuit of rational alternatives for black people.
For the black masses, struggling for political and social survival, the ideal of
individual achievement must appear after 400 years of racist oppression, to
be a treadmill and a 'con game.' So while sport may reinforce certain values
in white fans, it is unlikely that it has anything more, finally, than a sedative
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my mother and brother." In order to achieve his goal of playing
professional sports, he needed to obtain a scholarship to play bas-
ketball at a Division I institution. Mylan thus worked hard at de-
veloping his athletic skills, and his hard work paid off in the form of
the college scholarship.
Mylan developed into a phenomenal basketball player for his
college; he was named to the All-American team. Such skills
quickly caught the attention of the press. Mylan recalls being de-
scribed in one press account as follows: "I was described in the
newspapers as being 'so superbly blended and proportioned (and
driven by such a fission-fast nervous system) that he achieved the
graceful, swift appearance of a large, lithe cat.' ""n
Mylan explains that while some would consider such depictions
flattering, he finds them insulting. He sees them as dehumanizing
him and discounting the hard work that enables him to display such
athletic acumen. "I would be the first to acknowledge that I have
considerable athletic ability, but my skills are more closely identi-
fied with being an engineer than a cat. ' 178 To illustrate this point,
Mylan gave the following account of a competitive situation:
One of [Stanford's] players stole the ball at half-court for a
breakaway lay-up.... He was so far ahead of us that nobody
bothered to chase him but me. The guy's lead was so big he
wasn't hurrying. When he reached half-court I took one long
stride off to the left to change may angle, then went straight for
the bucket. I was flying.... [The sweetness of the play was the
giant step I took to the left as I was building up speed. Without
that step the play would have failed, because I'd have fouled the
guy by landing on him after the shot. The step to the left gave
me just enough angle coming across to miss him and land to the
right of him without a foul. [One teammate] was the only guy in
the [arena] who noticed that step and knew what it meant.179
In describing the source of his talent and the effort which went into
his skills, Mylan explained:
I thought about situations in a game. I dribbled around chairs
and worked on my crossover and change-of-pace dribbles. I ran
into stationary objects and faked one way and went another
effect on blacks, a soporific that keeps them from overcoming the impedi-
ments to black achievement.
Edwards, supra note 113, at 44.
177. Hoosa, supra note 146, at 17 (description once given of Oscar Robertson in a
book on the history of college basketball).
178. Id. (paraphrasing former basketball superstar Oscar Robertson).
179. Id. at 16. (quoting former basketball superstar Bill Russell).
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way. It was like a baseball player standing in front of a mirror
with a bat and watching his swing.'8
So you see, more is involved here than raw talent. Since com-
ing to college, I've worked hard to develop the fundamental
skills of basketball. Often, I'm so tired after practice (particu-
larly when we have two-a-days) that all I can do is go to the
dorm and crash. 181 In fact, all of the effort and time which goes
into practice makes playing basketball seem like going to
work.'8
2
Mylan relates the foregoing to emphasize that playing sports is
hard work even though it does not always seem to be the case.
People refuse to acknowledge that decisions made on the playing
field are the result of years of practice, of trial and error and of
theory development. 8 3 He attributes this to the fact that the dis-
play of talent seems automatic and masks the effort necessary to
develop them. In his words,
The program in your brain takes over. Subconsciously you've
probably seen and imagined every situation." 4 But remember it
is learned. You must learn the offense or you'll never get on the
floor.'8 5 You could be the greatest player, but if you don't know
how to react and go to certain spots you won't be out there."8
Thus, Mylan recognizes that the hard work and intellect required
to excel at sport is overlooked. Such is especially true in the case
of the black athlete. If society attributes their athletic success to
physical characteristics, it couples that with intellectual inferiority.
180. Id at 17. (quoting Oscar Robertson)
181. See PATRiCIA A. ADLER & PETER ADLER, BACKBOARDS & BLACKBOARDS:
COLLEGE ATHLETES AND ROLE ENGULFMENT 73 (1991).
182. See id at 81 (observing in their study of college basketball players that many
equate practicing to going to work).
183. In criticizing observations concerning basketball star Michael Jordan which fo-
cused on his innate ability as being the sole source of his basketball genius, one com-
mentator stated:
To describe Michael Jordan as 'a kid who takes off flying through the sky,' as
Dick Vitale does, is to lose sight of the person who decided to spring. Thejump, and the direction and timing of the jump, were strategic decisions,
made in microseconds, based on years of practice, of trial and error, of the-
ory developed on playgrounds and in gyms.
HoosE, supra note 146, at 15.
184. Id at 17 (quoting former NFL All-Pro running back Calvin Hill who "likens
great breakaway runners to jazz improvisers who launch long solo flights from a
solid-but unrecognized-foundation of chord theory").
185. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 181, at 75 (quoting a college basketball player on
the necessity of applying skills learned in practice).
186. Id
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IU. The Harm Caused by Racism in College Sport
The continued presence of the above-outlined stereotypical no-
tions of African-American athletes legitimizes the subtle forms of
discrimination existing in college athletics. The section below ex-
amines how this mindset of discrimination injures African-Ameri-
cans engaged in college sport.
A. Manifestations of a Mindset of Superiority
The following analysis of the harm occasioned by unconscious
racism in collegiate sport is undertaken to a considerable extent by
examining the concerns raised by the Black Coaches Association
(BCA). The BCA's grievances represent a useful laundry-list.
They identify the two broad categories of harmful consequences
caused by the persistence of racism in intercollegiate athletics: (i)
denial of unqualified participation in the college sport infrastruc-
ture; and (ii) the adverse impact on the academic, social and psy-
chological well-being of the African-American student-athlete.
The veil that masks the unconscious racism in college athletics
was partially lifted in October, 1993, when the BCA voted to boy-
cott an "issues forum" sponsored by the National Association of
Basketball Coaches (NABC).117 The BCA protest was designed to
draw attention to concerns regarding limited educational opportu-
nities afforded African-American student-athletes and limited op-
portunities for African-Americans within the administrative
infrastructure of collegiate athletics.188
Following its boycott of the NABC forum, the BCA presented its
concerns to members of the Congressional Black Caucus.1 89 Dur-
187. Steve Berkowitz, Black Coaches' Group to Boycott Issues Forum, WASH.
POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at Fl. The NABC is a nationwide group comprised of college
basketball coaches. Id
The NABC issued a statement in response to the BCA's protest which provided in
pertinent part as follows: the issues raised by the BCA "go beyond the game of bas-
ketball and reflect a concern with greater social problems." Laura E. Bollig, Black
Coaches Noticeably Absent from Meeting, NCAA NEws, Oct. 25, 1993, at 5. The
NABC also indicated that it supported the BCA's goals but felt black coaches needed
to separately address issues of particular concern to them. Debra E. Blum, Black
Coaches Head to Congress to Press Charge of Bias in College Sport, CHmoN. HioHER
EDUC., Oct. 27, 1993, at A3.
188. William C. Rhoden, Coaches Seek Voice on N.C.A.A. Rules, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct.
20, 1993, at B12 (summarizing the BCA's desire to include greater African-American
input in the NCAA rule making process and increased access to coaching opportuni-
ties; and their concern regarding the disproportionate impact of certain rules on Afri-
can-American students); Berkowitz, supra note 187, at Fl.
189. Michael Wilbon, Coaches' Boycott: It's Time, WASH. Posr, Oct. 15, 1993, at
C1. The BCA/Black Caucus deliberations resulted in the formation of a Black Cau-
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ing these deliberations, the BCA challenged, inter alia, the wisdom
and fairness of the newly adopted freshman eligibility require-
ments and the standardized tests on which the standards are pri-
marily based.19° These discussion precipitated the creation of a
Congressional task force to discuss BCA concerns.191
A conciliatory response by the NCAA failed to appease the
BCA. 192 BCA members threatened to mount a series of protest
activities including a possible coaches' and players' boycott of bas-
ketbal games. 93 The threat of a boycott gained momentum when
the NCAA voted 191 to 119, at its 1994 Annual Convention, not to
increase the number of Division I men's basketball scholarships al-
lowable. 94 Many college presidents at the convention perceived
the efforts to restore the scholarship as the first step toward erod-
ing the changes that were instituted as a part of the NCAA's re-
form efforts to contain costs in college athletics programs. 195
Nevertheless, a proposal to review Proposal 16, which contained
cus task force to examine the issues. Harry Blauvelt & Steve Wieberg, Black Caucus
Hears Case of Coaches, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 1993, at IC.
190. Steve Wieberg, Black Coaches, NCAA Open Talks Today, USA TODAY, Mar.
1, 1994, at 1C.
191. William C. Rhoden, Coaches Seek Voice on N.C.A.A. Rules, N.Y. Trams, Oct.
20, 1993, at B12; George H. Raveling, Black Coaches Want to be Heard, NCAA
NEws, Nov. 29, 1993, at 4. The task force was comprised of six members of the BCA
and six members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Rhoden, supra
192. Steve Wieberg, Conciliatory Talk Doesn't Stir Coaches, USA TODAY, Oct. 21,
1993, at IC.
The attitude of many members of the NCAA was illustrated by its willingness to
consider delaying the implementation of tougher academic standards and relaxation
of player-contact restrictions. Certain members of the NCAA President's Commis-
sion took a more critical stance toward the BCA. Presidents Hearn of Wake Forest
University and O'Brien of the University of New Orleans challenged the BCA to
specify their demands for suggested changes. Nevertheless, they too suggested possi-
ble compromise on issues of concern to the BCA. Tun Layden, Coaches Groups
Given Challenge, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 1993, at 166.
193. Steve Wieberg, NCAA Move Doesn't Deter Black Coaches, USA TODAY, Oct.
21, 1993, at 7C. The threatened boycott which was characterized as "Black Saturday"
would urge players and coaches to boycott college basketball games on a specific
Saturday. Id
194. Debra E. Blum, Basketball Protest, CHRON. IOHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 1994, at
A35; Malcolm Moran, N.C.A.A. Vote on Athlete Aid Irks Coaches, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
10, 1994, at B9; Steve Wieberg, Black Coaches Ready for Hoops Boycott, USA To-
DAY, Jan. 12, 1994. at IA.
195. For some officials, rejecting the proposal symbolized the NCAA's ability to
maintain the principles of the reform movement, such as toughening academic stan-
dards and cutting sports' spending. Blum, supra note 194, at A35.
President Thomas Hearn of Wake Forest emphasized that modifying reformed
minded legislation would "open the door, for every other sport to claim the need to
restore its own scholarships." Id. Hearn's view paralleled that of the Presidents
Commission which maintained that repeal of the legislation would impede the mo-
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new initial eligibility standards, was overwhelmingly adopted at the
convention after it was disclosed that an NCAA committee advisor
had ties to a psychologist with racist views on social engineering.196
Despite a high degree of anxiety in the aftermath of the NCAA's
scholarship vote,197 the threatened boycott failed to materialize.
The boycott was forestalled as a result of behind-the-scenes negoti-
ations. These negotiations culminated in a plan whereby the Com-
munity Relations Service, 98 a branch of the United States Justice
Department, intervened to mediate the BCA's dispute with the
NCAA. 199 These discussions in turn led to an agreement between
the BCA and NCAA that addressed "a number of issues related to
expansion of education, employment and governance-participation
opportunities for blacks and other ethnic minorities within the
NCAA .... 1200 In short, the agreement delineated a set of gov-
erning principles that will provide the framework for future discus-
sions between the BCA and NCAA. 201
mentum of reform, "signal a highly visible reversal of its cost-cutting initiatives and
invite similar appeals from coaches of other sports." Moran, supra note 194, at B9.
The 1991 NCAA Annual Convention has been heralded as the reform convention
because of its emphasis on cost containment reforms and, to a much lesser extent,
educational reforms. For critical assessments of the 1991 reform efforts see Robert
N. Davis, Athletic Reform: Missing the Bases in University Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L.
REv. 597 (1991); Deborah A. Katz, What are the "Bases" in University Athletics?
Comment on "Athletic Reform. Missing the Bases in University Athletics", 20 CAP. U.
L. REv. 611 (1991); Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games
with the Reform of Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 567 (1991).
196. Moran, supra note 194, at B9.
197. Steve Wieberg, Top Officials Try to Blunt Boycott Move, USA TODAY, Jan. 12,
1994, at 1C (also discussing efforts by athletic officials to determine how to respond to
an expected boycott).
198. "Irihe Justice Department's Community Relations Service... was created by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is empowered to offer assistance in resolving any
issue related to race, color or national origin discrimination.. .". Steve Richardson,
Black Coaches Association Postpones Boycott of College Basketball Games, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, Jan. 15, 1994, at 1A.
199. BCA Delays Boycott Action, NCAA NEws, Jan. 19, 1994, at 1; Richardson,
supra note 198, at IA. The first in a series of mediation sessions between the BCA
and NCAA was convened on March 1, 1994. Wieberg, supra note 190, at 1C.
200. Method for Addressing Issues Provided by NCAA-BCA Talks, NCAA NEws,
Mar. 30, 1994, at 1. Although it is not clear precisely what issues will be addressed
through mediation, NCAA Executive Director, Cedric W. Dempsey, explains that
"[w]e all benefit by examining the issues of access, fairness and academic integrity in a
considered and cooperative manner." Richardson, supra note 198. Additionally,
Congressman Kwesi Mfume says the issues are more complex than a fourteenth
scholarship. Id
201. Moreover, the endorsements set forth in the agreement focus on the need for
enhanced communication between the NCAA and the BCA so as to facilitate in-
creased opportunities for African-Americans to participate in all levels of intercollegi-
ate athletics. Debra E. Blum, Black Coaches and NCAA Agree to Discuss Disputed
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The BCA's concerns fall into two broad categories: (i) the need
for greater inclusion of African-Americans and other ethnic minor-
ities in all levels of college athletics, including the NCAA's gov-
erning process; and (ii) the impact of NCAA rules and regulations
on African-American student-athletes and their communities. 202
With respect to access for African-Americans to the NCAA in-
frastructure, the BCA demanded an examination of three con-
cerns: the paucity of African-American executives within the
NCAA administration,2 3 the need for more African-American
college faculty and coaching staff204 and increased opportunities for
female coaches. 20 5 BCA concerns regarding African-American
student-athletes include: alleged disparate impact and cultural bias
of NCAA initial eligibility standards;206 reductions in scholarships,
which allegedly reduce opportunities for prospective African-
American student-athletes;2 7 decreases in the numbers of African-
Rules, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30, 1994, at A36 (summarizing the accord
reached between the NCAA and BCA).
202. The BCA's activities represent a continuation of protest efforts by black
coaches and administrators.
For years, black coaches and others have complained about academic stan-
dards set by the NCAA, which they say discriminate against black athletes.
They have also voiced their discontent with what they see as the shrinking
availability of scholarships for black athletes and limited opportunities in
college sports for the advancement of black coaches.
Debra E. Blum, Black Coaches vs. an NCAA Rule, CHmON. IGHER EDUc., Nov. 10,
1993, at A48.
203. The BCA cited statistics which revealed that there are no African-Americans
among the 14 top-level NCAA administrators. Of the total 129 NCAA administra-
tors, 21 are African-American and two are Hispanic. Blauvelt & Wieberg, supra note
189, at 1C; Raveling, supra note 191, at 5.
204. A BCA-conducted survey revealed that 52 or 4.4% of the 1,218 head-coachingjobs in men's and women's basketball, football, baseball and track and field are held
by African-Americans. Richard Lapchick, Finally, a Small Step in the Right Direction,
SPORING NEws, Jan. 31, 1994, at 8. The same survey found that African-Americans
account for fewer than 200, or less than 4%, of the 5,000 assistant coaching positions
in the same Division I sports. Id See G.D. Clay, Black Coaches Take a Stand, NEws-
DAY, Oct. 17, 1993, at 30 (noting comments by basketball coach Nolan Richardson
decrying the limited numbers of black coaches in college athletics); John Weyler,
Baker Among Those Boycotting Conference of Black Coaches, L.A. TMIEs, Oct. 19,
1993, at 7C (also describing complaints of black coaches that the NCAA money sav-
ing measures which reduce the number of entry-level coaching positions, further lim-
its coaching opportunities for African-Ameicans).
205. Blauvelt & Wieberg, supra note 189, at 1C. See Raveling, supra note 191, at 5;
Lapchick, supra note 204, at 8 (noting a BCA survey revealing that substantially more
white men than black women coach women's basketball teams).
206. Raveling, supra note 191, at 5.
207. Id Recently enacted NCAA legislation reduced the number of athletic schol-
arships in Division I-A basketball and football to the following: basketball from 15 in
1992 to 13 in 1993 and in football from 92 in 1992 to 85 in 1994. NCAA OPERAING
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American student-athletes competing for Division I schools; 08 leg-
islation limiting the access of coaches to student-athletes and pro-
spective recruits;209 restrictions on the amount of athletic activities
of student athletes;210 and rules that restrict the money student-
athletes are permitted to earn.1
The foregoing concerns reflect societal beliefs that, despite the
integration of college athletics, African-Americans remain partial
participants in the various levels of college sport, such as adminis-
tration and coaching.212 Indeed, the inequality of access for blacks
to the administration of college athletics demonstrates the persis-
tent influence of a particular racial stereotype: the black athlete as
inferior to the white athlete regarding intellectual and leadership
abilities.
A remarkable contrast exists between the substantial numbers of
African-American student-athletes playing in college revenue-pro-
ducing sport and the limited number of African-Americans holding
decision-making positions within the collegiate sport enterprise.1 3
Denying African-Americans equal access to managerial, coaching
and administrative positions in college sport is consistent with and
a consequence of the unconscious racism existing in college sport.
NCAA-generated statistics tend to support this theory. Accord-
ing to a 1994 NCAA Minority Affairs Committee report, blacks
comprised approximately 25% of all student-athletes in 1993-94, 21
BYLAw, art. 15, §§ 15.5.4, 15.5.5, supra note 8, at 199. In addition, the legislation
reduced the size of coaching staffs-basketball to two full-time, one restricted-earn-
ings assistant and football to nine full-time, two graduate assistants in August, 1992.
NCAA OPERATmO BYLAw, art. 11, §§ 11.7.2, 11.7.4, supra note 8, at 62, 63.
208. Raveling, supra note 191, at 5.
209. d; Blauvelt & Wieberg, supra note 189, at 1C.
210. A student-athlete's participation in athletic activities is limited to a maximum
of four hours daily and 20 hours per week. NCAA OPERA7TNG BYLAW, art. 17,
§ 17.1.5.1, supra note 8, at 232.
211. Raveling, supra note 191, at 5 (the BCA proposes that student-athletes be paid
a stipend not to exceed $1,500 per semester).
212. See id at 4, 5.
213. Sage, supra note 14, at 11. See Rhodes & Butler supra note 14, at 924;
Berkowitz, supra note 187, at Fl.
The BCA protest also drew attention to the need for colleges and universities to
hire more black faculty and coaches. Harry Blauvelt, Black Coaches Take Case to
Congressmen, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 1993, at 1C. Commenting on the sparse numbers
of black professors at predominantly white institutions, Nolan Richardson, coach of
the University of Arkansas' men's basketball team, emphasizes the need for black
professors who can serve as role models and mentors for black student-athletes. Clay,
supra note 204, at 30.
214. Steve Wieberg, Study Faults Colleges on Minority Hiring, USA TODAY, Aug.
18, 1994, at 1C.
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yet held considerably fewer athletic director and coaching posi-
tions. Black representation at these levels was 10% and 8% re-
spectively.215 These statistics become even more dramatic when
the data for historically black institutions are removed.216 African-
American representation among both athletic directors and head
coaches consequently falls to 4%.217 With respect to non-black in-
stitutions, the NCAA report also concluded that the number of Af-
rican-Americans in such stepping-stone positions as associate
athletic director at Division I institutions decreased slightly from
5.5% in 1992-93 to 4.9% in 1993-94.218
One writer noted that, "[w]hile dominant racial ideology has
worked to turn black men into entertainment commodities in
sports, it has nearly kept them completely out of management posi-
tions in sport organizations. ' 219 Sociologist George Sage reaches a
similar conclusion by contrasting adult African-Americans' limited
management and administrative opportunities with student-ath-
letes' increased opportunities to compete in revenue-producing
sports. He opines that this contrast illustrates how the dominant
group can employ subtle tools of discrimination in college sport,
since it controls access and is better insulated from judicial and
public scrutiny.220
B. Racism's Impact on African-American Student-Athletes
Just as unconscious racism limits the opportunities available for
African-American coaches and administrators, it also limits oppor-
tunities and otherwise harms to African-American student-ath-
letes.22t From the black student-athlete's perspective. stereotypes
that nurture unconscious racism cause a myriad of negative effects,
including:
215. Id
216. Id
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. CoAKLEY, supra note 150, at 255. The basis for this exclusion is the dominant
ideology that "[Coaches and] managers have to think, and the conventional wisdom
among sports' ruling elite is that... blacks don't think as well as whites." Id Profes-
sor Coakley concludes that the sparsity of blacks in administrative positions is consis-
tent with race logic and stacking patterns in team sports. Id
For a discussion of stacking, see infra notes 223-32.
220. Sage, supra note 14, at 11. Black positions are not considered leadership and
thinking positions. A playing career at a non-leadership position is, therefore, as-
sumed to be inadequate training for a career in coaching, providing at least one factor
that keeps blacks out of this occupation. Eitzen & Sanford, supra note 14, at 950.
221. Harris, supra note 62, at 63.
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subtle racism evidenced in different treatment during recruit-
ment; poor academic advice; harsh discipline; positional segre-
gation on the playing field and social segregation off it; blame
for ills for which they are not responsible. Then there are the
complaints of overt racism: racial abuse; blacks being benched in
games more quickly than whites; marginal whites being kept on
the bench while only blacks who play are retained; extra money
for the white players; summer jobs for whites and good jobs for
their wives.=
In short, the perpetuation of stereotypes, incorporated into a domi-
nant ideology, continues to harm black student-athletes academi-
cally, athletically, economically, socially and psychologically.
Although the extent of the practice has decreased in recent
years,223 the phenomenon of stacking illustrates the relationship
between stereotypes and limited athletic opportunities for African-
American student-athletes. Stacking involves the assignment of
certain individuals to specific athletic positions based on race or
ethnicity rather than ability.225 For African-Americans, stacking
historically relegated them to positions requiring "speed, quick-
ness, and jumping ability, 226 and other physical abilities, instead of
intellect. Thus, the "thinking" and control positions, such as
pitcher in baseball and quarterback in football, were reserved for
white players. 27 How racial stereotyping contributes to stacking
has been aptly described: "The notion that blacks are physically
superior... helps ... justify the practice of stacking. If blacks are
physically superior, then whites can monopolize key positions
which ostensibly require greater thinking and organization ability;
for example, quarterback, and team captain." 2
Although African-American access to positions historically re-
served for white athletes has increased, that access continues to be
influenced by popular myths and stereotypes. That is, black ath-
letes who play in previously inaccessible positions are required to
222. LAPCHICK, supra note 103, at 236.
223. See infra note 228. Stacking is less common than was once the case.
224. Lombardo, supra note 3, at 61-62 (noting that stacking resulted in positional
discrimination in baseball and football).
225. Harris, supra note 62, at 63.
226. Id.
227. See Harris, supra note 62, at 62-3.
228. Edwards, supra note 113, at 52. The position segregation, known as stacking,
results "not because 'central' positions require higher levels of social interaction and
coordinative tasks, but rather because racial stereotypes suggest that blacks are more
ideally suited for those positions which are the least responsible and intellectually
demanding." Eitzen & Sanford, supra note 14, at 954.
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engage in styles of play that are an outgrowth of stereotypes con-
cerning innate athletic ability. For instance, black college
quarterbacks, assuming a position historically reserved for white
players, are required to run more often than whites in order to gain
significant yardage.2 9 Implicit in this requirement appears to be a
continued belief in the stereotype that blacks naturally have better
running abilities.230 Finally, the consequences of stacking extend
beyond the playing field. As explained by one commentator: "If
the black man-is an effortless, natural athlete, but the white man
must work at mastering the sport, then the white athlete would
probably know the intricacies and dynamics of the sport better."' 31
This raises the inference that "the white athlete would make a bet-
ter coach, manager, league commissioner, or even TV or radio
sportscaster."12
In addition, the persistence of racial stereotypes harms the aca-
demic interests of African-American student-athletes. Indeed, per-
haps the most disheartening and significant consequence of
unconscious racism in college sport is the failure of institutions to
value African-American student-athletes' academic competence
over their athletic ability. 3 3 The ultimate result is academic
neglect.
1. The Questionable Neutrality of NCAA Regulations'
Another consequence of unconscious racism is the disparate im-
pact of NCAA rules and regulations on African-American student-
athletes. The NCAA's uniform rules and regulations are premised
on a notion of colorblindness. Despite their assumed neutrality,
the NCAA rules appear to impact black student-athletes dispro-
portionately. Indeed, over the past ten years, considerable debate
has revolved around the disparate impact of NCAA initial eligibil-
ity requirements on African-American student-athletes. 3 s How-
ever, eligibility rules provide but a single illustration of NCAA
rules and regulations. Many believe that these rules as a whole
229. Id.
230. Harris, supra note 62, at 63.
231. Edwards, supra note 113, at 52.
232. Id.
233. Harris, supra note 62, at 63.
234. As previously noted, it is my intent to reserve full consideration of this issue
for a sequel to this Article. Nevertheless, a brief diversion seems warranted given the
relationship between facially neutral rules and regulations and the overall, including
academic, well-being of African-American student-athletes.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 254-68.
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operate to produce disproportionate injury to African-American
student-athletes and their communities.3- Ultimately, the ques-
tion posed is whether racial realities should be considered in as-
sessing the need for and application of particular rules and
regulations, especially those rules that concern limitations on
player/coach contact, limitations on earned income, reductions in
scholarships, sanctions for rules violations and academic eligibility
standards.
Arguably, the rules that should be subjected to a racial realism
analysis include those that limit a coach's contact with current stu-
dent-athletes.3 7 The NCAA imposes limitations on the amount of
time that Division I student-athletes can spend off season in other
sport programs.38 Limiting the degree to which student-athletes
can participate in such organized activities has the subsidiary effect
of limiting the time that they spend under a coach's guidance.23 9
Black coaches criticize this rule as interfering with the mentoring
function that African-American coaches can provide for black stu-
dent-athletes.240
African-American coaches and administrators have voiced simi-
lar criticisms of recruiting rules limiting a coach's access to high
school students.241 The problem with the rules at the high school
level echoes that of the NCAA rules: such restrictions inhibit the
mentoring role that coaches can provide for troubled black
youths. 42 The frustration emanating from this rule was dramati-
236. Black Caucus Backs Basketball Coaches, DeRorr FREE PRss, Oct. 20, 1993,
at 2C (noting black coaches' criticisms of uniform rules which more severely impact
the interests of African-American student-athletes); Black Coaches Seek Help on
Capitol Hill, PLAiN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 20, 1993, at ID (discussing how several
NCAA policies disparately impact African-Americans).
237. Blum, supra note 202, at A48 (noting that the access of coaches to players and
prospective players is a concern which seems only to have recently emerged).
238. NCAA OPERATNNG BYLAw, art. 17, § 17.1.5.2, supra note 8, at 232.
239. Berkowitz, supra note 187, at Fl.
240. Id.
241. Limits on contacting prospective athletes ... were meant not only to free
athletes from being hounded by coaches interested in their athletic talents,
but to curtail the mounting expense of recruiting wars among institutions,
and to keep coaches from having advantages over one another simply be-
cause of their budgets or locations.
Blum, supra note 202, at A49.
242. Certain segments of the athletic community are skeptical of the BCA's true
motivation. Some believe the desire for increased access has more to do with ob-
taining a recruiting advantage than serving in a mentoring role. These reservations
were expressed by the commissioner of the Colonial Athletic League as follows:
You have to question how completely altruistic their motives are when you
know what the rules are.... I'm sure the coaches are concerned with the
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cally articulated by John Thompson: "When somebody's shooting
somebody down here on First and K Street and I can't jump in a
car and go down there because, without a manual, I can't deter-
mine whether he's a recruitable athlete or not, that's where we're
frustrated. '2 3 In short, many African-American coaches view
such rules as being inconsistent with what they perceive as their
special obligation to help young people in African-American
communities. 2"
In addition to denouncing NCAA rules pertaining to contacts
between coaches and current or prospective players, the BCA ad-
dressed other limitations that adversely affect African-American
student-athletes. The BCA proposed that student-athletes receive
a stipend of up to $1,500 per semester.245 Studies reveal that Afri-
can-American student-athletes come from households with lower
socioeconomic status.2 6 Thus, the proposal is premised on the be-
lief that student-athletes "from economically disadvantaged back-
grounds have little access to spending money."2' 7 In proposing the
stipend,, the BCA indirectly assaults NCAA regulations limiting
the amount of income that student-athletes can earn. The broader
issue raised by the BCA's initiative is the extent to which facially
neutral income limitations, in ignoring the particular circumstances
of black student-athletes, harm African-American student-athletes
more than their white counterparts. 24s
health and well-being of all the kids who can leap a small building in a single
bound, but it's not as clear that they are as concerned with all the other kids.
Blum, supra note 202, at A48. See Raveling, supra note 191, at 5 (acknowledging that
critics question the BCA's motives); Kevin B. Blackistone, Black Coaches' Fight with
NCAA all about Fairness, DALLAS MoRmuNo NEws, Dec. 26, 1993, at 4B (noting
skeptical views of Texas basketball coach Tom Penders); Ben Brown & Steve
Wieberg, BCA Sows Seeds of Revolutioni Coaches and their Critics Clash on Motive
for Possible Action, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 1994, at 10C (discussing the differing per-
ceptions concerning the true motive for black coaches' protest).
243. Rhoden, supra, note 191, at B12.
244. Blum, supra note 202, at A48.
245. Raveling, supra note 191, at 5. At the NCAA 1995 convention, NCAA dele-
gates rejected the $1,500 stipend proposal. Alexander Wolff & Richard O'Brien,
Scorecard. Conventional Wisdom, SPoRTs ILL., Jan. 16, 1995, at 10.
246. A.I.R. REPoRT, supra note 175, at 32.
247. Black Coaches Association Seeks an End to Freshman Eligibility, THE NCAA
NEws, June 1, 1994, at 1.
248. A study of the college experience of African-American student-athletes tends
to support the assertion that they have special needs and are harmed by the failure of
NCAA rules and regulations to consider these needs:
Black student athletes' reliance on off-campus support may interact with
their socioeconomic background to place them at greater risk. Because
black student-athletes come from poorer families and because their support
systems are more likely to be located away from campus, it is more difficult
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Another issue that raises the specter of unconscious racism is the
reduction in the number of athletic scholarships allowed by the
NCAA. At its 1993 annual convention, the NCAA voted to de-
crease the number of men's basketball scholarships that Division I
institutions can award from 15 to 14.2 9 The number of football
scholarships was also reduced.2s° These rules and resulting reduc-
tions were a part of an overall agenda (at what has been character-
ized as the cost containment convention) aimed at reducing costs
associated with college athletics.251
The BCA severely criticized such cost-cutting measures.5 From
the perspective of many BCA members, scholarship reductions
eliminate opportunities for black student-athletes2 3 and demon-
strate a lack of sensitivity to the African-American community.
The facially neutral rules that have been most severely criticized
for their alleged adverse impact on African-American student-ath-
letes are those which relate to the initial eligibility requirements.
The BCA vociferously attacked these rules as reflecting bias
against African-American student-athletes. Specifically, the BCA
protested the upcoming implementation of Proposal 16,2 4 which
modifies current eligibility requirements.255
for them to access their support systems personally. This problem is exacer-
bated by the NCAA's financial restraints which forbid student-athletes to
work during the school year and yet do not provide them with any money
beyond tuition, room and board.
Robert M. Sellers et al., Life Experiences of Black Student-Athletes in Revenue-Pro-
ducing Sports: A Descriptive Empirical Analysis, 1991 ACA. ATHLEnIc J. 20, 33.
249. Steve Berkowitz, Two Groups, but Similar Agenda, Black Basketball Coaches
Split from National Group to Press Issues, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1993, at E2.
250. Id.
251. Berkowitz, supra note 249, at E2. See generally Davis, supra note 195.
252. Raveling, supra note 191, at 5; Berkowitz, supra note 187, at Fl.
253. John Weyler, Baker Among Those Boycotting Conference of Black Coaches,
L.A. Tauds, Oct. 19, 1993, at C7; Berkowitz, supra note 187, at Fl.
Critics also argue the cut-backs evidence a desire to limit the participation of black
athletes in college sport. John Weyler, Black UCI Coach Stands Up for Boycott, L.A.
Trams, Jan. 14, 1994, at Al.
Finally, some BCA representatives also expressed the concern that cuts in scholar-
ships were being made to accommodate gender equity issues at the expense of issues
and concerns involving black athletes. Berkowitz, supra note 187, at Fl.
254. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
255. Berkowitz, supra note 187, at Fl. BCA President, Marian Washington, as-
serted that the NCAA would soon "be legislating people out of going to college...."
Steve Berkowitz, Coaches' Boycott Possible: African-American Officials Air Griev-
ances, WASH. PosT, Oct. 11, 1993, at C5.
Under currently effective standards, a scholarship athlete is eligible to compete dur-
ing his first year only if he has a score of 700 on the SAT or 17 on the ACI" and at
least a 2.0 grade-point average in a core curriculum comprised of eleven courses.
NCAA OPmATno BYLAW, art. 14, §§ 14.3.1.1(a), (b), supra note 8, at 141-42. The
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Criticisms leveled against Proposal 16 parallel those voiced when
eligibility standards, known as Proposition 48 requirements, were
initially enacted in 1983,26 to take effect in 1986.5 7  Proponents
have argued that the enhanced standards would place the "stu-
dent" back into the term "student-athlete."' ' 8 To them, it marked
the beginning of an effort to restore academic integrity to colleges
and universities that had been undermined by scandals arising
within intercollegiate sport.259 Proponents also argued that height-
ened standards ,represented a means of ensuring that student-ath-
letes have a reasonable chance to obtain a meaningful degree. 60
core courses require a certain amount of course work in English, mathematics, social
science and natural or physical science. Id. § 14.3.1.1(a).
Under Proposed Rule 16, originally scheduled to take effect in August 1995, eligi-
bility is determined pursuant to an indexed scale which requires that high school grad-
uates with 700 or 17, on the SAT and ACT, respectively, must have at least a 2.5 GPA
in a core curriculum. NCAA OPERATING BYLAw, art. 14, H9 14.3.1.1(a), (b), supra
note 8, at 130-31. A high school graduate with a 2.0 GPA would be required to score
900 or 21 on the SAT and ACTr respectively. ld. § 14.3.1.1.1(b) (effective Aug. 1,
1995). Moreover, the number of courses included within the core curriculum will in-
crease from 11 to 13 under Proposed Rule 16. Id. § 14.3.1.1(a) (effective Aug. 1,
1995). See infra note 268 and accompanying text (concerning recent NCAA modifica-
tions to the effective date of Proposal 16).
256. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPOITS, INc. 218 (1990).
257. kLd
258. Id. at 220.
259. William C. Rhoden, Sports of the Times; N.C.A.A.'s Smoke and Mirrors, N.Y.
TimEs, Jan. 11, 1992, A27.
260. David Davidson, Administrators Say Prop 48 a Lose-Lose Situation, ATLANTA
CONST. July 28, 1991, at F1 (quoting a college administrator).
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Much of the opposition6 1 to Proposition 48 focused on allega-
tions that it was patently racist.262 Critics assailed the standards as
an effort to undermine the domination of blacks in the revenue-
producing sports.2 63 Black educators and civil rights advocates
261. In addition to charges of racism, other less publicized, yet in many cases re-
lated criticisms, were leveled against Proposition 48. Some critics lashed out at the
universal application of Proposition 48. They argued that it failed to take into account
the unique circumstances not only of student-athletes but also of institutions. Marvin
Cobb, Schools Have Responsibility to Underprepared Athletes, USA TODAY, Jan. 21,
1992, at 8C (noting that Proposition 48 indirectly limited black athletes' access to
historically black institutions as well as predominantly white institutions); Davidson,
supra note 260, at F1 (arguing that Proposition 48 failed to provide for institutional
diversity). An administrator at a historically black institution expressed the following
criticism: "An athlete below a 2.5 might have trouble at Notre Dame or Penn State or
Southern Cal, but he would be right in line and have a good opportunity for success at
Valley, Grambling, Jackson State and a lot of predominantly white institutions." Iel
In a related argument, critics assailed the standards as unfairly placing the burden
on student-athletes and their high schools. To these critics, Proposition 48 is a classic
example of blaming the victim inasmuch as it placed the responsibility for being aca-
demically underprepared for college on the student-athlete. Anderson & South,
supra note 19, at 88.
Other critics asserted that Proposition 48 had less to do with restoring academic
integrity and more to do with protecting the sphere of influence and power of the
NCAA. Some perceived it as a measure intended to serve as a shield against govern-
mental legislation which would regulate sports. Rhoden, supra note 259, at A27.
Fmally, others viewed the new standards as a cynical move by the NCAA to protect
the competitive position of predominantly white Division I institutions. See Cobb,
supra.
262. Greene, supra note 15, at 104. Professor Greene described the criticism of
Proposition 48 as focusing on both procedural and substantive concerns. The former
related to the exclusion of African-American educators and administrators in the rule
promulgation process. The substantive concerns related to the potentially adverse
impact of the rules on African-American student-athletes and historically black col-
leges. Id at 111-12. Several commentators have evaluated equal protection chal-
lenges premised on the disproportionate impact of the standards on African-
Americans. See also Greene, supra note 15; Yasser, supra note 15; Lufrano, supra
note 15.
263. Greene, supra note 15, at 117-18. "The president of Grambling State Univer-
sity predicted that it would lead to a kind of 'apartheid,' and he asked whether the
NCAA was 'trying to create a white organization.'" SPERBER, supra note 256, at 220.
264. It is important to note that blacks did not express a homogenous view with
regard to Proposition 48. The National Alliance of Black School Educators, National
Associations for Equality of Opportunity in Higher Education, and notable African-
Americans such as Jesse Jackson and Benjamin Hooks criticized the lack of black
input in formulating the standards as well as the discriminatory implications of the
rules. Anderson & South, supra note 19, at 89-90.
An equally sincere group of African-Americans viewed the standards as nondis-
criminatory and a step towards emphasizing the educational component of college
athletics and stemming the exploitation of African-American student-athletes. IkL
Lloyd V. Hackley, Chancellor of the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, Arthur
Ashe and Harry Edwards were among those favoring the new standards as tools for
motivating black student-athletes to focus more on education. Ik
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contended that heightened standards would reduce college access
to many black student-athletes who scored below 700 on the SAT
in greater numbers than whites.' 5 Another reason eligibility stan-
dards were charged as racist was because they were formulated, in
large part, based upon culturally biased standardized tests.266 Thus,
Proposition 48 was alleged to be racist because of the disparate
impact of initial eligibility standards on African-American student-
athletes.267 This impact challenges the neutrality of such rules.268
265. SPERBER, supra note 256, at 220.
266. Cobb, supra note 261, at 8C (attacking the SAT as discriminatory in nature);
Davidson, supra note 260, at F1 (noting that critics allege that racial and geographic
bias is inherent to the SAT and ACT). See also Greene, supra note 15, at 104.
In an effort to further stem academic abuse, the NCAA adopted Proposition 42 at
its 1989 convention which prohibits awarding athletic scholarships to partial qualifiers.
Alvin P. Sanoff & Gordon Witkin, When is the Playing Field Too Level?, U.S. Nnws &
WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1989, at 68. Even harsher criticism was voiced against this
attempt to toughen the Proposition 48 eligibility standards. As with Proposition 48,
many critics noted the disproportionate impact which Proposition 42 would have on
African-American student-athletes and its emphasis on standardized tests. For a dis-
cussion of these concerns and other criticisms of Proposition 42, see Timothy Davis,
Absence of Good Faith; Defining a University's Educational Obligation to Student-
Athletes, 28 Hous. L. Rv. 743, 761 (1991); Wilbon, supra note 189, at Cl; Tom
Wicker, Slamming the Door, N.Y. Timpas, Jan. 17, 1989, at A25; Jack Kroll, Race Be-
comes the Game, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1989, at 56; John Powers, New Scholarship Rule
Causes Rift in College Athletics, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 1989, Sports, at 1; Sanoff,
supra at 68. In light of such criticisms, Proposition 42 was modified at the NCAA's
1990 convention. The modified version permits partial qualifiers to receive university
financial aid from non-athletic sources. Joseph L. Galloway, NCAA Brains Show
Brawn, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 22,1990, at 12; NCAA MANUAL § 14.32.1.
267. Rhoden, supra note 259, A27. Those alleging a disparate impact on black
student-athletes found support in an NCAA study which concluded "'that if athletes
entering college in 1977 had been subjected to the [Proposal 48] requirements, a large
number of those who have now graduated, particularly black students, would not
have been eligible to participate in college athletics as freshmen' and possibly would
not have gone to college at all." SPERBER, supra note 256, at 220.
268. Although the NCAA membership rejected the BCA's demand to modify Pro-
posed Rule 16, it approved a resolution to study the new freshman eligibility require-
ments. Blum, supra note 194, at A35. The special committee formed to review the
standards recommended modifications to Proposal 16 and a one-year delay (until
1996) of implementation of the new standards. New Initial-Eligibility Standards Rec-
ommended, NCAA Nnws, June 15, 1994, at 1. The recommendation was premised on
concerns that the new standards would disparately impact minorities and had not
been adequately communicated to prospective student-athletes, high school coaches
and counselors. The suggested modifications would involve changing the sliding scale
of initial eligibility as set forth in Proposal 16. The committee's proposal called for
the elimination of a minimum cutoff for standardized test scores. Id
The NCAA Presidents Commission rejected the recommendations of the special
committee. Presidents Stick with Prop 16, Drop Playoff Study, NCAA Nnws, July 6,
1994, at 1. As a compromise, the Presidents Commission offered several alternatives
affecting partial qualifier status. Id at 1, 13.
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The meting out of sanctions for rules violations-an issue that
was not raised by the BCA-provides an additional illustration of
the disparate impact of NCAA rules and regulations on African-
American student-athletes. What has emerged in college sport is a
pattern of disproportionately high African-American involvement
in substantial scandals over the past thirty years. 6 9 As noted by
one commentator:
There are, in my opinion, three contributing factors that account
for the disproportionately high percentage of black athletes in-
volved in the various scandals. First, the vast majority of blacks
in big-time intercollegiate sports are from lower-class back-
grounds and, hence, most desperately in need of financial assist-
ance. Second, the black athletes recruited are blue-chip players
and highly sought after. The third contributing factor is
racism.270
Again, the rules that are violated and incur sanctions are facially
neutral. That the rules and their sanctions are disproportionately
impacting black student-athletes requires examination.
2. Academic Racism?
Analyzing the conditions and arguments in the foregoing section
merely provides a framework for applying a racial realism ap-
proach to rules and regulations promulgated by the NCAA. Addi-
tionally, the disparate impact of such rules on black student-
athletes provides a fertile field for examining the notions of neu-
trality and colorblindness of rules, and in turn, for educating ad-
ministrators, coaches and others on the potential implications.
Notwithstanding the significance of the alleged disparate impact of
At the NCAA's January 1995 convention, NCAA delegates considered conflicting
positions regarding Proposal 16 without a recommendation from the NCAA Council.
Steve Wieberg, NCAA Council Doesn't Take Stand on Academic Issue, USA TODAY,
Aug. 11, 1994, at 12C. In an unusual move, the 46 member Council declined to make
a recommendation. The Council felt that due to the important values at issue, aca-
demic standing and educational opportunity, "the full Division I membership should
debate and decide." Id. At the NCAA's 1995 convention, the NCAA membership
voted to delay implementation of Proposal 16 until 1996. Wolff & O'Brien, supra
note 245, at 10.
269. See Spivey, supra note 65, at 123. Spivey found that "[o]f the 29 substantial
scandals in collegiate sports during the 1950s and 1960s, 19 occurred on teams with
one or more black athletes. Of these 19 teams, 74 percent of the black athletes, as
compared to 11 percent of the white athletes, were allegedly involved in the rules
violations. For example, three of the four athletes charged in the Long Island Univer-
sity basketball fixes were blacks. Of the eight athletes involved in the Illinois scandal,
seven were black." Id
270. Id
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the NCAA rules, the discussion which follows focuses specifically
on institutions' academic neglect of African-American student-ath-
letes. The academic marginalization of African-American student-
athletes violates the primary purpose of institutions of higher edu-
cation-teaching and learning. 2 1 Moreover, academic neglect
raises the specter of athletic exploitation of African-American stu-
dent-athletes who provide valuable services to their institutions but
fail to receive access to meaningful educational benefits.272 Finally,
specific focus on academic marginalization is warranted since it re-
sults in the failure of many institutions to prepare their black stu-
dent-athletes to effectively deal with post-college life.273 As one
author cogently explained: "Just as education may destroy igno-
rance, open doors, and provide a vision for the future, miseduca-
tion can close doors, project the past as a vision of the future and
crush the will to win. '27 4
(a) Intellectual Marginalization
Several factors converge to produce neglect of the academic
needs of African-American student-athletes.275 Principal among
them is a mindset that all but disregards the educational interests
of black student-athletes. As noted above, this mindset stems in
large part from assumed beliefs nurtured by stereotypes of the in-
tellectually inferior, yet athletically superior, black athlete. The na-
ture and impact of such stereotypes were expressed by one
student-athlete as follows:
271. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
272. See infra text accompanying notes 281, 297-305.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 307, 311-22.
274. THEODORE L. CROSS, THE BLACK POWER IMPERATIVE: RACIAL INEQUALITY
AND T=m POLITICS OF NoNVIOLENCE 128 (rev. ed. 1987) (commenting on the conse-
quences of intentional efforts aimed at keeping African-Americans separated from
information and instruction).
275. Racist stereotypes are not the sole contributors to the academic marginaliza-
tion of the African-American student-athlete. As noted by sociologist Harry
Edwards:
The sociological etiology of their circumstances is far more complex. Many
of the social forces determining black student-athletes' extraordinary vulner-
ability to athletic exploitation have been affecting black society generally
and the black family in particular for decades.
Harry Edwards, The Black "Dumb Jock": An American Sports Tragedy, 131 C.
BOARD REv. 8 (1984). See Douglas Lederman, Survey Suggests Many Division I Col-
leges Fail to Graduate Their Black Athletes, CHRON. HIoHmR EDUC., July 22, 1994,
A31, A32 (noting that some attribute the poor academic performance of black stu-
dent-athletes in comparison to their white counterparts to disparate levels of educa-
tional preparation).
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I have a lot of upper-level courses and some people are looking
for me to miss a class .... They're looking to say, "that ol' lazy
football player." And because I'm black they're looking for
something they can say to lessen my credibility. So when I'm in
class on time, when I'm turning in my assignments and I'm do-
ing everything they're saying, "Hey, what's going on? That's not
what we're accustomed to, that's not what somebody told me
black athletes do or don't do."276
The foregoing underscores what Professor Harry Edwards charac-
terized as the three strikes that burden African-American student-
athletes.277 First, they must contend with reverberations of the
"dumb jock" caricature, which transcend racial boundaries.278 In
addition, the African-American student-athlete must endure the
racial implications of the myth of "innate black athletic superior-
ity." 279 Finally, there are the insidiously racist implications of the
stereotype of the "'dumb Negro' condemned by racial heritage to
intellectual inferiority."'m
Each of these "strikes" contribute to institutional tolerance of
the devaluation of the academic needs of African-American stu-
dent-athletes. Beyond their athletic skills, far too little is expected
academically of the black student-athlete who becomes a commod-
ity serving the financial interests of the institutions for which they
compete. 8 1 The product of this mindset is the exclusion of Afri-
can-American student-athletes from the academic and social main-
stream in many predominantly white colleges and universities.
(b) Racism and Higher Education
As suggested above, the academic marginalization of black stu-
dent-athletes results from factors related specifically to their race
and to their status as student-athletes.38 The pervasiveness of
these beliefs infests the American educational system to the detri-
276. William C. Rhoden, Athletes on Campus: A New Reality-Second of Three
Articles; Black Student-Athletes Find Life of Privilege and Isolation, N.Y. TimES, Jan.
8, 1990, at Al.
277. Edwards, supra note 275, at 8.
278. Id
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Edwards, supra note 275, at 9 (commenting that by the time black young-
sters proceed through the educational process to reach college they have been valued
for their athletic but not their intellectual acumen); Rhoden, supra note 276, at Al
(noting that the financial stakes involved in intercollegiate sport transforms black stu-
dent-athletes into a more valuable commodity than non-athlete black students).
282. See Davis, supra note 266, at 786-88 (discussing the additional pressures con-
fronting student-athletes).
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ment of African-Americans. As noted by Professor Kevin Brown,
"Our dominant culture says that African-Americans are less intelli-
gent. This knowledge affects blacks in social contexts where intelli-
gence is important. ' '2 3
Post-secondary institutions are undoubtedly influenced by the
subtle racism nourished by these untrue, yet potent, beliefs. In-
deed, colleges and universities are entities that are dominated by
people imbued with this regnant ideology.284 This ideology under-
lies tolerance for university environments unfriendly to African-
American students.2 5 Moreover, the dominant ideology perpetu-
ates and institutionalizes policies that ultimately disregard the
needs of African-American students.2 6 As noted by Professor
Alex Johnson, the assimilationist vision of education on which
Brown v. Board of Education2s7 is premised, harms the interests of
African-American students. "[Tihey are forced to compete on a
'level playing field' that ignores their own unique culture and com-
munity and forcibly places them in an environment in which the
chances of failure are significantly increased. '288 Professor John-
son also describes the detrimental effects of the continued presence
of racism at American universities:
The racial dynamic-arising out of occasional blatant racism, re-
current subtle remarks or unconscious behavior, and an ever-
present white norm that is the foundation of institutional ra-
cism-conspires to create a cognizable injury to black students
in predominantly white schools. It alters students' conditions of
education just as courts have recognized that racial harassment
on the job alters conditions of employment. Racism adds to the
stress and anxiety that diminish any person's ability and desire
to excel in an academic environment, especially one leading to a
professional world known to contain further racial roadblocks to
283. Do African Americans Need Immersion Schools?, supra note 97, at 831.
284. Brown, supra note 23, at 303 ("Major universities are dominated in their ad-
ministration, faculties, and student bodies by whites-and disproportionately by those
born into the comfortable classes.").
285. After providing illustrations of the hostility and racial insensitivity which con-
fronts black students on predominantly white campuses, a student author concludes
that "[d]espite formal equality and race neutrality in institutional policy as well as law,
American universities are still infested with myriad, recurrent reminders of racism."
Id. at 318. See Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does
"Sound Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black
Colleges?, 43 EMoRY LJ. 1, 24 (acknowledging the adverse consequences of racial
bias at predominantly white colleges and universities).
286. Brown, supra note 23, at 303.
287. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
288. Johnson, supra note 36, at 1423.
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career advancement and hospitable working conditions. The ra-
cial dynamic to which black students are subjected at predomi-
nantly white colleges contributes to stress that has a detrimental
effect on personal well-being as well as academic
performance. 28 9
In effect, many predominantly white institutions fall short of fulfil-
ling their educational mission29 of producing African-American
students who are capable of performing in society on many differ-
ent levels.291 Thus, the existing educational construct, when viewed
concomitantly with racial stereotypes of African-American ath-
letes, increases the chances of educational neglect of black student-
athletes. Employing the terminology of Professor Edwards, "insti-
tutionalized racism" present at white institutions creates another
strike that intensifies the educational risk encountered by African-
American student-athletes. 292
The unconscious racism293 within the existing Americadi educa-
tional paradigm also contributes to the social isolation of African-
289. Id at 1444 (quoting Brown, supra note 23, at 315). See also Brown-Scott,
supra note 285, at 60 (stating that a harm which is associated with blacks attending
predominantly white colleges is that they encounter the "consequences of the nega-
tive social construct of African-Americans perpetrated and perpetuated by the domi-
nant culture").
290. Professor Johnson summarizes this educational mission as follows:
From the perspective of both the secondary and post-secondary educator,
then, the mission of the educational system must be to produce a student
who can perform capably in society on many different levels. Thus, public
educational institutions must do more than simply transmit bare facts and
statistics. They must also instill and reinforce in students the important cus-
toms, values, and principles learned in the family, church, and community.
Johnson, supra note 36, at 1433.
See also Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement College
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 How. LJ. 259, 269 (1993) (commenting that the
primary mission of institutions of higher education is to provide their students, includ-
ing student-athletes, with a "bona fide high-quality education"); H.R. 2620, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) (declaring the primary purpose of colleges is to provide and
encourage higher education).
291. Johnson, supra note 37, at 1433. See also Kevin Brown, After the Desegrega-
tion Era: The Legal Dilemma Posed by Race and Education, 37 ST. Louis U. L. J. 897,
904 (1993). Professor Brown argues that non-traditional educational techniques, such
as African-American immersion schools, are necessary to enable African-Americans
to overcome obstacles emanating from racial categorization which carries negative
connotations. Id.
See also Brown-Scott, supra note 285, at 6 (arguing that the public education system
in the United States denies equality of access and opportunity to racial minorities).
292. See Edwards, supra note 113, at 44.
293. Johnson, supra note 36, at 1445 n.162 ("The phenomenology of black students'
experience with racism on white campuses leaves no doubt of the existence and effect
of subtle (or unconscious) racism... Despite formal equality and race neutrality in
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American student-athletes. 294 This isolation operates as another
detrimental strike, rendering them particularly susceptible to aca-
demic and psychological injury.295 Additionally, as discussed
above, the black athlete's isolation derives in part from the
problems that confront all African-American students on predomi-
nantly white campuses. 296 Social and academic isolation are, how-
institutional policy as well as law, American universities are still infested with myriad,
recurrent reminders of racism").
294. A 1989 NCAA sponsored study conducted by the American Institutes for Re-
search confirmed the isolation of African-American student-athletes on predomi-
nantly white campuses which makes it difficult for them to cope with their dual roles
of athlete and student. A.I.R. REPORT, supra note 175, at 22. The A.I.R. Report
found that approximately 70% of black football and basketball players at schools with
black enrollment of less than 4% possess feelings of being different and isolated from
the mainstream of campus life. The report concludes that black football and basket-
ball players at predominantly white universities are less likely to become involved in
other extracurricular activities than student-athletes at predominantly black colleges.Id.
295. Id In concluding that black-student athletes at predominantly white colleges
perceive isolation and discrimination, the A.I.R. study reported the following
findings:
Black football and basketball players on predominantly White campuses, as
compared to those on predominantly Black campuses, are more apt to feel
different from other students, to feel that they lack control over their lives,
to feel isolated from other students, to feel racially isolated, and to feel racial
discrimination.... Almost 70% of the Black football and basketball players
at the predominantly White institutions with the fewest numbers of black
undergraduates report a sense of feeling different....
IL
A black student-athlete captured this feeling of isolation as follows:
I was walking across campus a couple of days ago and suddenly I looked
around and I saw that there were no blacks anywhere around, said Bob
Meeks, an offensive tackle at Auburn, where 3.5 percent of the 16,914 stu-
dents are black. Sometimes it's like you're the only black person on campus.
I've gotten used to it, but still, sometimes it makes you feel a little uncom-
fortable on the inside.
Rhoden, supra note 276, at Al; see Sellers et al., supra note 248, at 32 (concluding that
black student-athletes are more likely to experience racial isolation than white stu-
dent-athletes).
296. See Anderson & South, supra note 19, at 91. See also A.I.R. REPORT, supra
note 175, at 13.
In his study of the experiences of African-American student-athletes Professor Sell-
ers described the circumstances which produce need for enhanced institutional sup-
port to aid in their educational attainment as follows:
Although black student-athletes' support networks may be very effective in
providing emotional support, black student-athletes may have more diffi-
culty receiving the instrumental support which often can only be provided by
a person who has had some college experience. Because black student-ath-
letes on average have parents who have never attended college and because
they are more likely to seek support from parents, they are more limited in
the type of support that their networks are able to provide.
Sellers et aL, supra note 248, at 33.
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ever, exacerbated in the case of the black student-athlete. The
unconscious racism inherent in environments that fail sufficiently
to nurture African-American students spawns deliberate actions
that often relegate the black student-athlete to the status of a social
and academic outsider.
By devoting greater efforts to recruiting African-American stu-
dents who are athletes rather than those who are non-athletes,
some commentators contend, universities contribute to the sense of
isolation of black student-athletes.29 Statistical data demonstrate
the gross disparity in the numbers of African-American student-
athletes competing in basketball and football, and non-athlete
black students attending Division I institutions.29  For instance,
during the 1992-93 academic year, African-Americans accounted
for only 7.5% of all students at Division I colleges and universi-
ties.299 In contrast, black male student-athletes made up 30% of all
student-athletes who attended Division I institutions in 1992-93.300
This disjunction is more pronounced when the racial composi-
tion of athletes participating in the revenue-producing sports is ex-
amined. For example, the percentage of black student-athletes
playing in Division I basketball and football far exceeds that of
297. The report's authors sensed that predominantly white colleges exert greater
efforts to recruit black student-athletes than black students who are not athletes. Wil-
liam C. Rhoden, Many Black College Athletes Express Feelings of Isolation, N.Y.
TiMEs, Apr. 6, 1989, at Al.
298. 1994 NCAA DIVISION I GRADUATION-RATES REPORT 617 (Martin T. Benson
ed., 1994) [hereinafter 1994 GRADUATION-RATES REPORT].
299. 1993 NCAA DrwSION I GRADUATION-RATES REPORT 7 (Martin T. Benson
ed., 1994) [hereinafter 1993 GRADUATION-RATES REPORT].
300. I The disparate recruitment of black athletes in contrast to the black non-
athlete student, has marked the history of the relationship between black athletes and
predominantly white colleges and universities. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 171. Rich-
ard Lapchick made similar observations a few years ago:
Unlike other racial groups, African-American student-athletes make up a
significant 6.1 percent of African American students on campus. That is 3
times higher than for whites (1.9 percent), 6 times higher than for Hispanics
(1.0 percent) and 15 times higher than for Asians (.4 percent). It clearly
raises the question of whether colleges use black athletes for their brawn
more than their brains.
Richard Lapchick, Finally, a Small Step in the Right Direction, SPoRTINo NEWS, Jan.
31, 1994, at 8. Black-student athletes comprise as much as half of the black student
population on some predominantly white campuses. Sellers et al., supra note 248, at
21.
Professor Harry Edwards argues that given thpt between 60 to 70 percent of black
student-athletes fail to graduate, it is unjustifiable that predominantly white colleges
pursue black student-athletes more intensely than other black students. Douglas
Ledermann, Survey Suggests Many Division I Colleges Fail to Graduate Their Black
Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 22, 1994, at A31-32.
1995] 673
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
white student-athletes. During the 1992-93 academic year, of the
male student-athletes who received financial aid and played bas-
ketball at Division I institutions, 64.1% were black in comparison
to 32.3% who were white.30 1 During this time frame, a smaller yet
substantial percentage, 48.9%, of Division I football financial aid
recipients were black.30 2 The large proportion of black student-
athletes reinforces the stereotype "that blacks are better suited to
physical activities than to intellectual pursuits. ' ' 303 It also sends the
message to young African-Americans that sports, rather than aca-
demics, provides a more readily accessible route to college. 4 In
sum, the disproportionate numbers of African-American student-
athletes is a significant factor in the creation of a subculture that is
separated both from blacks and whites on university campuses. 0 5
The sense of isolation experienced by many black student-ath-
letes is significant given that the quality, of social interactions, in-
cluding relationships with coaches and other students, contributes
to the academic success of student-athletes.306 In short, all student-
athletes are subjected to pressures that create an ongoing tension
between their roles as students and athletes. Yet, the black stu-
dent-athlete confronts the additional challenge of overcoming insti-
301. 1994 GRADUATION RATES REPORT, supra note 298, at 617.
302. Id
303. Douglas Lederman, Blacks Make Up Large Proportion of Scholarship Ath-
letes, Yet Their Overall Enrollment Lags at Division I Colleges, CHRON. HIoHER
EDUC., June 17, 1992, at Al.
By not recruiting representative numbers of African-American students,
while simultaneously increasing the number of African-American athletes
who are almost uniformly less qualified than the black students who are
turned down, the impression is created that blacks do better in athletics,
because they are disinclined or incompetent to perform academically.
Id at A34 (quoting Professor Harry Edwards).
304. Id Political scientist Andrew Hacker notes that the cynicism of colleges in
capitalizing on this constructed reality represents a blot on our educational system.
1d at A30.
Many college officials disagree with Hacker's assessment. They perceive sports as
having provided educational access to thousands of black youngsters who otherwise
would have no such opportunity. Id
305. IL at A34.
306. A.I.R. RsPORT, supra note 175, at 25. The existence of a racially insensitive
environment contributes to lower academic performance. See Spivey & Jones, supra
note 68, at 943 (concluding that racism experienced by black student-athletes at the
University of Illinois created an absence of the type of environment which aids in
fostering academic success).
Black student-athletes. complain that too few of their coaches encouraged them to
excel academically. LAPCHCK, supra note 103, at 230. Moreover, they expressed
concern over the few black coaches or faculty members on campus who were avail-
able as role models. Id
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tutional barriers. For example, when barriers are perpetuated by
unconscious racism, the athlete's ability to obtain requisite aca-
demic skills is impeded. This loss is damaging to the black student-
athlete, as these skills are necessary for effectively addressing the
myriad of situations they will encounter throughout life.3°7 Thus,
the social marginalization experienced by today's black student-
athletes adversely impacts their academic potential, just as exclu-
sionary Jim Crow era practices were detrimental to the academic
success of black athletes.30 One commentator has noted that:
Young black men from relatively poor socioeconomic back-
grounds have entered some of the most prestigious universities
in this country largely because they were sought out for their
athletic ability. Athletic scholarships have usually provided the
financial means for these student-athletes to attend college. Be-
cause of this fact there exists the wide spread assumption that
these grants provided one of the few, if not only, means for
black athletes to attend college, obtain a degree, and go on to
improve their basic life situation. However, in more cases than
not, this assumption masks the realities of being a black student-
athlete on most of the nation's college and university campuses.
Student-athletes in general, and black student-athletes in partic-
ular, often find it difficult to cope with the dual elements of the
student-athlete role. 9
The fact that black student-athletes are not competing academi-
cally as successfully as their white counterparts on the presumed
"level playing" field is evidenced by disparate graduation rates be-
307. See Kevin Brown, After the Desegregation Era: The Legal Dilemma Posed By
Race and Education, 37 ST. LoUis U. LJ. 897, 904 (1993).
308. See supra notes 71, 80.
309. Spivey & Jones, supra note 68, at 939; see Sellers et aL, supra note 248, at 32
(noting that a number of factors converge to result in poorer academic performance
of black student-athletes compared to white student-athletes).
A sportswriter described the situation which produces difficulties for the black ath-
lete to cope with the dual role of athlete and student as follows:
Black athletes, because of their celebrity, their size, indeed, their black-
ness, are often the most visible undergraduates on campus. In the most com-
petitive programs, they frequently make up four of the five starters on the
basketball team, and sometimes 7 of the 11 starters on each unit of the foot-
ball team.
Still despite their visibility, black athletes are a tiny fraction of the under-
graduate community on many major college campuses.
They are often revered as campus heroes for their athletic prowess, but
many feel shackled to the pedestals on which they have been placed. They
move between two conflicting worlds-education and entertainment-with-
out truly belonging to either.
Rhoden, supra note 276, at Al.
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tween white and African-American student-athletes. The most re-
cent studies produced by the NCAA reveal an overall increase in
the graduation rates of student-athletes, including African-Ameri-
cans. This has been the case since the imposition of Proposition 48
standards.310 Despite this promising trend, unrestrained optimism
is unwarranted. White student-athletes continue to graduate at a
considerably higher rate than their African-American counter-
parts. The 1994 NCAA Graduation Rates Report reveals that, of
the student-athletes who matriculated in 1987, 58% of Division I
white student-athletes graduated. This contrasts with the 43%
graduation rate for black student-athletes.311
On at least two accounts, however, these numbers may be mis-
leading. First, graduation rates for black student-athletes in the
revenue-producing sports are lower than the overall graduation
averages. Of the Division I black male basketball players who en-
tered college in 1987, 39% graduated. 12 This contrasts with the
graduation rate for Division I white male basketball players for the
same time period, which was 57%.313 Similarly, only 44% of Divi-
sion I-A black football players graduated in comparison to a 63%
rate for their white counterparts. 4 Not only do these numbers
evidence the continuing disparity in the graduation rates between
white and black student-athletes, but they also represent unaccept-
ably low rates of graduation for student-athletes in general, and for
black student athletes in particular.
Graduation rates for student athletes are misleading to the ex-
tent that they fail to reflect that, at many institutions, the gradua-
310. See generally 1994 GRADUATION-RATES REPORT, supra note 298, at 616 (doc-
umenting increasing graduation rates for student-athletes who matriculated at col-
leges during the period 1984 through 1987); see also Debra E. Blum, Are Athletes
Graduating?, CHRON. HiGHE.R EDUC. July 6, 1994, at A38 (discussing recent student-
athlete graduation rates).
311. These percentages marked a slight increase in graduation rates for student-
athletes who entered college in 1986. The comparative rates for this group, were 57
percent for whites and 41 percent for blacks. 1994 GRADUAnON-RATES REPORT,
supra note 298, at 616.
312. Id
313. Id A fifteen percentage point difference exists in the graduation rates be-
tween white and black women Division I basketball players. White women who ma-
triculated in 1987 graduated at a rate of 67% compared to 52% for black women
basketball players. Overall, white women student-athletes graduated at a rate of
69%, while black women graduated at a rate of 53%. The graduation rates for black
women actually represent a one percentage point decrease from the 54% graduation
rate for those matriculating in 1986. Id.
314. I The 44% graduation rate represents a 1% improvement over that for
black student-athletes who entered college in 1986. White student-athletes realized a
4 percentage point improvement from 59% to 63%.
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tion rates of African-American male student-athletes are
unacceptably low. 3 15 Approximately forty Division I institutions
that matriculated more than six black student-athletes in 1987
failed to graduate more than 30% of their black athletes.316 This
group includes prestigious athletic institutions such as Auburn Uni-
versity,317 the University of Washington,318 Michigan State Univer-
sity3 19 and Ohio State University.320 In addition, the graduation
rates of many other academically and athletically prestigious col-
leges and universities reported graduation rates for their black
male student-athletes that hovered around the 30 percent mark.321
In short, despite the modest increases in graduation rates for
both white and black student-athletes, the percentages remain suf-
ficiently low that they raise the issue of exploitation. In the case of
African-American student-athletes, the data suggests that they
continue to suffer from academic neglect. Finally, graduation rates
alone cannot sufficiently measure whether African-American stu-
dent-athletes are being provided with an educational opportunity
sufficient to allow them to partake fully of their educational experi-
ence and develop the skills necessary to compete in a post-athletic
environment. Thus, despite the graduation data presented, the ex-
tent to which black student-athletes are provided access to a mean-
ingful educational opportunity is still worth further investigation.32
315. See generally Davis, supra note 266, at 755 (commenting that generalized grad-
uation rates fail to consider significant factors which can raise or lower rates, such as
the type of institution and the level of competition at which student-athletes
compete).
316. Debra E. Blum, Athletes' Graduation Rates Lag at Some Division I Colleges,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 13, 1994, at A34; Graduation Rates for Athletes and
Other Students Who Entered College in 1987-88, CrRON. HiGHER EDUC., July 6, 1994,
at A39-A40.
The number of institutions graduating less than 30% of their black athletes in-
creases when graduation rates for all institutions, including those which matriculated
less than 6 black students in 1987-88, are considered. Id.
317. Auburn graduated only 20% of its African-American student-athletes. It. at
A39.
318. Only 28 percent of the black male student-athletes who entered the University
of Washington in 1987-88 graduated after six years. Id. at A40.
319. Only 20% of Michigan State's black student-athletes graduated after six years.
Id. at A39.
320. Ohio State reported that only 21% of its black student-athletes graduated af-
ter six years. Id,
321. Examples include the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Ne-
braska, which reported graduation rates of 30 and 31 percent, respectively. Id at
A40.
322. See generally Davis, supra note 266, at 754 (discussing how graduation rates
may mask the extent to which student-athletes leave college with adequate academic
preparation).
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Black student-athletes who obtain degrees should be included in
any such inquiry.
IV. Redressing The Harm of Unconscious Racism
Thus far, the discussion has focused on identifying the sources of
the unconscious racism present in college sport and the harm that it
continues to inflict upon black participants. This harm manifests
most acutely in the devaluation of the African-American student-
athlete's academic interest. This devaluation raises the question of
exploitation 32 of black student-athletes who provide valuable serv-
ices,3 ' yet too often leave their institutions of higher learning with-
out having obtained the academic preparation necessary for them
to cope successfully with life issues following their college careers.
Consistent with the overall purpose of this Article, the goal of
the discussion that follows is to begin a dialogue concerning the
mechanisms that may assist in protecting the academic interests of
black student-athletes. Since combating the deleterious effects of
unconscious racism requires resorting to many different tools,325
323. The issue of the potential exploitation which could result when student-ath-
letes are denied an opportunity to access the academic benefits their colleges have to
offer has been analyzed by several commentators including: Lesa A. Barkowsky,
Note, The Illiteracy Problem and College Athletics: An Argument for Educational
Malpractice, 16 CoLuM.- VIA J.L. & ARTs 537 (1992); Leroy D. Clark, New Direc-
tions for the Civil Rights Movement: College Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 How.
L.J. 259 (1993); Davis, supra note 266; Daniel P. Rafferty, Note, Technical Foull Ross
v. Creighton University Allows Courts to Penalize Universities Which Do Not Perform
Specific Promises Made to Student-Athletes, 38 S.D. L. Rav. 173 (1993); Edmund J.
Sherman, Note, Good Sports, Bad Sports: The District Court Abandons College Ath-
letes in Ross v. Creighton University, 11 Loy. Er'. L. 657 (1991); Ron Waicukauski,
The Regulation of Academic Standards in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1982 Amz. ST. L.
79; Michael N. Widener, Note, Suits by Student-Athletes Against Colleges for Ob-
structing Educational Opportunity, 24 ARiz. L. Rav. 467 (1982).
324. Successful intercollegiate athletic programs can result in tangible and intangi-
ble benefits for their institutions. Illustrations of the former include revenues derived
from gate receipts, radio and television contracts, and alumni contributions. Michael
J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent: A Con-
tract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1287 n.35 (1989); Deborah A.
Katz, What are the "Bases" in University Athletics? Comment on "Athletic Reform:
Missing the Bases in University Athletics", 20 CAP. U.L. Rsv. 611, 614, 616 (1991).
Less tangible, but nevertheless significant benefits include the prestige, visibility and
pride which winning teams bring to their institutions. James V. Koch, The Economic
Realities of Amateur Sports Organizations, 61 IND. LJ. 9, 11 (1985); DONALD CHU,
TiH CHARACTER OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT
34, 57 (1989).
325. Neil G. Widliams Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Com-
mon-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Pro-
cess, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 183, 189 (1994) ("Every conceivable tool should be used
in the battle against racial discrimination.").
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both traditional and non-traditional analytical approaches are
identified.
A. A Race-Conscious Approach
To reiterate, the presumed role of the African-American stu-
dent-athlete is as a valued sports commodity. This role results in
the failure of many colleges and universities to improve support
services and take measures necessary to reduce the social isolation
of black athletes. In turn, this isolation ultimately negatively im-
pacts the black student-athlete's academic performance?.
As noted above, institutional environment is critical in determin-
ing the black student-athlete's potential for academic success at
predominantly white institutions. As noted by the chief scientist of
the Report of the American Institutes for Research, "What the re-
port shows is just bringing [black student-athletes] on campus is
not enough."327 The something more that is required is the devel-
opment of a supportive environment, one that would work to
lessen the academic and social hostility black student-athletes en-
counter at predominantly white institutions.
The provision of an academically supportive environment may
require increased hiring of African-American coaches and adminis-
trators who can provide the mentoring and design programs that
will improve the academic, social and professional opportunities
for black student-athletes. 328 Concomitant with increases in the
number of black coaches and administrators should be increased
admission of non-athlete African-American students. More specif-
ically, courts should require predominantly white colleges that re-
cruit and employ student-athletes "to engage in race-conscious
admissions and hiring policies to increase black student enrollment,
faculty, and staff."329
Such efforts alone, however, are likely to prove inadequate. On
account of the often deficient educational backgrounds of many
black student-athletes, universities must implement academic sup-
An approach which is not discussed below but which may provide a viable means of
redressing the negative impact on the academic interests of black student-athletes is
legislation. The legislative approach, both in Congress and within the NCAA, is one
of several courses of action being pursued by the BCA and their allies. See also Clark,
supra note 323 (including legislative initiatives as part of a multi-pronged strategy
aimed at ending the exploitation of black and other student-athletes).
326. Lederman, supra note 275, at A32.
327. Rhoden, supra note 276, at Al.
328. Sellers et aL., supra note 248, at 35.
329. Brown-Scott, supra note 285, at 53-54.
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port systems that "provide skill building opportunities along with
tutorial services."330 In this regard, the suggestions of Professor
Wendy Brown-Scott provide guidance. In the context of arguing
for the preservation of historically black institutions, maintains that
predominantly white institutions should take the necessary steps to
provide the "maximum opportunity for African-Americans to ob-
tain higher education. '331 Professor Brown-Scott adds that these
steps may involve the use of race-conscious approaches such as ag-
gressive affirmative action admission and hiring policies.332 The
needs of African-American student-athletes are unique, and sup-
port programs should be developed specifically to address those
needs.333 As one sociologist noted, academic support programs
must "shift their focus from the short term goal of eligibility to the
long-term development of the black student-athlete. '334
330. Sellers et al, supra note 248, at 35.
331. Brown-Scott, supra note 285, at 7. The need for aggressive efforts to transform
the environment into one more supportive of black students was stated by Professor
Brown-Scott as follows:
Even in predominantly white institutions, the issue of trust between the
races must be addressed through the creation of cultural institutions within
the larger institutions that include content culturally relevant to African-
American students and enlightening to whites. This shift recognizes the real-
ity that integrated institutions are not culturally neutral, but reflect the value
and norms of the dominant culture. The establishment of African-American
cultural centers or institutes on white campuses is an especially good idea as
part of a remedial plan premised on sound educational policy.
Id at 78.
332. Id. at 7. See also Brown, supra note 97 (arguing that the unique needs of black
males underscore the need for immersion schools).
333. Responding to the unique needs of the African-American student-athlete does
not mean affording them preferential treatment. As noted by one commentator, stu-
dent-athletes like non-athlete students involved in other subcultures within the uni-
versity possess unique needs to which institutions are obligated to respond. Doug
Single, The Role of Directors of Athletics in Restoring Integrity to Intercollegiate Sport,
in THE RuLEs OF THE GAME: ETHics IN CoLLEGE SPORTS 156-57 (Richard E.
Lapchick & John B. Slaughter eds. 1989). Accordingly, fashioning support mecha-
nisms to respond to the special needs of African-American student-athletes is equallyjustifiable.
334. Sellers et aL, supra note 248, at 35. Professor Sellers makes the following spe-
cific suggestions as to the composition and structure of such an academic support
program:
Finally, universities must provide more appropriate and effective academic
support systems for student-athletes. This philosophy can best be accom-
plished through at least two broad policy changes. The first involves provid-
ing academic advising services with a measure of autonomy from the
eligibility pressures of the athletic departments... The second policy change
involves mandating the use of trained professionals in teaching programs. It
is up to the university to provide a structure that values the long-term devel-
[Vol. XXII
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B. Contract-Based Remedies
The student-athlete's relationship with his or her college is
widely acknowledged by courts and commentators as premised on
an express contract.335 The express contract and the obligations
formed thereby arise from the Letter of Intent,33 the Statement of
Financial Assistance,337 and various university publications, includ-
ing bulletins and catalogues. 38 The existence of this contractual
relationship brings into question the utility of contract to provide
the basis for an antidiscrimination norm. It is relevant, therefore,
to explore the extent to which statutory and common law contrac-
tually-based principles provide means for redressing the academic
neglect of black student-athletes.
1. Civil Rights Approach-Section 1981
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial discrimina-
tion in the contracting process.3 39 In the institution's performance
opment of black student-athletes and provides them with an atmosphere
conducive to learning.
Id.
335. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Colorado Semi-
nary Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 417 F. Supp. 885, 895 n.5 (D.
Colo. 1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191
S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 192 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1972);
Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of In-
tent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. Rnv. 1277 (1989); Robert N.
Davis, The Courts and Athletic Scholarships, 67 N.D. L. REv. 163, 187 (1991);
ifmothy Davis, supra note 261, at 786.
336. A Letter of Intent obligates the student-athlete to participate in sports exclu-
sively for the signatory institution. Cozzillio, supra note 335, at 1290.
337. Id at 1284 n.20 (discussing the legal significance of the Statement of Financial
Assistance).
338. ld. at 1290; Davis, supra note 21, at 315.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West Supp. 1994). Prior to 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected decades of contrary precedent in Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989), by narrowly interpreting the scope of Section 1981 as only applying
to the initial formation and the enforcement stages of a contract. The court stated as
follows:
Interpreting § 1981 to cover postformation conduct unrelated to an em-
ployee's right to enforce his or her contract, such as incidents relating to the
conditions of employment, is not only inconsistent with that statute's limita-
tion to the making and enforcement of contracts, but would also undermine
the detailed and well-crafted procedures for conciliation and resolution of
Title,VII claims.
Id. at 180. Thus, discrimination which involved contractual performance was held to
fall outside the strictures of the statute. Id. at 177. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 re-
turned the state of the law to that preceding Patterson by amending section 1981 and
thus clarifying its scope. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief
Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 No.
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of its contractually-based educational obligation to its student-ath-
letes, racism harms the latter's academic interests.30 Thus, racism
resulting in harm during the.performance stage of the contracting
process invites inquiry into the availability of § 1981 as a means of
redressing and thereby protecting the academic interests of black
student-athletes.
In this regard, despite the contractual relationship, the utility of
§ 1981 is dubious. Section 1981, like most antidiscrimination stat-
utes,3 1 proscribes only intentional acts of racial discrimination.342
Therefore, to sustain a § 1981 claim, the student-athlete would be
required to show that the institution's conduct was motivated by
race. Except in rare instances, however, the academic neglect of
black student-athletes appears to result from unconscious rather
than deliberately overt forms of racial discrimination.343
Ta DAmE L. REv. 923, 940 (1993). The amendment states, in part, as follows: "the
term 'make and enforce contacts' includes the making, performance, modification,
and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(b) (West Supp. 1994).
See also Williams, supra note 325, at 183 (describing the stages of the contracting
process and the legislative evolution of Section 1981 to encompass the performance
stage).
As noted, the explicit inclusion of the performance stage of the contracting process
within Section 1981's proscription is particularly important to a potential claim by
black student-athletes, since discrimination occurs in the institution's performance of
its academic obligation.
340. See infra part III.
341. Williams, supra note 325, at 227-28. See Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimina-
tion in Business Transactions, 42 HAsT NGS LJ. 1257 (1991) (discussing the barrier to
recovery imposed by the intent requirement of one of the grounds for relief under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the intent requirement of Section 1981).
See generally Lawrence, supra note 125 (discussing the limitations of intent based an-
tidiscrimination laws as providing a mechanism for combatting unconscious racism).
342. Id; Suggs, supra note 341 (disparate impact is not sufficient to sustain a section
1981 claim); see, e.g., Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345, 1349 (8th
Cir. 1987); Watson v. Pathway Financial, 702 F. Supp. 186, 188 (N.D. IlM. 1988).
343. See Suggs, supra note 341, at 1275 (noting, in the context of Title VI, that only
in cases of extreme discrimination can a plaintiff show the requisite intent to discrimi-
nate short of an admission of culpability by the defendant).
It should be noted, however, that under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1988),
which forbids discrimination in employment, liability can be established notwithstand-
ing the absence of invidious intent. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
see Rotunda, supra note 339, at 928-38 (summarizing the history of disparate impact
theory under Title VII); Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does
It Mean and What Is Its Likely Impact, 71 NEB. L. REv. 304, 314 (1992) (defining the
disparate impact theory of discrimination as involving "neutral employment practices
that are not discriminatory on their face, but which result in discrimination in their
application or effect on a 'protected class' (i.e., race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin)."
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Consequently, the black student-athlete is situated like many
other plaintiffs alleging discrimination in the contracting process.
That is, all § 1981 claimants encounter an intent element, which
represents an almost insurmountable hurdle to establishing their
claim. 344 The slim likelihood of establishing such a claim mandates
the search for other means of protecting the black student-athlete's
academic interests.
2. Common Law Contract as an Antidiscrimination Norm
Common law contract principles may provide the theoretical
foundation for developing an antidiscrimination norm to address
the unconscious racism that confronts African-Americans engaged
in collegiate athletics.3 5 As specifically described below, such
344. See Williams, supra note 318, at 227 (recognizing that the intent element of a
Section 1981 claim represents a fatal obstacle for many plaintiffs even though they
suffer real injuries); Suggs, supra note 341, at 1275 ("When subjective evil intent is the
critical element necessary for recovery, success on the merits becomes virtually impos-
sible"). Id. at 1302.
345. Recently Professor Richard Epstein attacked the legitimacy of deploying an-
tidiscrimination statutes to end racial discrimination in economic relationships such as
that of employee and employer. RiciiARD A. EpSTn, FORBIDDEN GROUnDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EmLomtm" DIsCRiMINATION LAWS (1992). In urging the repeal of
Title VII, Professor Epstein argues that antidiscrimination laws are the antithesis of
freedom of contract. Id. at 3. He describes freedom of contract as "a principle that
allows all persons to do business with whomever they please for good reason, bad
reason, or no reason at all." Id. One commentator summarizes Epstein's views on
freedom of contract as follows: "Epstein strongly believes that the traditional com-
mon law principles of freedom of contract have served us well, and that antidis-
crimination laws constitute an unwarranted and inefficient intervention into private
contractual matters." Gregory S. Crespi, Market Magic: Can the Invisible Hand Stran-
gle Bigotry?, 72 BosT. U. L. REv. 991, 997 (1992). Pursuant to this theory, Professor
Epstein would limit state intervention into contractual relations to preventing the use
of force and fraudulent behavior in the making of contracts. EPsmN, supra at 3-4,
19.
The discussion which follows, while relying on common law contract principles to
address discriminatory conduct, diverges considerably from Professor Epstein's reli-
ance on common law principles. I propose that certain common law contractual prin-
ciples provide the basis for creating an antidiscrimination norm since they operate to
limit the range of permissible contractual conduct. Specifically, the article proposes
that the common law good faith doctrine limits personal autonomy in the perform-
ance stage of contractual arrangements. Thus the doctrine provides a mechanism forjudicial intervention into private contractual matters even in the absence of force or
fraud. In addition, it provides a means of attacking the invidious forms of discrimina-
tion which can persist even in competitive markets. See Ian Ayres, Alternative
Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Market Settings, 31 SAN Dino
L. REv. 67, 84 (1994) (arguing that invidious discrimination can exists within competi-
tive markets).
It is likely that critics of antidiscrimination laws will also criticize the proposed use
of the good faith doctrine notwithstanding the legitimate and limited intrusion which
it suggests on the exercise of personal autonomy. See Robert Dugan, Civil Rights and
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
principles can, in some instances, be employed to constrain dis-
criminatory conduct that harms black student-athletes. In addi-
tion, these principles provide a basis for imposing affirmative
obligations on universities and colleges to promote the academic
interests of African-American student-athletes. The discussion
that follows proposes that, of these principles, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing holds the most utility for providing the basis
for a common law antidiscrimination norm.
Despite the revered position of the notion of freedom of con-
tract in our legal jurisprudence,346 this freedom has never been ab-
solute.347 In contrast to the late Nineteenth Century, during which
classical contract was dominated by notions of individualism and
personal autonomy,38 the idea of freedom of contract should now
be understood as "sensitive both to individual autonomy and to the
limitations placed on that autonomy by the social environment in
which individuals are situated."' ' 9 In attempting to achieve this
balance, common law principles have been employed to limit con-
tractual freedom for reasons ranging from public policy to restraint
Freedom of Contract: Employment, Housing and Credit Transactions (Part I-Employ-
ment), 26 S. DAKOTA L. lnv. 259, 298 (1981) (criticizing the socialization of contract
law occasioned by antidiscrimination laws and the constraints on freedom on contract
mandated by the good faith doctrine and other developments in contract law).
346. See Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARv. L.
Rav. 1993, 1994 (1989) ("Freedom of contract, as embodied in our common law, is
one of the most revered liberties of our legal culture"); see also Richard A. Epstein,
In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 947, 953 (1984) (arguing that
freedom of contract is a fundamental aspect of individual liberty on an equal footing
with freedom of speech or the freedom to select marriage partners); FRJEDRICH KWS-
LER, GRANT GLMORa AND ANTHONY T. KaoNmAn, CoNmTcrs: CASES AND
MmATEuALs 7 (1986) (noting it was during the formative years of classical contract
theory that "the principle of freedom of contract established itself as a paramount
postulate of public policy"); Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Per-
formance: Patterson and a State Law Alternative, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. Rlv. 431, 434
(1990) (stating the law of contract continues to be based on the idea of freedom of
contract).
347. The Antidiscrimination Priciple in the Common Law, supra note 346, at 1993;
KESSLER ET AL., supra note 346, at 9 (quoting Pound for the proposition that "there
never has been in our law any such freedom [of contract] as they [i.e., the advocates of
doctrinaire liberalism] postulate").
348. Williams, supra note 325, at 191, KESSLER aT AL., supra note 346, at 6-7.
349. Burton, supra note 346, at 447 (modem conceptions of freedom of contract
limits personal autonomy through the incorporation of values arising from the social
environment in which individuals are situated); Williams, supra note 325, at 194 (con-
tract has evolved into a regime which recognizes that social responsibility and moral-
ity constrain personal autonomy); Liebergesell v. Evans, 613 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Wash.
1980) (modem contract law interprets freedom of contract as "acknowledging the
parties' duty to deal in good faith with one another").
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of trade to unconscionability.50 Included within these principles is
a common law antidiscrimination norm, the "duty to serve. '351
Courts historically employed this concept as a means of disallow-
ing private racial discrimination in discrete situations.3 -2 Pursuant
to the duty-to-serve doctrine, "public service companies ' 353 are re-
quired to serve the public without discrimination. 3 4 In the context
of the duty-to-serve, constraining individual autonomy and free-
dom of contract grows out of concern for the vulnerability of some
individuals to the unreasonable exercise of discretion by private
entities. 355 Thus, the "duty-to-serve limits the contract and prop-
erty rights of the public service company, and creates a common
law basis for disallowing discrimination on racial grounds."356
The significance of the duty-to-serve doctrine is two-fold. As al-
luded to above, the doctrine illustrates the use of notions of social
responsibility to constrain personal autonomy. The doctrine limits
350. See KESSLER ET AL., supra note 346 (identifying the willingness to deny en-
forcement of contracts contemplating crimes and contracts in restraint of trade as
illustrations of common law limitations on the freedom of contract principle); Burton,
supra note 346, at 451 (identifying the unconscionability and good faith doctrines as
two of the more prominent developments in contract law which are antithetical to
classical notions of freedom of contract); Williams, supra note 325, at 195 (promissory
estoppel clearly reflects contract doctrine which has evolved toward greater social
responsibility).
351. See generally The Antidiscrimination Priciple in the Common Law, supra note
346, (discussing in detail the duty to serve principle as a well established illustration of
a common law antidiscrimination norm).
352. See, eg., Odom v. East Ave. Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 312, aff'd, 37 N.Y.S.2d 491
(1942).
353. Public service companies are persons or business enterprises which engage in a
public calling. The Antidiscrimination Priciple in the Common Law, supra note 346,
at 1993; Williams, supra note 325, at 202.
354. The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, supra note 346, at 1995
(citing to De Wolf v. Ford, 86 N.E. 527, 530 (N.Y. 1908)).
355. The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, supra note 346, at 2001.
Iwo rationales have been offered for this doctrine which restricts personal autonomy
by removing the freedom of certain individuals to select with whom they will enter
into a bargain. The duty-to-serve doctrine is thought to have been developed to re-
spond to the monopoly power exercised by those engaged in public callings. Id. at
1995. "A situation of virtual monopoly... require[s] more protection to ensure that
merchants would deal fairly with each individual." Id. The second rationale is pre-
mised on the view that "by affirmatively electing to hold herself out as serving the
general public, a person consents to the imposition of a duty to serve all members of
the public without distinction." Williams, supra note 325, at 203.
356. The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, supra note 346, at 2002.
One commentator emphasizes the significance of this common law antidiscrimination
norm notwithstanding the existence of antidiscrimination laws. "Given the difficulty
of proving intent and the subtleties of racial discrimination, plaintiffs often find" the
intent to discriminate burden present in Section 1981 and other laws impossible to
meet. Id. at 2008.
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the "right of certain parties to choose the persons with whom they
contract. '35 7 Further, the duty-to-serve doctrine is significant to
the extent that it constitutes a common law antidiscrimination
norm that limited the unreasonable exercise of contractual auton-
omy. 358 In this regard, the doctrine establishes the predicate for
the recognition at common law that parties have a reasonable ex-
pectation to be free from discrimination in the contracting
process.5 9
3. Good Faith as an Antidiscrimination Norm
In addition to the duty-to-serve doctrine, the good faith doctrine
constitutes another common law antidiscrimination norm with util-
ity for precluding overt and convert racial discrimination in the
performance stage of the contracting process. Commentators have
357. Williams, supra note 325, at 202.
358. The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, supra note 346, at 2010-
11; Williams, supra note 325, at 208 (arguing that the duty-to-serve doctrine demon-
strates common law recognition of the propriety of prohibiting discrimination in the
formation stage of contracts); but see, Burton, supra note 346, at 458-59 (noting that
the common law of contract developed no significant body of law addressing racial
discrimination in the contract process).
359. Williams, supra note 325, at 208.
The lawful performance doctrine has also been identified as an emerging common
law contract principle which could be used to combat discrimination in contracting.
Burton, supra note 346, at 434 (1990). Professor Burton describes the lawful perform-
ance doctrine as follows:
The lawful performance doctrine reflects the fact that some statutes create
reasonable expectations on the part of contract parties concerning the duties
of their contract partners in the course of contract performance. These ex-
pectation and legal duties help to form the world of their contract no less
than those generated by statutes that only invalidate offending terms of an
agreement. The lawful performance doctrine permits the courts to use the
judicial power to coordinate common law and statutory law by circumscrib-
ing the world of a contract through the construction process. Consequently,
statutory duties can become contractual obligations generating legitimate
expectations, exposing the party who violates the relevant law to an action
for breach of contract.
Id. at 464-65.
Professor Burton proposed the use of the lawful performance doctrine as a means
of circumventing the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union as not covering discrimination in the performance
stage of the contracting process. See Williams, supra note 325, at 211-12.
Professor Burton's conceptualization of the lawful performance doctrine remains
significant notwithstanding the fact it is no longer necessary to fill the voids created in
Patterson. It represents one of few attempts to articulate an antidiscrimination norm
in common law contract. In addition, Professor Burton's notion that contractual ex-
pectations consist of a world of contract which excludes racial discrimination is rele-
vant to constructing an antidiscrimination norm premised on the good faith doctrine.
Burton, supra note 340, at 463.
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considered the use of the good faith doctrine as a basis for prohib-
iting overt discrimination in contractual performance.36 As will be
seen, however, greater utility may reside in use of the doctrine to
redress covert forms of discrimination in contractual performance.
In a recent article, Professor Neil Williams proposes use of the
good faith doctrine to prohibit overt forms of discrimination in the
contracting process. 61 Professor Williams lays the theoretical
foundation for his proposed antidiscrimination norm by arguing
that employing the good faith doctrine in this manner is consistent
with the evolution of contract law. 62 More specifically, he views a
common law antidiscrimination norm as an extension of a regime
of contract that does not operate independently of social and moral
considerations.363 Professor Williams proceeds to provide illustra-
tions (e.g., promissory estoppel, duty-to-serve and unconscionabil-
ity) of the extent to which modem contract law employs
community standards of decency and fairness to impose obligations
on contracting parties.36
Professor Williams' proposed use of the good faith doctrine as an
antidiscrimination norm hinges on his concept of the principle as
one that incorporates community standards of decency and fair-
ness. In this regard, he adopts a concept that views good faith as
an excluder of bad faith conduct.3 65 Proceeding from a bad faith
360. See generally Williams, supra note 325, at 228 (proposing that, of the common
law contract theories, the duty of good faith and fair dealing offers the greatest prom-
ise as a mechanism for attacking racial discrimination in the contracting process); Bur-
ton, supra note 346, at 464 n.116 (questioning the use of the good faith doctrine to
prohibit discrimination in contractual performance).
361. See generally Williams, supra note 325.
362. Williams, supra note 325, at 184, 207.
363. Id. at 194, 207.
364. Id. at 184, 193-207.
365. Id. at 214. The excluder formulation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
was originally conceptualized by Professor Robert Summers. See Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 54 VA. L. Rnv. 195 (1968). Professor Summers conceptualized good
faith conduct negatively by determining that such conduct is not in bad faith. Id. at
195-96. According to Summers, it is preferable that the good faith obligation not
have a specific meaning or meanings. Robert Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CoRNELL L. Rnv. 810, 829-30
(1982). In his view, any such effort to give the good faith obligation a positive mean-
ing would be unwise because it would provide little useful guidance and might unduly
restrict the scope of the doctrine. Id. Summers further explained as follows:
Good faith, then, takes on specific and variant meanings by way of contrast
with the specific and variant forms of bad faith which judges decide to pro-
hibit. From the cases it would be possible to compile a list of forms of bad
faith, with an opposite for each listed as the corresponding specific meaning
of good faith.
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concept of the good faith doctrine, Professor Williams concludes
that parties possess expectations that they will not.be treated in a
manner that offends prevailing community norms.366 Williams fur-
ther argues that notions of what constitutes good faith or bad faith
behavior are fluid in that they reflect "continually evolving com-
munity standards." 367 He concludes that ideas of good or bad faith
behavior are "free to reflect a maturing social conscience that rec-
ognizes racial discrimination to be inherently incompatible with
modem standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness. Con-
sequently, practical reasoning mandates that it is time for racial dis-
crimination to be considered bad-faith behavior contrary to the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. '368
In short, the paradigm of good faith envisioned by Professor Wil-
liams for proscribing racial discrimination in the contracting pro-
cess finds its content in "community standards of decency, fairness,
and reasonableness. 3 69 Under this construct of good faith, parties
have a moral obligation not to discriminate in the contracting pro-
cess.370 Under this model, the good faith doctrine functions as the
legal mechanism for enforcing an implied moral obligation not to
discriminate.371  This moral obligation is derived from society's
condemnation of discriminatory conduct.372
Id.
366. Williams, supra note 325, at 214.
367. Id
368. Id
369. Williams, supra note 325, at 214.
370. Id. at 209.
371. Id As noted, above, Professor Williams argues that a moral obligation not to
discriminate represents an extension of society's recognition that certain moral obli-
gations, such as those found in sections 82, 83, 85 and 86 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, are worthy of enforcement. Id at 209.
372. Id at 216-7. Professor Williams recognizes that some will criticize his morally
based conceptualization as creating too much judicial discretion and lacking of any
ascertainable standard which will circumscribe the implementation of "every 'vague'
moral requirement imaginable in the mind of a judge." I& at 217. For instance, he
notes that Professor Richard Epstein's argument that deploying common law contract
principles to prohibit racial discrimination is inappropriate since the state should re-
strain from efforts aimed at imposing standards of morality on its citizens. Id. at 216.
He also notes the concern of Professor Burton that a morally based conceptualization
of good faith is not sufficiently limited. Id at 217.
Professor Williams responds to these criticisms as follows:
[Mioral good faith and legal good faith need not necessarily be the same in
every instance. If a reasoned process of judicial inclusion and exclusion is
employed, racial discrimination can be recognized as being inimical to mod-
em standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness without incorporating
wholesale the "Sermon on the Mount."
688
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Professor Williams' analysis provides a useful foundation for
constructing the good faith doctrine as a contractually-based an-
tidiscrimination norm. Indeed, the morally-based paradigm of
good faith envisioned by Professor Williams would seem to provide
a useful mechanism for prohibiting overt forms of discrimination
that defeat reasonable contractual expectations. This conclusion is
explained by the understanding that overt discrimination is
deemed by society to constitute morally culpable behavior. 3
It is unlikely, however, that a morally-based paradigm of good
faith will proscribe unconscious and subtle forms of racism, which
nevertheless manifest to subvert a party's contractual expectations.
As noted above, the morally based model of good faith presup-
poses that racial discrimination constitutes morally culpable and
offensive behavior. Therefore, overt acts of racial discrimination
would fall within its prohibitive parameters. Yet it remains unclear
whether unconscious racism is viewed by society as representative
of the sort of morally culpable behavior that offends community
standards of fairness and decency.374 This lack of consensus on the
moral culpability of unconscious racism casts doubt on the utility of
redress by a morally-based concept of good faith. In short, a mor-
ally-based paradigm of good faith may be ineffective in preventing
subtle, yet harmful, forms of racial discrimination. Consequently,
the viability of this paradigm of good faith to redress the harm to
student-athlete's academic interests resulting from unconscious ra-
cism may be limited.
An alternative formulation, not premised principally on commu-
nity standards of decency to give content to the good faith doctrine,
provides the foundation for a contractual antidiscrimination norm
adequate to prohibit unconscious racism. The linchpins of this for-
mulation are: proscribing conduct that undermines the reasonable
expectations of the parties to a contract, and requiring, where nec-
essary, parties to engage in cooperative conduct to promote those
Id. The precise contours of Professor Williams' "reasoned process of judicial inclu-
sion and exclusion" are unclear. He intimates, however, that the process should focus
on whether a party to a contract exercises his or her private autonomy in ways which
serve no legitimate business purpose and result in harm to others. Id. at 216-17.
373. See supra note 127.
374. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. It might be argued, however, that
unconscious racism has been sufficiently identified so as to place society on notice of
the adverse consequences flowing therefrom. Thus, at some point, moral culpability
can be inferred from the effects of such conduct. This in turn raises the issue of a
subjective versus an objective test for determining discriminatory intent. See Marti-
nez, supra note 30, at 602-603 (discussing objective and subjective standards for show-
ing discriminatory intent).
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expectations. As discussed below,* this concept of the good faith
doctrine would include another essential feature: emphasis on the
impact of a party's exercise of discretion, regardless of his motiva-
tion or intent, on the other party's reasonable expectations.375
When the express terms of the contract are either unclear or
omitted, a party may possess the power to determine or control the
actualization of their performance obligation.376 Thus, discretion
in performance refers to "one party's power after contract forma-
tion to set or control the terms of performance. 377 Accordingly,
good faith performance occurs when a party's exercise of discretion
is in pursuit of any purpose consistent with the opportunities the
parties reasonably contemplated at the time they entered into the
contract.378 Conversely, bad faith performance occurs when a
party uses discretion in a manner inconsistent with the essence of
the contractual relationship.379
Several courts have adopted this concept of good faith.3 0 For
example, in Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp.,381 the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court addressed whether the defendant's conduct,
375. Varying conceptualizations of the good faith doctrine have been articulated.
The formulation, in which the doctrine functions to limit the exercise of discretion in
contractual performance, represents one such effort. The various attempts to give
meaning to the good faith doctrine are discussed in the following: A. Brooke Overby,
Bondage, Domination, and the Art of the Deak An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in
Lender Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 963, 978-992 (1993)
(discussing current theoretical conceptualizations aimed at giving content to the duty
of good faith); Maureen Armour, A Nursing Home's Good Faith Duty "to" Care:
Redefining a Fragile Relationship Using the Law of Contract, 34 ST. Louis U. LJ. 217
(1995) (also discussing the efforts of scholars to define the good faith doctrine); Davis,
supra note 266. See also Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v. Frey, 941
F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991) (identifying various conceptualizations of the good faith doc-
trine); Centronics Corp. v. Genicom, 562 A.2d 187, 191 (1989) (noting the difficulties
which have confronted commentators attempting to define the good faith principle);
Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 579 A.2d 1252 (NJ. 1990) (discussing differing defini-
tions of the implied duty of good faith); supra note 397 and accompanying text.
376. Steven Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of Contract: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Summers, 69 IowA L. Rnv. 497, 501 (1984).
377. Id. Professor Burton has observed that discretion in performance arises for
varying reasons. "A party has 'discretion' when it 'has a legal power in effect to spec-
ify a term of the contract during the performance stage of the contract,' ... 'such as
when the contract expressly allows one party to dictate a term,' ... or as a result of 'a
lack of clarity and completeness in the express terms, which may become apparent
only as events unfold after formation."' Overby, supra note 375, at 981 n.99.
378. Burton, supra note 376, at 500.
379. Id.
380. Se4 e.g., Greer Properties, Inc. v. LaSalle National Bank, 874 F.2d 457, 460
(7th Cir. 1989) (good faith requires the party with discretion in performance to exer-
cise it reasonably).
381. 562 A.2d 187 (N.H. 1989).
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in refusing to release a portion of escrow funds, constituted a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. In finding no breach
of the duty, the court attempted to import substantive content into
the duty of good faith.8
The court characterized the implied duty of good faith as a series
of doctrines that serve different functions.8 3 According to the
court, the good faith doctrine has been relied on in three categories
of cases: "those dealing with standards of conduct in contract for-
mation, with termination of at-will employment contracts, and with
limits on discretion in contractual performance...,s With re-
spect to the third category, the court concluded that previous case
law demonstrated the propriety of good faith serving such a func-
tion. The court concluded:
[U]nder an agreement that appears by word or silence to invest
one party with a degree of discretion in performance sufficient
to deprive another party of a substantial proportion of the
agreement's value, the parties' intent to be bound by an enforce-
able contract raises an implied obligation of good faith to ob-
serve reasonable limits in exercising that discretion, consistent
with the parties' purpose or purposes in contracting.385
The Centronics court noted that the limitations imposed by the
good faith doctrine on discretion in contractual performance are
rooted in protecting reasonable expectations. 8 6 As expressed by
another court, "a party vested with contractual discretion must ex-
ercise that discretion reasonably and with proper motive, and may
not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with
reasonable expectations of the parties.' '387 Therefore, the idea of
382. Id at 187.
383. Id at 190.
384. Id The court defined good faith in contract formation as "tantamount to the
traditional duties of care to-refrain from misrepresentation and to correct subse-
quently discovered error, insofar as any representation is intended to induce, and is
material to, another party's decision to enter into a contract in justifiable reliance
upon it." Id The court stated that good faith in the employment at-will context oper-
ates to limit the power of an employer to terminate an at-will employee. Id at 191.
385. Id at 193.
386. See DENms PAi-rERSON, GooD FArrH AND LNmDER LtADULrry ix (1990) (not-
ing that protection of reasonable expectation is the essence of the good faith
doctrine).
387. Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (S.D. Fla. 1992); accord,
USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing, Inc., 988 F.2d 433,438 (3rd Cir. 1993) (implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing requires exercise of reasonable discretion); Continental
Mobile TWi. Co., Inc. v. Chicago SMSA Ltd. Partnership, 587 N.E.2d 1169, 1174
(lll.App.Ct. 1992) (good faith between parties "requires that a party vested with con-
tractual discretion must exercise that discretion reasonably.... ")
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protecting reasonable expectations lies at the heart of attempts to
define the duty of good faith:388
Almost all [commentators] view the concept as a mechanism to
prevent one party from engaging in conduct which undermines
the spirit of the bargain .... In sum, the good faith doctrine
insulates the parties' bargain from attempts by one party or the
other to evade or undermine it. It imposes upon the parties an
obligation to cooperate in achieving the benefits that they ex-
pected to flow from their bargain.3 89
The ultimate impact of the good faith doctrine was recently said
to "require parties to a contract to do and perform those things
that according to reason and justice they should do in order to
carry out the purpose on which the contract was made and to re-
frain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the other
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." 390 Thus, the
good faith doctrine has dual elements. It not only proscribes un-
reasonable exercises of discretion, but also requires affirmative
conduct in order to avoid depriving the other party of the benefits
of the agreement.3 91 As stated by a California court, the duty of
good faith requires that "neither party will do anything which in-
jures the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agree-
ment" and imposes upon parties "an obligation to do everything
that the contract presupposes they will do to accomplish its
purpose. ' '392
As suggested above, the question of whether the duty has been
breached is intimately tied to determining the essence of the ex-
change. Consequently, the process whereby reasonable expecta-
tions are defined is critical inasmuch as a party's exercise of
388. Armour, supra note 375 at 330-31.
389. Davis, supra note 266, at 775-76.
390. USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing, Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 439 (3rd Cir. 1993). This
concept of using the doctrine to promote the essence of the transaction was articu-
lated by then Circuit Judge Scalia as follows:
[T]he authorities that invoke, with increasing frequency, an all-purpose doc-
trine of 'good faith' are usually if not invariably performing the same func-
tion executed (with more elegance and precision) by Judge Cardozo
(citations omitted) ... when he found that an agreement which did not recite
a particular duty was nonetheless 'instinct with [..1 an obligation,' imper-
fectly expressed.'
lymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
391. See Weldon v. Montana Bank, 885 P.2d 511, 515 (Mont. 1994) (bad faith oc-
curs when contractual discretion is used to deprive a party of the benefit of the
contract).
392. Jacobs v. Freeman, 163 Cal.Rptr. 680, 686 (Cal. App. 3d 1980).
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discretion is deemed in good faith or in bad faith according to the
impact on these expectations. 93
Reasonable expectations are determined pursuant to a broad
contextual approach.394 Such an approach involves consideration
of variables ranging from the express terms of the agreement, to
the nature of the particular relationship including trade usage,395
and to the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.396
Thus, under this view of good faith, any exercise of discretion in
contract performance that undermines the other party's reasonable
expectations would constitute bad faith.
Under this formulation, however, a party's intent or motivation
for engaging in such conduct becomes irrelevant. The focus shifts
to the impact of the conduct in determining whether the exercise of
discretion is in bad faith. Does the exercise of discretion result in
conduct that undermines the spirit of the transaction? Does such
conduct defeat the gain that the other party reasonably expected to
derive from the contract? In short, this approach infers discrimina-
tory intent from the consequences of conduct during performance
393. This model of good faith recognizes the significance of the intent of the parties
in determining their reasonable expectations. Yet it extends the boundaries of tradi-
tional contract doctrine to focus on the impact of parties' conduct as it relates to the
furtherance of the objectives of their agreement. The focus on conduct underscores
the proscriptive and affirmative dimensions of the good faith doctrine. On the one
hand, it can be employed as a norm to proscribe conduct which tends to thwart those
objectives. On the other, it functions as a norm which may require that one party
engage in affirmative conduct to assist the other to achieve the objectives of the con-
tract. See USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 439 (3rd Cir. 1993) (describ-
ing the dual functions of the good faith doctrine as prohibiting certain forms of
conduct and requiring conduct to promote the essence of the contractual).
Professor Armour describes the dual function of the doctrine as follows: "A con-
tract agreement has two related dimensions; while there is clearly a commitment to
the mutually agreed upon goals of that relationship expressed as a consensus, there is
also a commitment to the relationship, an understanding of the mutuality of the obli-
gations and the reciprocal nature of the cooperation essential to the successful per-
formance of the contract. Armour, supra note 375 (manuscript at 196).
394. Armour, supra note 375, at 276-77, 318-33.
395. Id. at 318.
396. Professor Dennis Patterson states that expectations derive both from express
contractual terms and the circumstances surrounding contracting. PATrERSON, supra
note 386, at 35. He adds:
The obligation to act in good faith thus complements the concept of Agree-
ment. The reasonable expectations of the parties best protected by a con-
struction of the relationship between good faith and Agreement that
measures the reasonableness of expectations against a pre-existing, yet
changing, commercial context of a meaningful relationship.
I at 34.
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which subverts the benefits within the reasonable contemplation of
the parties.3 97Adopting this impact-based theory of discretion in performance
is not intended to suggest that intent becomes irrelevant to the per-
formance stage of contracting. A party's intent is merely consid-
ered during the process of objectively determining the reasonable
expectations that shape the permissible range of discretion in per-
formance. In this sense, intent, as it relates to performance, be-
comes subsumed within the process of determining the purpose of
the agreement.398
As intent becomes irrelevant in relation to the reasons that un-
derlie an exercise of discretion, good faith or bad faith behavior
would not be dependent on the agreement's incorporation of moral
obligations other than those reflected in the commercial back-
ground and the commercial needs of a particular trade or business
setting.399 As it relates to racial discrimination in the contracting
process, this alternative formulation of good faith would not re-
quire a determination of whether the discriminatory conduct is a
proscribed norm. Rather, it focuses on another norm-whether
the essence of the transaction, as reflected in the parties' respective
reasonable expectations, has been impacted adversely as a conse-
quence of racial discrimination. As a result, the impact of uncon-
scious racism, no longer dependent on finding an improper intent,
397. The proposed conceptualization of good faith departs from that posited by
Professor Burton in that it would preclude courts from considering the reasons why
the discretion exercising party engaged in conduct which undermines reasonable con-
tractual expectations. In contrast, Professor Burton's model of good faith consists of
a two step process in determining breach of the duty:
The identity of foregone opportunities is determined by an objective stan-
dard, focusing on the expectations of reasonable persons in the position of
the dependent parties. Whether a particular discretion-exercising party ac-
ted to recapture foregone opportunities is a question of subjective intent.
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARVARD L. REv. 369, 391 (1980).
398. Such a treatment of intent and a shift to an impact theory of discretion is
supported by a broad contextual approach to determining reasonable expectations.
As discussed above, a broad range of considerations determine reasonable expecta-
tions. Included within these factors is the subjective intent of the parties, as mani-
fested in their words and conduct, at the time they contract.
399. Indeed what is suggested by the notion of moral obligation in this context is
intended to include those things which would comprise trade usage or industry
custom.
The idea of focusing on the consequences of conduct is far from alien to contract
law. Indeed contract liability can be seen as a form of strict liability since a non-
breaching party is compensated for the loss of its bargains irrespective of the breach-
ing party's fault. W. PAGE KEETON ET Al., PRossER AND KEETON ON ToRTs, § 92, at
664 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
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may provide the basis for a breach of contract action. If uncon-
scious racism manifests in such a way that when the party exercis-
ing discretion in effect undermines the purpose of the agreement,
he or she has acted in bad faith. Similarly, if racial discrimination
results in a party refusing to cooperate in order to deprive the
other party from recognizing the gains it reasonably sought from
the contract, such conduct would constitute bad faith.4°
In summary, under an impact-based approach to the duty of
good faith, determinations about whether a party has engaged in
prohibitive conduct, or has failed to engage in necessary affirma-
tive conduct, would not depend on moral assessments of the dis-
criminatory conduct. The focus shifts to the effects of conduct
analyzed in the context of the objectively reasonable expectations
of the parties, as viewed in the "contextual and relational dimen-
sions of a contract."40 1 Such an approach to the good faith doctrine
would encompass both overt and unconscious forms of racial dis-
crimination that manifest to defeat expectations under the con-
tract. Accordingly, unconscious as well as overt forms of racial
discrimination that undermine the spirit of the contractual relation-
ship would constitute bad faith conduct.
4. Applying the Good Faith Antidiscrimination Norm
A good faith performance doctrine premised on limiting discre-
tion in order to promote reasonable expectations holds promise as
a vehicle of redressing the unconscious racism that harms black
student-athletes' academic interests. The propriety of applying the
doctrine in this context stems from the discretion that institutions
possess in determining the contours of their obligations to provide
student-athletes with educational benefits. In addition, the parties'
reasonable expectations justify the requirement that institutions
provide their student-athletes a meaningful opportunity to benefit
educationally.
The express contract between student-athletes and their institu-
tions fails to define clearly the nature and scope of the latter's edu-
cational obligation to student-athletes.4° More precisely, the
400. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasona-
bleness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 666 (1963) (concep-
tualizing good faith as placing an obligation on parties to cooperate so as not to
deprive each other of their reasonable expectation).
401. Armour, supra note 369, at 319.
402. Davis, supra note 266, at 772, 777 (noting the contract documents strongly
support the imposition of an educational component to the relationship, yet the con-
tours of this aspect of the relationship are unclear).
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contract documents do not articulate the nature of institutions'
contractual obligations to assist their student-athletes in achieving
educational goals." 3 The result of this failure is to imbue colleges
and universities with considerable discretion in the performance of
their educational obligation. 4
Under an impact theory of good faith, a broad contextual ap-
proach would be used to determine the reasonable expectations of
the parties with regard to an institution's educational obligation to
its student-athletes. 40 5 This approach would conclude that a funda-
mental expectation that goes to the very heart of the student-ath-
lete/university relationship is the expectation that student-athletes
be afforded an opportunity to obtain a meaningful educational ex-
perience.4° Consequently, anything short of efforts directed to-
ward integrating African-American student-athletes into the
academic and social mainstream of campus life would deny them
the full value of the contract into which they enter with the institu-
tion. "By diminishing the contract's value, the institution does not
merely frustrate, but actually defeats the student-athlete's reason-
able expectations. '40 7 Following such an analysis, consideration
would be given to the impact of racism on this and other reason-
able expectations inherent in the relationship40s To the extent that
overt or subtle forms of racism result in conduct that undermines
these expectations, .institutions would be held accountable pursu-
ant to the good faith performance doctrine.
Under an impact theory, evidence such as the disparity between
the graduation rates of African-American student-athletes and
their white counterparts would suggest a breach of the good faith
performance doctrine.4 9 Such a disparity would demonstrate that
403. Id at 773.
404. Id at 781.
405. See id. at 780-81, 788-90 (discussing the reasonable expectations which arise
from application of such a broad based contextual approach).
406. For discussions of the precise nature of this expectation and the obligations
which would be imposed upon institutions, see Davis, supra note 266; Rafferty, supra
note 323; Sherman, supra note 309; Widener, supra note 323.
407. Davis, supra note 261, at 778.
408. Another reasonable expectation arguably intrinsic to the student-athlete/uni-
versity relationship is that student-athletes have an opportunity to develop their ath-
letic abilities. See Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Prospective Economic Interests:
Contractual Dimensions, 19 T. MARSHAuL L. REv. 585 (1994); Felix J. Springer, Note,
A Student-Athlete's Interest in Eligibility: Its Context and Constitutional Dimensions,
10 CoNN. L. REv. 318 (1978).
409. The grades which African-American student-athletes receive in their courses
could also be examined to determine whether or not they are being afforded a reason-
able opportunity to develop academically. Other evidence of educational neglect
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institutions, as parties to the contract, are exercising their discre-
tion in performance in ways that obstruct the ability of African-
American student-athletes to obtain educational benefits. For ex-
ample, counseling an African-American student-athlete who en-
tered college with low academic predictors to take courses aimed
toward eligibility rather than skill-building would constitute an im-
proper exercise of discretion. Such conduct would be "inconsistent
with the parties' ... purposes in contracting. '410
Disparate graduation rates would also provide evidence that in-
stitutions exercised their discretion improperly by not doing or per-
forming those things necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
contract.4 11 Providing the requisite resources to afford African-
American student-athletes with an ability to develop educationally
may involve constructing academic assistance programs and coun-
seling geared toward the long-term development of the student-
athlete.12 Such programs would attempt to assist these students in
developing skills, such as note-taking, writing, time management
and reading comprehension. 3 The required affirmative conduct
on the part of institutions might also involve hiring black adminis-
trators to assist African-American student-athletes in making ad-
justments necessary to achieve academically.
VI. Conclusion
As noted at the beginning of this Article, the goal has not been
to touch on all of the implications of racism in college sport. The
more modest aim has been to begin a candid dialogue to address
this issue. In this regard, certain key points are worthy of restate-
ment if such a dialogue is to be meaningful.
First, as is true of society in general, untrue stereotypes underlie
the subtle forms of racism prevalent in college sport. Despite its
covert nature, persistent racism in college athletics inflicts real in-
jury on its African-American participants. A particularly vulnera-
ble group are African-American student-athletes. Their academic
could focus on whether student-athletes whose test scores and grade point averages
were below the university minimums for incoming students were provided with diag-
nostic testing to determine skill levels and appropriate levels of tutoring. See Edmund
J. Sherman, Casenote, Good Sports, Bad Sports: The District Court Abandons College
Athletes in Ross v. Creighton University, 11 Loy. ENT. LJ. 657, 680 (1991).
410. Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193.
411. See Jacobs v. Freeman, 163 Cal.Rptr. 680, 686 (Cal.App.3d 1980).
412. Sellers et al., supra note 248, at 35.
413. Sellers, supra note 117, at 167.
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needs suffer as a result of misconceptions propelled by myths con-
cerning their intellectual and athletic abilities.
Secondly, long-term solutions to the harm inflicted upon stu-
dent-athletes and other African-American participants in college
sport will require honest and creative approaches that may tran-
scend traditional doctrinal boundaries. In the short term, this Arti-
cle has identified potential approaches for providing some
modicum of relief for the harm caused by racism. Some of these
theories suggest new ways of utilizing traditional doctrines.
Whatever the mechanism employed, racial justice for African-
American participants in college sport will remain elusive, absent
recognition of the role of racism.
